ELEMENTS

OF THE SCIENCE OF

ETHICS.

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A NEW EDITION, being the THIRD, of

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY,

and their Application to the

Subjects of TASTE, SCIENCE, and HISTORY.

By JOHN BRUCE, A. M.

ELEMENTS

OF THE SCIENCE OF

ETHICS,

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

THE Science of Phyſics has deſcribed the Laws of Nature, while Ethics have furniſhed only ingenious and eloquent ſpeculations. As the ſubjects of both are to be found in Nature, the manner in which they have been cultivated can alone explain their different characters.

Phyſics have proceeded on a natural hiſtory or analyſis of Phenomena. By a ſcientific uſe of experiment and evidence, inductions have been eſtabliſhed, which deſcribe the Laws of material Nature.

Ethics,

Ethics, among the ancients, conſiſted of elegant ſpeculations, with the view of aſcertaining the diſtinctions between good and evil, happineſs and miſery: Ethics, among the moderns, conſiſt of diſſertations, not leſs elegant and ingenious, with the view of aſcertaining the principles from which the diſtinctions between good and evil, happineſs and miſery, proceed. Phyſics therefore preſent Science: Ethics, Speculation and Syſtem. The one affords Laws of Nature which have created or improved the uſeful Arts; the other, doctrines which at beſt but amuſe or gratify men of taſte and erudition.

The different ſituations of the two Sciences ſtruck the Author of the following Sketches, when he explained the Science of Ethics in the Univer-

Univerſity of Edinburgh. The ſubject of Ethics, as well as of Phyſics, is Nature. If the method of cultivating Ethics has, in the hands of the moſt ſubtile and refined Moraliſts, produced only ſpeculation and ſyſtem, he conjectured, that the method of Natural Philoſophy might be applied to that Science with ſucceſs. The experiments in Phyſics take their character from the ſubjects in which they are inſtituted; the demonſtrations, from the exact meaſurements of quantity, of which material Phenomena are ſuſceptible. Experiments, or repeated obſervations, taking their character from the nature of the ſubject, he thought might be inſtituted in Ethics as well as in Phyſics. If in the former Science Phenomena, admit not of the ſame perfect meaſurement of quantity as in the latter,

latter, the demonſtration of the Law of Nature does not require it. The Laws of Phyſics are to be demonſtrated to the ſenſes only: the Laws of Ethics ariſe in the human mind itſelf. The evidence of conſciouſneſs and intuition accompanies every moral deduction, and renders it the ſubject of the moſt obvious and ſimple demonſtration.

The application of the method of Natural Philoſophy to the Science of Ethics (allowing for the different characters of the two ſubjects) ſeemed to promiſe, therefore, if not the reputation of ingenuity, that of patient obſervation of Phenomena.

Though this work has undergone the examination, and met with the approbation of Dr. Smith, the Author of "the Inquiry into the Cauſes

"of

" of the Wealth of Nations, &c." yet the Public, who are to examine it with candour, muſt decide whether Nature be faithfully traced, or whether this ſervice be reſerved for ſome more fortunate enquirer. To their award the Author ſubmits with anxiety and deference.

ERRATA.

Page 8. line 29. *for* c me *read* come.
11. — 8 & 9 *note. for* hytheſes *read* hypotheſes.
63. — 13 & 14. *for* on *read* in.
95. — 13. *for* this *read* the.
170. — 21. *for* obſcures *read* obſcure.
27. *for* ſhuts *read* ſhut.
177. — 11. *for* conſtitutes *read* conſtitute.
189. — 24. *for* of country *read* of his country.
198. — 1. *for* groans *read* wounds.
231. — 6. *for* domeſtic *read* domeſtic and.
234. — 2. *for* appears *read* appear.

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ELEMENTS

OF THE

SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

INTRODUCTION.

Introduct. Nature, the proper ſubject of all Philoſophy.

THE proper ſubject of all philoſophy is Nature; and the ſimple and obvious means of obtaining a knowledge of its laws, are obſervation and experiment. So many, however, are the appearances which the kingdoms of Nature preſent, and ſo unequal are the powers of diſcrimination and judgment in the human mind, that, forgetting the ſubject which firſt raiſed our curioſity and engaged our talents, we often give the name of philoſophy to artificial ſubtilties, or to the elegant phantoms of imagination. If we could diveſt ourſelves of prejudices, and place phenomena of body or of mind before us, as ſimple objects of examination, and continue obſervation till they

Introduct. had diſcloſed their true qualities, then philoſophy would aſſume the unequivocal character, of a faithful hiſtory of Nature.

Different ſituations of its great branches. Some of the ſciences have followed this plain and obvious method, while others of them remain ſubjected to hypotheſes and to ſyſtems.

Of Phyſics. PHYSICS, which explain the laws of the material world, after experiencing the ſubtilties of the Ariſtotelians and ſchoolmen, at laſt threw off their dominion; and while the ſteady phenomena in the mechanical arts directed to the laws of gravitation and motion, accidents, and the happy powers of Galileo, Kepler and Newton, perceived, that the laws of body were uniform and general, and operated over the great ſyſtem of Nature.

Of Ethics. ETHICS, on the other hand, though the ſubject of ſpeculation to the moſt refined and virtuous of the ancient philoſophers; though preſenting in their works leſſons fitted equally for the judgment and for the heart; though revived by the moſt profound and elegant of the moderns; ſtill remain ſubjected to contradictory hypotheſes and ſyſtems. It is even a queſtion, whether the moral philoſopher could ſay with more certainty than the peaſant, what was the great moral law of his nature. Is it not a fair inference from this compara-

tive ſtate of theſe two great departments, to ſay, that if patient attention to phenomena, and repeated obſervation on the characters of theſe phenomena (which is the ſame with ſcientific experiment), have led to all the great diſcoveries in the material world, the ſame means can only extricate the other branch from ſubtilty and uncertainty, or afford a faithful view of moral nature?

Introduct.

Method of ſcience applicable to both ſubjects.

The juſtneſs of this obſervation will be allowed, but new difficulties will preſent themſelves.

It will be ſaid on the one hand, that matter or body is fixed in its qualities, ſteady and uniform in its operations, and admits of experiments which perpetually addreſs themſelves to our ſenſes; ſo that its rules of acting, or the laws of its nature, may with mathematical demonſtration be eſtabliſhed: in one word, that it admits of obſervation and experiments.

Objections from the nature of the ſubject of Ethics;

It will be ſaid on the other hand, that mind is ſubjected to ſuch a variety of accidents, both in its powers of intelligence and of action, that to fix attention on its phenomena, arrange its hiſtory, and deduce its rules of acting, or the laws of its nature, would be equally impracticable as to marſhal the waves of the ocean.

It will farther be ſaid, that the celebrated moraliſts of Greece have explored this ſubject

from hiſtory.

Introduct. with all the talents and refinement of man, and yet could not fix the diſtinctions betwixt good and evil, virtue and vice: that with a more ſcientific eye, the moderns have been examining the principles from which good and evil, happineſs and miſery, proceed, and yet preſent us only with oppoſite and uncertain opinions. It will thence be concluded, that man has already reached the Hercules's pillars in this part of Nature; and that any attempt to go beyond them, is not leſs preſumptuous, than it would be unavailing.

Anſwers to theſe objections. If the ſame method is followed which theſe philoſophers have purſued, if new ſyſtems are ſchemed more manly and refined than thoſe of the Greeks, or new hypotheſes attempted more ſubtile and elegant than thoſe of the moderns, the effects of vanity and of unequal powers will at once be confeſſed and regretted. But if the leſſons of the natural philoſophers are conſidered as applicable to all the parts of nature; if, admitting the marked characters of phyſical and moral phenomena, an attempt is only made to give ſuch a hiſtory of the latter, as may directly lead to the law of this part of nature, then the hope of ſucceſs will ſpring from the ſubject and from the method of explaining it. Even an unequal effort to form ſuch a ſcience may call forth the talents

lents of ſome more able and fortunate enquirer. Introduct.

In this ſituation the ſubject preſents itſelf to our examination, and leads us to ſtate the enquiry, By what means has the knowledge of the Phyſical Sciences been promoted; and are they applicable to the moral part of nature? Origin and progreſs of the arts which led to the Phyſical Sciences.

The origin of the Phyſical Sciences (or thoſe Sciences which are commonly comprehended under the titles of Natural Hiſtory or Natural Philoſophy) may be traced to the rude arts which a primeval people exerciſe. The ſavage who hunts and fiſhes, finds but a ſcanty ſtore for himſelf and his family. Ignorant that other means of ſubſiſtence exiſt, but thoſe to which he has been accuſtomed, with the enjoyment of them his gratifications are completed. From the want of new objects to rouſe and extend his appetites, the energies of his mind remain dormant. If ſuch objects ſhall call them forth, he is as fruitful in expedients, as he is eager in the purſuit of his ends. The ſavages of Germany, America, and New Zealand, are thus deſcribed by Tacitus, Charlevoix, and Cook.—With new objects, new arts appear. The ſhepherd ſucceeds the hunter, the mariner the fiſher. Ignorant of the methods of cultivating the herbage his flocks require, the barbarian wanders

Introduct. in ſearch of their food. The accidental fertility of one country fixes his habitation, the barrenneſs of another forces him to cultivate the ſoil. Every ſeaſon gives new advantages from this new art: by degrees the village is formed; the ſkill and induſtry of the artiſan furniſh him with the means of ſubſiſtence, and leave the landholder and farmer to rear and give in exchange their eſculent vegetables and cattle. The materials of theſe arts at laſt rouſe curioſity and obſervation, and call forth the natural hiſtorian. He examines the great qualities of vegetable and animal productions; he diſcovers the rules followed by Nature in theſe her different kingdoms, and thus creates the ſciences that reciprocally improve the arts which had ſuggeſted them. The neceſſary demands of man, in this inſtance, led to the means of ſubſiſtence. The underſtanding was employed to invent arts, the arts aſcertained the real qualities of phenomena, and thus ſuggeſted Science, or the diſcovery of the rules by which Nature acts.

The mechanical arts will exhibit a ſimilar progreſs. The ſavage wanders in ſearch of the objects which preſerve and defend his life. In catching his fiſh, and hunting his game, he employs ſkill and art. He invents his fiſh-line and his bow: he perceives the effects

effects of deceptions of the eye from the one, and of motion from impulſe from the other, and yet knows not that both are laws of Nature. He learns by degrees to employ the ſimple mechanical powers, and to conſtruct unwieldy inſtruments for the purpoſe of diminiſhing his labour. If he finds that the lever will raiſe a weight too great for his naked arm, he doubles its powers, or combines them in the wedge, the ſcrew, and the wheel. The mill which grinds his corn is thus ſet in motion, and the ſtones and timber with which he builds his habitation, are thus formed and brought into uſe. Every new ſtep ſeems to perfect his art, and yet invention is continually adding to his ſtore, till at laſt the effects which ſeemed to be peculiar are diſcovered to be common, and in the cauſes which produce them, the laws of motion and of gravitation appear. This diſcovery has at firſt but a limited application in the very arts which ſuggeſted it. The obſervations of Galileo had enriched natural philoſophy, before Newton perceived that the laws of motion and gravitation were uniform over all material nature. Neceſſity in this caſe, as in the other, led to new objects; invention formed the rude art; the phenomena in the art were diſcovered to be laws of Nature, and at laſt to be common to one of its great departments.

Introduct. These examples of Arts which are progreſſive, and which have led to the uſeful Sciences, ſhew, that the ſteps to diſcovery are gradual; that Nature in the aſpect of arts firſt ſhews her real characters; the knowledge of which directs to the diſcovery and delineation of laws, equally ſimple in their character, and fruitful in their application.

Origin and progreſs of the arts which have led to the ancient and modern ethical ſpeculations.

If with patient obſervation we view the moral part of nature, we ſhall diſcover, that, like the material, it has its ſtages of rude and refining arts; but we ſhall be obliged to conclude, that its laws of ſcience are, in a great meaſure, yet to be diſcovered.

In rude ages, the ſavage is firſt directed by his inſtincts, and next by his affections; the one leads him to rear, the other to protect his family from danger. If his ſons are ungrateful, they are abhorred and puniſhed; if they are leſs brave, they are contemned and diſgraced. If they ſeize the arms or the food of a companion, they are conſidered as diſhoneſt and unjuſt. Though ſuch actions are meritorious againſt an enemy, they are inconſiſtent with the ſafety of a tribe. Theſe obvious deciſions o me to form the opinions of a people; and the application of them to the events which occur among barbarians, calls forth the rude arbiter

arbiter or judge. Though he decides from the uſages which accidents and time have confirmed, his decrees form a rude art of juriſdiction. The habit of viewing ſuch deciſions with reſpect, makes them not only the rudiments of education to the youth, but the common conſtituents of character. They are put into rhyme, and become the proverbial language of a people. In many inſtances the progreſs is here checked by ſuperſtition, and by the low ſtate of the uſeful arts; in other inſtances it goes on, and produces the gradual refinements of government, law, and the moral virtues. All the proverbs or moral precepts which deſcribed the duties we owe ourſelves, the Greeks claſſed under the titles of prudence, temperance, and fortitude; thoſe again which deſcribed the duties we owe to other men, were included under the title of juſtice. When the artificial character of their philoſophy was more ripened, they ſtated the queſtion, What are the diſtinctions betwixt good and evil, happineſs and miſery? but never thought of the moral qualities, or phenomena, on which their rude juriſdictions, their precepts, or arrangements into cardinal virtues, had proceeded. Speculation thus ſtopped the progreſs of arts to ſcience, and amuſed the mind with the elegant ſubtilties and refinements of the ſects.

Introduct. When the ſects of antiquity began to hold out their leſſons to the moderns, ſpeculation, from the new and more liberal ſpirit of enquiry, became only more refining and profound. The ancient diſtinctions betwixt good and evil, virtue and vice, were admitted; but the queſtion was ſtated, From what principle in our nature is it, that we approve of the one, and diſapprove of the other? The ſolutions have been as contradictory, as they have been numerous. At one time the approbation is ſaid to ariſe from the diſcovery, that virtue is agreeable to the will of the Deity; at another, from the fitneſs or order of things; at a third, from a particular ſenſe or feeling; at a fourth, from the deciſion of a well-directed judgment. Theſe very principles were, by ſtill more refining and elegant powers of reaſoning, firſt reſolved into that of utility, and next into that of propriety.

The natural philoſophers, when they diſcovered that gravitation was a principle in the material ſyſtem, employed themſelves in examining the extent of its operations. The queſtion of Newton was, How gravity acted? not Why it acted? The moral philoſophers have not copied Newton's method of ſcience; for, inſtead of obſerving the qualities of the actions of man, which (like gravitation in body) could explain

plain them, they have waſted the fineſt talents in ſpeculating about the principles from which theſe actions are ſuppoſed to proceed. The moral part of Nature is thus in an advanced ſtate of its progreſs as an art. It has paſſed through the ſucceſſive forms of rude juriſdictions, proverbs, and precepts, artificial arrangements into cardinal virtues, ſpeculations on the diſtinctions betwixt good and evil, happineſs and miſery, principles accounting for the foundation of theſe diſtinctions, and refinements on the ſpirit of theſe very principles; while obſervation of the moral phenomena which appear in theſe arts and hypotheſes, has been overlooked as unneceſſary or impracticable. Introduct.

Sources of the improved ſtate of the Phyſical Sciences.

The oppoſite aſpects of phyſical and moral ſcience lead us to aſk, Why the one is daily receiving improvements, while the other is ſtationary, or in the ſtate of ſpeculation? The different characters of the ſubjects, and the different methods in which they have been inveſtigated, will ſolve this apparent difficulty.

Of the hypotheſes which ſtill prevail in Ethics.

In the Phyſical Sciences, phenomena are ſubmitted to the examination of the ſenſes ſimply, or aſſiſted by art: the great qualities of body, ſolidity, gravity, motion from impulſe, or the more latent properties of animal, vegetable, and foſſile productions, are aſcertained. Theſe different qualities ſhew the kind of experiment inſtituted

Firſt Source. The different nature of the ſubjects.

to

Introduct. to determine their characters. Some of them admit of the preciſe meaſurement of quantity; and all of them, by effects, indicate producing cauſes. The reaſoning on the laws is limited by the extent of the obſervation and experiments. Scientific demonſtration and certainty thus ariſe from the character of the ſubject.

In moral ſcience, phenomena alternately addreſs our feelings, our prejudices, and our judgment. Though fixed in their qualities, they are difficult to obſerve and aſcertain. Probity, juſtice, and benevolence are more obtruſive than gravitation and motion, but they are eaſily obſcured by prejudices and ſophiſtry; becauſe obſervation on the moral aſpects of man has not, as in phyſics, been limited by the nature of the ſubject, it has been concluded that they were ſubjects in which repeated obſervations or experiments could not be inſtituted. Had the natural hiſtorians thought, that animated or vegetable productions admitted not of experiment, becauſe their ſubjects were different from mechanical philoſophy, neither Harvey nor Linnæus would have been admired. When obſervation of moral phenomena ſhall begin, advance, and yet be bounded by the qualities of theſe phenomena; when ſuch obſervation ſhall proceed by ſimple intuitions, till the characters

of

of the diſpoſitions and actions of man are aſcertained; then Ethics, though treating of a different part of nature from Phyſics, will, like it, have its ſpecific demonſtration and certainty. The character of the different ſubjects of Phyſics and Ethics thus explains why they are in different ſtages of diſcovery. In the one, the experiments on which obſervation proceeds, are conſtantly keeping the eye fixed on Nature, by the appeal which can be made to ſenſible objects: in the other, experiments are conſidered as inadmiſſible, becauſe they do not take the preciſe character of thoſe in Phyſics; demonſtration has therefore, in this branch, been abandoned, and refined hypotheſes ſubſtituted for the ſimplicity of ſcience. Introduct.

The different methods too in which inveſtigations in Phyſics and Ethics have been conducted, account for the latter ſcience being ſtill imperfect and ſtationary. The methods in which Phyſics and Ethics have been ſtudied, may be divided into the *natural* and the *artificial*. Second Source. The different methods in which they have been cultivated.

The method of Nature begins with attention to phenomena as they riſe to the ſenſes, fixes this attention by experiments, which equally take their character from the nature of the ſubject, and aſcertain its qualities. It moves on in the ſame line to the claſſes into which Nature has divided this

part

Introduct. part of her works, and then decides on the general facts, or laws, as they appear in the uſeful arts, or in the order of the univerſe. If, on the other hand, a law of Nature is offered to examination, returning through all the claſſes in which the qualities are ſuppoſed to direct, it brings back attention to the ſimple phenomena which obtrude themſelves on the organs of ſenſe.

The method of art, on the other hand, begins with ſome principle which has been dictated by authority, or aſſumed from conjecture. In the firſt caſe, Nature is to be meaſured, not by herſelf, but by the leſſons of a philoſopher. What Ariſtotle or what Plato ſaid, was philoſophy, not what we can read from the phenomena and operations of Nature. In the ſecond caſe, an hypotheſis is appealed to, ingenuity is employed to reconcile Nature to this phantom, and a ſyſtem is eſtabliſhed. Des Cartes's vortices were thus as fanciful as the romances of Voltaire.

Theſe methods are ſo unequal in their intrinſic value, and in the conſequences which reſult from the application of them, that we ſhould be apt to conclude the manly character of the one, and its utility, in making, or in underſtanding diſcoveries, would have ſecured it the general ſuffrages of philoſophers, while the extravagant

travagant pretenſions and "airy nothings" of the other, would ſoon have baniſhed it from the ſchools of ſcience. Theſe expectations would be as much a proof of a limited knowledge of human nature in thoſe who entertained them, as the adoption of the artificial method has been of inadequate views in thoſe who have been its dupes. Introduct.

The hiſtory of Phyſics will ſhew, that while the artificial method prevailed, diſcoveries were partial and imperfect: the hiſtory of Ethics will ſhew, that diſcoveries have neither been numerous nor decided.

The natural philoſophers had made but a few partial obſervations when they reduced them to ſyſtems. The obſervations aſcribed to the Orientals on the periods of the ſtars, and their conjectures reſpecting the theory of the earth, were methodiſed by the Greek philoſophers into a ſyſtem. They did not appeal to Nature as the meaſure by which to try the truth of a doctrine, but argued that, as the doctrine was perfect, Nature could be reconciled to its award. It was not time, but accidents, which corrected this error. One philoſopher contradicted the eſtabliſhed noſtrum reſpecting the falling and percuſſion of bodies, by the ſimple experiment of dropping bodies of different denſities from the dome of a cathedral; another philoſopher contradicted the noſtrum reſpecting the action of fluids, by ſhewing the different heights

Introduct. heights to which mercury roſe in a tube at the baſe and at the ſummit of a mountain; a third ſhewed, that the ſame laws which direct in the minute experiments of man, regulate the great ſyſtem of Nature. The method of Art was thus exploded, and that of Nature introduced into this department. The moral philoſophers had ſcarcely obſerved the virtues which we owe to ourſelves and to mankind, when they offered hypotheſes to account for the foundations of virtue, and for the diſtinction betwixt good and evil. Theſe hypotheſes were revived after the reſtoration of learning. When their authority began to diſappear, new and more refined principles, not an appeal to the phenomena and arrangements of Nature, ſucceeded. The Queriſts were as diſtant from Nature as the Sceptics. The hypotheſes which have ſucceeded are ſo like life, that they have been thought to be life. The authors as well as the diſciples of theſe oppoſite opinions have formed parties. Novelty and eloquence have given to each hypotheſis its faſhion. The proportion or fitneſs of things in the moral world was admired, till the moral ſenſe was pointed out; and when this was itſelf conſidered as too precarious a guide, it was reſolved into different principles. The method of Art has thus continued in Ethics;—authorities have been ſucceeded by ſpeculations.

The

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The following obſervations are to attempt the application of the method of Science to the moral department of Nature. The object is not the aſpiring one of a Theory, but the humble one of a Natural Hiſtory.

Plan of eſtabliſhing a Science of Ethics on the principles of Natural Philoſophy.

I. A ſketch of the Hiſtory of Ethics, will ſhew the utility of an attempt to introduce into the ſubject the certainty of Science.

II. A ſketch of the Principles of Natural Philoſophy, will ſhew the means to be employed in forming a ſcience of Ethics.

III. A ſketch of the Science of Ethics, will ſhew how far theſe principles are calculated to give certainty to its laws.

PART I.

HISTORY OF ETHICS.

CHAP. I.

Hiſtory of Ancient Ethics.

SECT. I.

Of Ancient Ethics as an Art.

PART I.

Arts. Their characters.

AN Art is the application of rules to the uſeful purpoſes of life: theſe rules are either laws of Nature, or practical inferences from them. When they are laws of Nature, the relation of the Arts to the Sciences is underſtood; when they are practical inferences from the laws of Nature, this relation may be known to the philoſopher, but imitation and habit direct in the ſubdiviſions of labour.

If we were to explain the natural progreſs of the mind in the attainment of knowledge, we muſt follow obſervation, collecting and forming the hiſtory of phenomena, inferring by ſcience the laws of Nature, and uſing theſe laws as rules of Art. If we are to follow the progreſs of mankind, this order

order muſt be reverſed, for we ſhall find that the Arts have preceded the Sciences, and the Sciences carried forward the mind to the full hiſtory of Nature.

Their origin.

It would be a vain attempt to ſeek the origin of the Arts amid the almoſt defaced veſtiges of Antiquity. Arts, like the wants of mankind, are coeval with them, and precede any monuments or memorials which could preſerve their firſt aſpect. The origin of the Arts will be found in the character of the human mind, in conjunction with the progreſſive ſituations of man from rudeneſs to refinement. The human mind is poſſeſſed of talents and diſpoſitions, the one fits it to ſelect the means which are ſuited to its ends; the other, to employ them in a manner that is conſiſtent with common ſafety. The ſituations of mankind are progreſſive; from the ſavage, to the barbarous; and from this, to the poliſhed aſpects of civil ſociety.

Propenſities in the human mind which lead to the invention of Arts.

The love of life, the love of pleaſure, and the love of novelty, are uniform propenſities in the human mind, which impel it to the invention and improvement of the Arts, in all the poſſible ſituations of man.

1. Propenſity to ſelf-preſervation

1. The love of life, or of ſelf-preſervation, is a propenſity common to all animated natures. In the lower animals, it is the

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leads to the invention of the neceſſary, uſeful and mechanical Arts.

inſtinct which directs them to the fixed claſſes of their objects: in man, it calls forth the powers of his underſtanding, to obſerve, examine, and ſelect the means which are neceſſary for his ſubſiſtence and defence. While the ſavage ſeems to ſeek only the gratification of his appetite for food, or a defence from the ferocious animals, or other ſavages like himſelf; he invents his club, his ſling, and his bow. If he ſees a ſuperiority in the ſimilar inventions of another, he imitates or copies them, and thus ſhews both capacity and the firſt dawnings of improvement. As his deſires, however, are bounded by his wants, and as theſe ſeldom exceed the demands of nature, his inventions and his imitations are for a long time few and ſtationary, and come under the limited deſcription of the *neceſſary Arts*.

The original propenſity to the love of life, or to ſelf-preſervation, leads forward to new objects. Accidents may ſhew, that many of the herbivorous animals can be tamed and formed into flocks: the means of ſubſiſtence are thus increaſed, and a new ſpecies of property created. The ſavage changes to the barbarous or patriarchal ſtate. If ſtrength and uncontrolled paſſions had made the ſavage the ſuperior of his family, experience and this new ſpecies of property confirm his powers. The accident of

of his death has no effect but to transfer this power to the moſt diſtinguiſhed of his deſcendants. Habits, means of ſubſiſtence, and mutual defence, continue the eſtabliſhed arrangement. Families multiply, but conſanguinity continues the union of the tribe. If the conveniences of life are unknown, its neceſſaries are encreaſing. If the hoard is attacked, the rude army marſhals itſelf under a chief, diſtinguiſhed by birth, ſtrength, courage, and ſkill in battle. If he acquires fame and victory, his ſtation becomes permanent and his property enlarged—uſages founded in opinion confirm both of them. He exhauſts all his wealth on the neceſſaries of life; its luxuries are unknown: his ſons, his ſervants, his retainers, his captives increaſe his power. He directs their ingenuity and induſtry to different objects and different ends: inventions by theſe means become more numerous, and to the former deſcription of the *neceſſary*, may now be added that of the *uſeful Arts*.

The original propenſity to ſelf-preſervation continually leads to new objects. If the flock has become numerous, the difficulty of paſturing them increaſes; particular ſpots are cultivated, leſt the common ſtore of Nature ſhould fail. Slight as this ſpecies of agriculture is, it fixes the place of reſidence.

PART I. As the circumjacent fields become common property, a chief finds his dependants ready, becauſe intereſted in its defence. He thus becomes a kind of ſovereign. If the eſculent vegetables, which form the firſt article of tillage, are few, perpetual exertions of ſkill and induſtry are required to improve them in kind, and to increaſe them in quantity: hence a ſucceſſion of arts is invented, to prepare the ſoil for ſowing, to enſure its fertility, to reap its fruits, to preſerve them, and make them into bread. Theſe arts are leſs perfect in the warmer, than in the colder climates: in the former, the ſoil demands but a ſlight culture; every invention is ſought after in the latter, which can diminiſh labour, and enſure a produce. Land at firſt is the common property of the tribe or village; by inſenſible degrees property becomes particular and hereditary. During this progreſs, the village becomes a fortified town, and the reſidence of a ſovereign. Ranks and offices begin to be underſtood and defined. With this progreſs of civilization the Arts are ſubdividing. The profeſſions of the ſoldier, the farmer, and the artiſan, commence. The names and intereſts of nations appear. The intereſts of nations depend on ſituation and on accidents. Inland or maritime ſituations make agriculture, or arts and commerce, the reſources of a people.

Accidents

Accidents make them conquerors, or place them in a ſtate of ſubjection. The Arts depend not on the fate of war, for the Greeks cultivated them when conquerors, and, though the Romans vanquiſhed the Greeks, they imitated and copied their refinements. The Arts, during this progreſs of civilization, to the deſcription of *neceſſary* and *uſeful*, now add that of *mechanical*.

2. The love of pleaſure is a ſecond propenſity in the human mind, which directs it to the invention of Arts.

2. The propenſity to pleaſure leads to the invention of the Fine Arts.

Pleaſures are diſtinguiſhable into thoſe which chiefly belong to the body, and thoſe which chiefly belong to the mind. The former kind are common to man and to the lower animals, and ariſe from their ſenſations and appetites: the latter kind ſeem peculiar to man, and ariſe from his finer ſenſes, from his paſſions, and from his imagination. Though the animal, may ſometimes appear to be connected with the mental pleaſures, all the Arts which refine the latter ſhew, that the former muſt ſeem to be concealed and forgotten. A ſlight view of the phenomena in Nature will ſhew the ſources of ſuch refined pleaſures; an equally ſlight view of the hiſtory of mankind will diſcover the Arts which they have invented to render the effects of theſe pleaſures permanent and intenſe.

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The finer ſenſes furniſh a firſt claſs of objects for the propenſity to pleaſure.—The eye has organic pleaſures, which ariſe partly from its ſtructure, partly from its medium; the one has its ſphere and its ſenſibility, the other has its laws of refraction and reflection. The kinds of qualities which give pleaſure to the eye, are alſo fixed and uniform, viz. the figure, colour, motion, proportions, animation, and expreſſion, which excite the pleaſures of ſight in ſtill, in animated, in ſentient, and in intelligent Nature.

The ear has its organic pleaſures, which in a ſimilar manner depend on its ſtructure, media, and the conditions which accompany the mechanical production and propagation of ſounds. Though the muſical ear is connected with the ſenſe of hearing, it ſeems to be a diſtinct ſenſe, and not explicable by any phenomena hitherto detected by ſcience. Its pleaſures, however, are uniformly coincident with the mechanical principles of ſound.

The paſſions furniſh a ſecond claſs of objects for the propenſity to pleaſure.—The emotion which precedes a paſſion is a ſimple mental feeling: the paſſion is this feeling accompanied with deſire or averſion. The tranſition from emotion to paſſion is ſo immediate, and ſo common, that language deſcribes

deſcribes them by the ſame names. The tones of the voice which indicate the paſſions correſpond with the ſcale of ſounds, from deep or grave, to ſharp or acute. Grief has deep, Joy its ſprightly notes: as they are the natural language of feelings, they are univerſally felt and underſtood. Accident, ſituation, and imitation, may vary artificial language; but the tones of the paſſions are uniform, and mingle their influence with all the virtues and vices which mark diſpoſition and character.

The imagination furniſhes a third claſs of objects for the propenſity to pleaſure.—Imagination is the faculty of combining the perceptions which the finer ſenſes, the paſſions, memory, and abſtraction, have furniſhed. Its beings and ſcenes reſemble life, and yet riſe above it; for this faculty can remove all the ſhades, and bring forward only the ſtriking features or objects in the piece. It is by this power that it makes either repreſentation or deſcription outrun reality. In Nature, virtues and vices, beauties and defects, ſeem blended: in Imagination, evils and defects are forgotten, and virtues and beauties ſo faſcinate the heart, that we forget it is illuſion. At one time Imagination takes the character of Genius, and ſelects the objects of the finer ſenſes, the paſſions, and its own beings, and either in exhibition

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or deſcription preſents them in ſtriking aſſemblages to the ſpectator or the audience. At another time Imagination takes the character of Taſte, and feels from the exhibitions or deſcriptions of another.

The inventions which gratify the propenſity to pleaſure from the finer ſenſes, from the paſſions, and from the imagination, admit of the deſcription of *the Fine Arts*.

One artiſt ſelecting the ſounds which addreſs the muſical ear, unites them with the natural tones of the paſſions, and creates the ſimple melody, which ſeems the language of the heart. Another artiſt, in deſcription gives ſuch vivid perceptions of the objects of the eye, of the paſſions, and imagination, that they ſeem in fantaſtic order to paſs before us. Sometimes theſe artiſts unite their powers, and poetry and muſic ſeem to make but one art. They thus ſing the deeds of heroes, to gratify national pride; they ſing the praiſes of the dead, to calm the melancholy of the living; and they bring life, in all its great, intereſting, or abſurd aſpects, on the ſtage, to be loved, admired, or ridiculed. Other artiſts limit themſelves to the objects of the eye, and make them alone addreſs paſſion and imagination. In the ſtatue, the artiſt copies the modification of features and the attitudes of the body, which in actual life form

form the natural language, or ſigns of feeling and of diſpoſition. In painting, the artiſt, by ſhade and colour, takes advantage of the deceptions of the eye, and copies the ſame ſigns of feeling and diſpoſition ſo exactly, that in admiring the picture we almoſt believe it is reality. In architecture, at one time, ſymmetry unites with ſtrength; at another, the bold irregularities of Nature are copied, and the objects of the eye become the ſource of beauty and of magnificence. Theſe Arts are ſo many inventions, to which the propenſity to pleaſure has directed, in the progreſs of civilization.

3. The love of novelty is a third propenſity in the human mind which leads to the invention and perfection of the Arts.

3. The propenſity to novelty leads to the invention of the Liberal Arts.

Though the propenſities to ſelf-preſervation and to pleaſure have different characters, objects, and terminations in man, and in the lower animals, yet in ſome degree they ſeem to be common; but the propenſity to novelty ſeems to be peculiar to man. The individuals of any ſpecies among the lower animals ſeem to have inſtincts nearly equal; for a bird builds its firſt neſt with equal ſkill and perfection that it does its ſecond or its laſt. The individuals of the human ſpecies are not only different in original ſuſceptibility of improvement, but in the

PART I. the actual perfection to which cultivation can bring their faculties. The propenſity to novelty impels to the uſe of this double advantage. It ſeems to lead on to the perpetual exertions, of which the underſtanding is capable. In rude or poliſhing ſituations its influence is leſs powerful, than when ſociety has reached degrees of refinement. Though the Barbarian ſeeks novelty in the Arts which miniſter to his pleaſures, he has no curioſity to examine the phenomena by which theſe very pleaſures are gratified. In rude ages, this propenſity goes not beyond the immediate objects of utility or pleaſure. In poliſhed ages, it examines the foundations of the Arts which miniſter to either. The poets gratified the propenſities to pleaſure and to novelty, before the critics aroſe and aſked, By what qualities is Poetry fitted to give the refined pleaſures of Taſte? The mechanical artiſts had invented the inſtruments of agriculture and war, before the philoſophers began to obſerve or examine the phenomena on which theſe Arts depended, or to demonſtrate them to be phyſical qualities, and laws of material Nature. The Arts therefore to which the propenſity to novelty ſeems to lead, take their character from their relation to the laws of Nature being perceived, and therefore admit of the deſcription of

Liberal

Liberal Arts. The mechanical Arts did not receive their perfection, till their relations to the laws of motion and gravitation were perceived; the Arts ſubſervient to manufacture have only been perfecting, ſince their relations to the different branches of Natural Hiſtory have been obſerved and purſued.

Effects of theſe propenſities in producing the ſucceſſive aſpects of Ethics as an Art.

The propenſities which ſeem from this plain hiſtory of phenomena to make a part of the human mind, and to direct it to the invention of the uſeful, the fine, and the liberal Arts, muſt have ſimilar effects on the actual conduct of life, and produce the Ethical Arts.

The ſituations and the actions of mankind will ſhew that their propenſities operate not leſs powerfully in the moral, than they do in the phyſical world. The ſituations of man are progreſſive, from the family to the tribe, and from the tribe to the nation. In the rude ſtate of ſingle families, men may ſeem to act from inſtinct and from habits, but as they have life to preſerve, and means of ſubſiſtence to procure and diſtribute, neceſſity obliges them to invent rules of conduct. In the poliſhing ſtate of tribes, though a chief has dependants and retainers, and may ſeem to act from opinions and uſages, theſe very uſages diſcover rules for preſerving the rights to life, and to the means of ſubſiſtence. In the

PART I. the poliſhed ſtate of nations, though ſovereignties may ſeem to reſt on arbitrary inſtitutions and partial laws, they have not only all the rights which appeared in their more original ſituations, but the new and indeed endleſs variety of them, which the introduction of arts, commerce, and public tranſactions have created. The Arts to which our propenſities lead for regulating conduct, as they ſpring from the ſame ſource, admit of the ſame deſcription, of neceſſary, uſeful, and liberal.

The actions which characteriſe mankind in theſe progreſſive ſituations, unite their power in requiring this ſucceſſion of Arts. If the ſavage ſeems to act for himſelf, and to be regardleſs of the claims of other men, other ſavages repel his attacks, and puniſh them with ſeverity, or with death. If the barbarous chief makes war for booty, and ſeems proud of the valour by which he deſtroys, or renders his enemies wretched, his very conteſts ſhew that his actions have their reſtraints, and the power of his enemy convinces him of their equal rights to life, and to the fruits of their induſtry. If poliſhed nations offer as the juſt cauſe of a war, the infringements made on their rights, and retain conqueſts under the ſpecious pretext of repairing their injuries, they prove that juſtice is the public, though perhaps

not the true rule of their conduct. The ſituation and the actions of mankind thus lay the foundations of the Arts which direct civil ſociety.

I. *The firſt aſpect of Ethics as an Art, appears in the rude forms of ſubordination and juriſdiction.*

1. Aſpect of Ethics as an Art in the rude forms of ſubordination and juriſdiction.

Events in the hiſtory of mankind will explain the manner in which their propenſities direct them to theſe inventions. Like the other neceſſary Arts, theſe ſeem to be dictated by the wants and ſufferings incident to a rude ſituation.

The relation of parents and children muſt always have exiſted; inſtinct would begin their mutual affection, habit would confirm it, intereſt would cement it. The little community which began with the family, from conſanguinity and from the ſenſe of mutual ſafety, would continue with the tribe; war and victory would lay the foundations of the power of a chief. The influence which he would derive from victory and from ſpoils, would continue this power. If he employed it with prudence, it would become permanent; his imprudent ſeverity would be puniſhed with expulſion or death, and his enemy or his murderer would become his ſucceſſor. When a reſidence is once fixed, agriculture and the mechanical

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mechanical arts would appear, and increaſe the means of ſubſiſtence and accommodation. If a town was incloſed with walls, and defended by towers, the protection which it afforded would increaſe the number of its inhabitants, and with them the power of its ſovereign. His rank, however, and that of his immediate inferiors, would differ only in name. Each would ſtill have their dependants ready to aſſert their claims. Talents, ſervices, and accidents would fix the power in one, or divide it among the different orders of the people. Opinions ſpringing from ſources equally obvious, would give riſe to uſages; theſe inſenſibly would deſcribe the governing and the governed. The ſucceſſive principles of inſtinct, of affection, of conſanguinity, of ſafety, and of intereſt, will aboliſh the remembrance of equality, and make a people acquieſce in the eſtabliſhed inſtitutions of their country.

Juriſdiction advances in an equally ſlow and marked manner. The paſſions and intereſts of individuals would lead to violence and injury; the uncontrolled power of a father would dictate a deciſion preſcribed by his feelings. When relationſhip became diſtant, the rude arbiter would be choſen; he would decide from prevailing opinions and prejudices, not from per-

ceptions of equity or juſtice;—the injured would be authoriſed by the public opinion to take his own vengeance. Rude as ſuch decrees are, they would be appealed to as forming the cuſtoms of a people. The arbiter who decided by appeals to them, would become an eſtabliſhed judge; and when the form of ſubordination was fixed, his deciſions would become the foundation of the laws, which a more poliſhed age would render defined and poſitive. The rude forms of ſubordination and juriſdiction mark thus the beginnings of Ethics as an Art.

II. *A ſecond aſpect of Ethics as an Art, preſents itſelf in the proverbs and maxims of every early or rude people.*

2. Aſpect of Ethics as an Art, in the proverbs of every early people.

The origin of this aſpect of the Art may be traced as a natural conſequence of the preceding one, joined to the uniform tendency of the mind to praiſe what it admires, and to poſſeſs what it praiſes.

When mankind are paſſing from the ſavage to the patriarchal ſituation, talents, virtues, and ſervices recommend the rude chief, and in an inferior degree thoſe who approach him in poſſeſſing the qualities to which he owes his elevation. If as an arbiter his deciſions are conſidered as juſt, his wiſdom is confeſſed and extolled. If oppoſite

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claims ſhall ariſe betwixt himſelf and his ſubjects, and inſtead of appearing ſelfiſh, he ſhall acquieſce in their feelings, his juſtice and his generoſity are gratefully remembered and admired. If when an enemy approaches, he ſeems indifferent to dangers and to life, and ſhields or ſaves the liberties of his country, his heroiſm becomes its pride, and his fame the object of emulation. Events thus bring forward virtues, talents, and ſervices to view; and as they are the moſt honourable marks of diſtinction, deſcriptions of them are held up as leſſons, which ſeem to have been taught by the Gods. To aid the memory and gratify the untutored ear, they are put into rhyme; the bold figures of an original language give them energy and expreſſion, and eſtabliſh them as the maxims of conduct, which tend to refine the very forms and inſtitutions from which they have originated. Mankind admire them, and are emulous to perform the actions to which ſuch deſcriptions of the virtues can be applied as meaſurements.

3. Aſpect of Ethics as an Art, in collections of proverbs by wiſe men.

III. *A third aſpect of Ethics as an Art, appeared in collections of proverbs made by diſtinguiſhed characters or wiſe men.*

The paſſions and imagination of a ſimple people delight in the deſcriptions of events, which

which equally gratify their national pride and form them for action. At firſt the poet or the bard appears, and when he ſings the deeds of warriors, or records the events which yet live in memory or tradition, he mingles with them moral and religious maxims, as well as ſtriking views of the prevailing ſuperſtitions of a people. By degrees inſtruction takes a more ſettled form. Men who poſſeſs talents and experience, and who hold the rank of rulers of ſtates and cities, form collections of theſe maxims, with the view of perfecting ſubordination, poliſhing manners, and educating youth. Such were the proverbs of Solomon, the words of Agur, and the wiſdom of the Son of Sirach. The ſayings of the celebrated wiſe men of Greece were collections of apophthegms, with ſimilar views. They were either governors, or legiſlators, in their native cities *. Thales, who founded the Ionic ſchool, and Pythagoras, who founded the Italic ſchool, delivered collections of precepts for the conduct of a ſtate, and of private life. "The moſt difficult attainment "in life (ſaid Thales) is to know one's ſelf;

* Septem fuiſſe dicuntur uno tempore, qui ſapientes haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes præter Mileſium Thalen civitatibus ſuis profuerunt. Cic. *de Orat.*

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"the moſt eaſy, to recommend this know-
"ledge to others. The only method of
"being juſt, is to avoid doing that which we
"blame in others *."

4. Aſpect of Ethics as an Art, in the inſtructions given by Fables.

IV. *A fourth aſpect of Ethics as an Art, appeared in the inſtructions given by Allegories and Fables.*

Though the imagination fixes the attention of a poliſhing people, yet, as civility advances, fiction artfully withdraws, leaving Morality to its native force. To produce this change, allegory or fable is invented; it employs objects apparently unconnected with our diſpoſitions or actions; it aſſigns them life, paſſions, and engagements, and while it ſeems but to amuſe us with ſuppoſed feelings and deeds, it imperceptibly draws in the aſſent to a moral precept, which is equally ſimple and important. If the ſayings of the wiſe men had refined the forms of government and of juriſdiction, inſtruction in the ſimple and artleſs dreſs of the fable ſoftened and humanized private manners. The Fables of Æſop remain models of this ſpecies of Art.

* Vide Dio. Laert. Lib. i. §. 35. Cic. de Senect. cap. 20.

V. *A*

V. *A fifth ſpecies of Art appeared in the arrangement of the cardinal virtues by the Greeks.*

When poetry had acquired conſiderable perfection, and when the Sophiſts were giving leſſons for the conduct of reaſoning, the Greek Philoſophers formed more enlarged connections with mankind. They travelled into Egypt and Aſſyria, with the view of collecting the wiſdom of the Barbarians; and then returning to their native cities, reduced their obſervations into claſſes, or predicaments, and taught them to their diſciples and to their countrymen. Pythagoras, who viſited Egypt, has been ſuppoſed to have learned from its prieſts the method of arranging the virtues into diſtinct claſſes*. But if we may conjecture from the previous aſpects of Ethics, and from the comprehenſive talents of this Philoſopher, we may aſcribe to himſelf the honour of the invention.

It was obſerved, that all the maxims of Morality might be referred to the duties which we owed to ourſelves, and to the duties which we owed to mankind. Thoſe maxims which related to ourſelves, directed the underſtanding, the appetites, and the

* Jamblich. Vit. Pythag. Bruckeri Inſt. Hiſt. Phil. Lib. ii. cap. 10.

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will; thoſe which related to mankind directed our actions. The firſt claſs of virtues was reducible to the general titles of Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude; the ſecond, under the title of Juſtice.

1. PRUDENCE, the firſt of the cardinal virtues which relate to ourſelves, ſignifies the proper choice of the means which produce our happineſs. The univerſal purſuit of man (it was obſerved) is pleaſure. The difference between one man and another ſeems to conſiſt in diſtinguiſhing the true from the falſe objects of pleaſure, and in ſelecting the means which are fitted to enſure the one, and to enable him to avoid the other. If the true objects are purſued, pleaſure will be found to conſiſt in virtue; if the falſe objects are purſued, it will be thought to conſiſt in vice. He then who examines the motives of his own conduct, and who ſifts with care thoſe of other men, has prudence: hence all the maxims which tend to regulate the underſtanding in the choice of proper objects, or ſuch as are fitted to produce happineſs, are to be claſſed under the general title of *Prudence*.

2. TEMPERANCE, the ſecond of the cardinal virtues which relate to ourſelves, ſignifies the power of rendering the appetites and paſſions ſubſervient to reaſon. Pleaſure, in actual life, is conſidered as a good; pain,

pain, as an evil. Some of our pleaſures are inſtinctive and tranſient; others of them are rational and permanent. The former, though dictated by the appetites and meaner paſſions, frequently addreſs the mind with more ſucceſs than the latter, though preſcribed and approved of by the judgment. The ſenſualiſt prefers low gratification to refined enjoyment, and by exceſs loſes the very pleaſure which he purſues. All the maxims which tend to reſtrain the appetites and paſſions within the bounds preſcribed by Nature, as they produce real happineſs, may be claſſed under the general title of *Temperance*.

3. FORTITUDE, the third of the cardinal virtues which relate to ourſelves, ſignifies the power of uniformly directing the will to the actions which reaſon preſcribes. The love of pleaſure may be dictated by inſtinctive feelings, or by the judgment. When the former prevail, the puſillanimous ſink under the viciſſitudes of fortune, and fly from the ſtations allotted them in the defence of their country: when the latter prevails, the brave, though they ſee approaching evils, or death, meet the firſt with intrepidity, and the laſt with heroiſm. Hence Fortitude was the command of the ſtrong and violent paſſions, which it is difficult to control even for a moment:

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whereas Temperance, to which, in various ſyſtems, it was oppoſed in its effects, was the command of the weaker paſſions, which are apt to get the better of us by their continual ſolicitations. All the maxims which correct the will, and form a mind fitted to meet the accidents of life, may be claſſed under the general title of *Fortitude*.

4. JUSTICE is the great or cardinal virtue which regulates our actions with reſpect to mankind. It ſignifies the power of directing the will, by an impartial regard to the rights of others. The ſame love of pleaſure, which, if properly directed, leads us to the virtues we owe to ourſelves, leads us to this great virtue which we owe to other men. Under the impulſe, however, of the love of pleaſure, mankind are often ſelfiſh and baſe. When ſelfiſh, they invade the rights of others from avarice; when baſe, they betray confidence and friendſhip from malevolence. All the maxims, therefore, which direct the will to actions, which improve and maintain the rights of mankind, may be comprehended in the general predicament of *Juſtice**.

Such are the aſpects of ancient Ethics as an Art, admitting of ſimilar deſcriptions with the other Arts which ariſe in the early or poliſhing ages of civil ſociety.

* Vid. Cicero de Nat. Deorum, et de Orat.

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Of Ancient Ethics as a Science.

Nature of a Science.

SCIENCE ſignifies the knowledge of the laws of Nature. The laws or rules by which Nature acts are different and ſpecific in the great departments into which her works are divided. Every ſubordinate branch has alſo its peculiar laws. The rules of the animated are diſtinct from thoſe of the vegetable kingdom, and both of them from the great laws which direct in the ſyſtem of Nature.

Progreſs of the mind in obtaining the knowledge of a Science.

The progreſs of the human mind in obtaining the knowledge of any general or particular law of Nature, is plain and uniform, and can be traced in the method by which the moſt ſucceſsful Philoſophers have made their diſcoveries. The mind begins with directing its attention to particular phenomena: the next ſtep is to repeat its obſervations, or make experiments, which ſhall take their character from the qualities of the ſubject in which they are inſtituted. By this means it obtains the hiſtory of a claſs or ſpecies in Nature. By continuing experiments,

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riments, it forms a chain of intuitive judgments, which at laſt enable it to draw an inference, deſcriptive of a general rule, or law, in that part of Nature which it has examined. In mechanics, the Philoſopher began with the ſimple phenomena of the lever, he followed them to the higheſt mechanical combinations, till at laſt he perceived the laws of gravitation and motion which obtain in the great ſyſtem of Nature*.

If mankind had employed this ſimple method of examining Nature, the hiſtory of Philoſophy would have been a plain record of uſeful diſcoveries. In the annals of knowledge, however, fancy and obſervation, errors and truth, ſpeculations and ſcience, alternately appear. Theſe paradoxes are to be accounted for, rather by the accidents which marked the firſt cultivation of knowledge, than by the ſucceſſive ſtages of civilization.

Accidents which prevented the application of the method of Science to the ſtudy of Nature.

1. The firſt nations who cultivated the human mind were directed chiefly by the imagination.

The finer ſenſes of ſight and ſound, the paſſions and the feelings of the heart, furniſh objects to the imagination. It is the office of this faculty to hold out ſuch combinations or deſcriptions of them, as may

* See Bacon, Nov. Org. p. 119. Alſo, Firſt Principles of Philoſophy, 3d Edit.

call

call forth and gratify a native taſte. For this end the rude muſician combined ſounds in ſimple melody: it appeared a language of the paſſions to which the poet accommodated his deſcriptions of the objects of the paſſions. The ſong thus ſucceſsfully addreſſed the ear, and intereſted the heart. When the relation betwixt theſe two Arts was laid aſide in practice, poetry retained the meaſures which muſic had ſuggeſted, and, guided by the imagination, offered thoſe deſcriptions of Nature and of man, which equally accorded with the prejudices and poliſhed the taſte of a civilizing people. During this progreſs of the imagination, the underſtanding was perceiving and collecting its objects by ſlow and unequal degrees. The peaſant ſees the fire burn and the water boil, but attends not to the phenomena of inflammation and ebullition. The ruſtic wields his axe, but adverts not to the phenomena of motion from impulſe, much leſs to the miracle, that an arm can be moved at the inclination of a mind. In a ſimilar manner, he thinks the rude ſubordination and juriſdiction a part of his ſituation, but dreams not that they are the firſt dawnings of Morality, or that they ſpring from a particular faculty in the human mind. The uſeful Arts were ſubdivided in Greece, but we do not obſerve them giving riſe to the Natural Sciences:

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ences: the arts of government and juriſdiction were refining, but we only obſerve them terminating in ſpeculations, not in the ſcience of Morality.

2. Philology obtained high degrees of perfection, when the Sciences were but beginning.

Poetry in Greece was early admired, and the paſſion for it became ſo general, that the Rhapſodiſts rehearſed the favourite poetical productions as the rudiments of inſtruction to youth. In ſmall and free ſtates, where every citizen was intereſted in every public event, one art was formed for the conduct of reaſoning in public diſputes, and another to direct the powers of perſuaſion. Sophiſtry and rhetoric thus introduced diſcrimination into a language, to which the Poets had already given a decided and elegant character. During this progreſs, the uſeful Arts were not extending beyond the accommodations of life. If the Philoſophers were beginning to obſerve Nature, and to collect the obſervations of the Barbarians, they were uſing their philology to give ſpeciouſneſs to their philoſophy, and by theſe means withdrawing attention from Nature.

3. The Philoſophers began with Art, and employed their ingenuity to reconcile Nature to their ſyſtems.

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In early ages, the obſervation of Nature muſt be limited and partial. The facility with which the human mind can abſtract, enables it to form opinions; if theſe opinions are ſpecious, they are adopted as true. The ingenuity of a Philoſopher is employed to give them the authority of principles. The reputation of Thales and of Pythagoras was ſo high, that they were ſuppoſed to have reached the limits of human wiſdom. What Plato and what Ariſtotle thought, was truth. To queſtion the conformity of their opinions to Nature, would have been conſidered as extravagant and abſurd. Art thus fettered the ſpirit of Invention, and Nature was loſt ſight of in the categories of the Philoſopher *.

Having thus begun with Art and Authority, inſtead of accommodating their Logic to Nature, they accommodated Nature to their Logic.

Influence of theſe accidents on the Science of Ethics;

The influence of the imagination, of the prevailing taſte for philology, and of an artificial method of philoſophizing, muſt have been conſiderable, in a ſubject like Ethics, when it was about to receive the aſpect of a Science.

Thales and Pythagoras had offered rules for the conduct of ſtates, and taught pre-

* Bacon, Nov. Organ.

cepts

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cepts for the improvement of their fellow-citizens. They had applied their philology to their moral maxims, and by this means had given them a form. The latter of theſe Philoſophers had introduced (it has been ſuppoſed) an arrangement of the virtues. Leſſons in Morality ſeem not, however, at this period, to have taken the form of a ſyſtem, but gradually to have been narrowing to this point. The intermixture of moral maxims, with conjectures reſpecting the agency of Deity aſcribed to theſe Philoſophers, forms only a ſpecies of ſuperſtitious Theiſm, in which the powers of imagination and of ſophiſtry muſt have been ſupreme *.

on the firſt Philoſophers;

Socrates ſeems to have been the firſt philoſopher who attempted to correct the prevailing taſte for ſophiſtry, and to introduce ſimplicity and practice into the leſſons of Morality. Like the other Greeks, he began his ſtudies in the ſchools, and from the diſtinguiſhed reputation which he held, he ſhared with the founder of the Ionic ſchool the honour of giving it a name. His firſt ſtudies ſeem to have been poetry and philology. When he found that the ſolutions offered of the queſtions, "What is the origin of Nature?" and "By what laws is

on Socrates;

* Herodot. Lib. ii.

the

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the univerſe regulated?" were unintelligible and abſurd, he relinquiſhed phyſics as beyond the reach of the human mind, and devoted his talents to the ſtudy of Morality*. He ſeems in his Morality to have had one great object in view, to connect the moral maxims which were fitted to regulate the conduct of mankind, with ſublime conceptions reſpecting the character and government of a Supreme Being.

on the founders of the Sects.

Though Socrates offered no theory of Ethics, his diſciples were numerous and diſtinguiſhed, and the founders of the celebrated Greek Sects.

The ſolutions of the queſtions which the founders of the Sects ſtated in Ethics, furniſhed thoſe refined theories in the Science, which ſeem equally to have formed the opinions of the ancients, and to have been admired by the moderns.

The firſt great queſtion of the Sects was, "What are the foundations of virtue?" the ſecond, "What are the diſtinctions betwixt

* Socrates mihi videtur, id quod conſtat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipſa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum Philoſophi occupati fuerunt; avocaviſſe Philoſophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxiſſe; ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis, quæreret; cœleſtia autem vel procul eſſe a noſtra cognitione cenſeret; vel ſi maximè cognita eſſent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. Cicero, Academ. Queſ. 1. 4. Diog. Laert. Lib. ii. § 21.

† Xenophon, mem. Socrat. Lib. i.

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good and evil, happineſs and miſery?" The anſwers given to theſe important queſtions divided the philoſophers and their diſciples into diſtinct orders.

Of the queſtion reſpecting the foundations of virtue.

The queſtion reſpecting the foundations of virtue ſeems to have led to the earlieſt aſpects of Ethics as a Science.

While Ethics was yet an Art, the virtues had been arranged: when the Philoſophers, therefore, began to attend to the ſources of the virtues, their ſpeculations inſenſibly and neceſſarily centered in this great queſtion.

I. The ſolutions offered by Plato, Ariſtotle, and Zeno, admit nearly of the ſame deſcription *.

Solution of it by Plato and the Academics.

1. Plato conſiders the ſoul to be poſſeſſed of three diſtinct faculties: reaſon, the paſſions, and the appetites. The governing power, or reaſon, examines the proper means to be purſued in obtaining an end. The governed powers are, firſt, the higher or more dignified paſſions, which are ambition, the love of ſuperiority and of honour; next, the meaner paſſions, or the appetites, which terminate in ſenſual gratification.

The mind, conſtituted in this manner, is like a little ſtate, where the ſecurity of the whole depends upon the control maintained

* See Dr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part vi. Sect. 2. chap. 1. Plato de Repub. Lib. iv. de Leg. Lib. viii. Hiſ. and Crit. Account of the Science of Morality, by Puffendorf.

by

by the ſuperior over the ſubordinate powers. In its directing them to proper objects, conſiſts the virtue of Prudence; in its fixing the higher paſſions on their proper objects, conſiſts the virtue of Fortitude; in its reſtraining the inferior paſſions and appetites within the limits preſcribed by Nature, conſiſts the virtue of Temperance. In the proper direction of all theſe powers to their objects, without encroaching on the ſame claims in others, conſiſts the great virtue of Juſtice. According to this ſyſtem, therefore, virtue conſiſts in the proper direction of the powers of the mind.

Solution of it by Ariſtotle and the Peripatetics.

2. Ariſtotle, in the firſt place, varied the arrangement made by Plato, by ſubſtituting in the place of the governing and governed powers of the mind, a ſcale, in which every particular virtue appears in a point of view of which the oppoſite vices are extremes. The virtue of Fortitude appears betwixt cowardice and preſumptuous raſhneſs; the virtue of Frugality, betwixt avarice and profuſion. In the next place, to differ from Plato, he makes virtue to conſiſt, not ſo much in the proper direction of the powers of the mind, as in the habit of perceiving the true characters of its objects, and of being directed by right reaſon *.

* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments—Ariſtotle Ethic. Nic. Lib. ii. cap. 5. Ibid. Lib. i. cap. 2.—Grot. de Jur. Bel. et Pac. Proleg.

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Solution of it by Zeno and the Stoics.

3. Zeno refined upon theſe two ſyſtems, by teaching that Nature recommends every man to his own care, that he ought to preſerve the powers of his body and the faculties of his mind. Objects are to be choſen or rejected, as Nature points them out to be proper objects of choice and rejection. Prudence conſiſts in diſcerning the place and the value which objects hold in the great ſcale of exiſtence: Fortitude conſiſts in the ſelf-command which conſiders the events of life as indifferent, and but an inſignificant part in the great order of Nature: Temperance, in ſelecting the means which preſerve the ſtrength of the body and of the mind: Juſtice, in making each individual give place to the good of the whole; for a wiſe man ſhould feel no reluctance to comply with the good of mankind. Virtue, according to this ſyſtem, conſiſts in the conformity of our actions to the order eſtabliſhed by Nature *.

Theſe celebrated ſyſtems nearly approach to each other, and all reſolve themſelves into the general deſcription—That virtue is founded in the proper government of the

* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.—Cic. de Fin. lib. iii. cap. 19. Mundum autem cenſent, regi numine Deorum, eumque eſſe quaſi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum, et unumquemque noſtrûm ejus mundi eſſe partem; ex quo illud naturâ conſequi, ut communem utilitatem noſtræ anteponamus. Vide etiam cap. 21.

mind,

mind, in that government becoming habitual, and being ſubſervient to the order eſtabliſhed by Nature and by Providence.

II. Epicurus offered a ſyſtem, which held out different objects of deſire from thoſe which the preceding ſyſtems had preſcribed, and gave different reaſons for their becoming objects of eſteem. Solution of it by Epicurus.

Pain and pleaſure (ſaid that philoſopher) refer chiefly to the body, and are natural objects of deſire and averſion. We ſhould uniformly purſue pleaſure, unleſs the purſuit of it may expoſe us to pain, or to ſuffering. The pleaſures of the mind ultimately reſt on thoſe of the body: the body feels the preſent pleaſure or pain, the mind anticipates or remembers them. Preſent pleaſures or pains are inſignificant, compared with thoſe which are either recollected or expected. Prudence then is valuable, not on its own account, but from its tendency to enſure the greateſt degree of pleaſure, and to avert the greater degrees of pain. Temperance is the prudent uſe of pleaſure; Fortitude is firmneſs in the purſuit of pleaſure; and Juſtice is the ſelection of the means of pleaſure without injury to the pleaſures of other men. In all this progreſs man uniformly acts from ſelf-love: he is ſelfiſh when he appears benevolent; compaſſion is exerciſed to avoid a pain, ra-

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ther than to relieve the unhappy. Virtue, according to this ſyſtem, conſiſts in that prudent exerciſe of the ſelfiſh affections, which enables us to poſſeſs the moſt perfect pleaſure *.

Of the queſtion reſpecting the influence of Virtue upon happineſs.

The ſecond great queſtion of the ancient philoſophers regarded "the conſtituents of "good and evil, happineſs and miſery." It is evidently a conſequence of the preceding requiſition, and the following ſolutions of it were offered:

Solution of it by the Peripatetics.

1. Ariſtotle and the Peripatetics taught, That the deſires of the human mind afforded it pleaſure, when they were conſiſtent with each other. To obtain the gratification of our deſires, the mind muſt be active. As Virtue conſiſted in the habit of ſelecting the proper objects of deſire, the effect of Virtue is to confer the greateſt number, and the higheſt degrees of pleaſure. If Prudence does not always ſecure the poſſeſſor from error, it has this tendency; if temperance does not always give health, or Fortitude overcome danger, the temperate are the moſt likely to enjoy health, and the brave are beſt fitted to meet danger. If Juſtice does not ſecure from fraud and oppreſſion, it gives a title to puniſh theſe

* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments—Cicero de Fin. Lib. i. Dio Laert. Lib. ii. § 127.—Locke on Human Underſtanding, Book ii. c. 21.

vices.

vices. According to this ſyſtem, happineſs conſiſts in the exertion of the active powers of the mind to obtain the proper objects of deſire, and in the actual poſſeſſion of them *.

Solution of it by the Stoics.

2. Zeno and the Stoics taught, That if the active powers of the mind were uniformly and reſolutely exerted, the mind would poſſeſs its own approbation independent of events. The more difficult the taſks which the Fates impoſe, and the greater the degrees of wiſdom employed, the greater the happineſs: the leſs difficult the offices of life, and the more inactive or indolent the mind, the enjoyment will be proportionably leſs. According to this ſyſtem, active virtue is happineſs †.

Solution of it by the Epicureans.

3. Epicurus taught, That the active powers of the mind are continually in purſuit of ſome pleaſure. As Virtue conſiſts in the proper direction of the ſelfiſh affections to obtain pleaſure, happineſs conſiſts in the attainment of pleaſure, and in the abſence of pain ‡.

When the aſpiring powers of ancient genius were languiſhing, a Sect was formed from the union of many of the diſciples of

* Cicero de Finibus.

† Cic. de Fin. et de Nat. Deorum.

‡ Cicero de Finibus.

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the former Sects. They took the name of Ecclectics, ſignificant of their attempt to extract what was valuable from former ſyſtems, and to inſtitute one perfect and univerſal philoſophy. This attempt could only terminate in producing a complicated, though ingenious ſyſtem of errors. They began by reducing the two Ethical queſtions into one great queſtion, and offered a general ſolution of the whole*.

Solution of it by the Ecclectics.

Man (ſaid the Ecclectics) acts partly from the impulſe of feeling, partly from the dictate of reaſon. He is directed by both to procure his own good, and to procure the good of other men. All the Philoſophers were right, in aſcribing motives to actions; but many of them erred, in thinking that there exiſted but one claſs of motives. If the ſelfiſh affections were annihilated, there could be no Virtue. Benevolence, therefore, which is ſuperior to them, is the higheſt object of praiſe, and therefore the foundation of Virtue. Happineſs, of conſequence, conſiſts in the practice of benevolence.

This Eccleticiſm of the Greek Sects was formed in the Alexandrian ſchool. Its diſciples were very numerous. It gradually pervaded every branch of knowledge; and

* Vid. Bruckeri Inſt. Hiſt. Philoſ. Lib. 2. cap. 2. § 4. Dio. Laert. § 21.

by

by encreaſing myſtery and obſcurity, prepared the poliſhed world for the ignorance and ſuperſtition which unlettered ſavages were ſoon to introduce *. The fall and diſappearance of ancient Ethics ſeem to have been effected by the following circumſtances:

Cauſes of the fall and diſappearance of ancient Ethics.

1. The poliſhed ages of Greece and of Rome were of too ſhort duration to allow the defects of prevailing ſyſtems to appear, or to ſhew the ſimplicity and neceſſity of experiment in the ſtudy of Nature. Rome indeed was but beginning to copy the elegant Arts, and admire the theories of the Greeks, when her liberties were ſubverted, and freedom of enquiry rendered impoſſible.

2. The natural Sciences which ſhew the true path to ſucceſsful diſcovery, had experienced but inferior degrees of attention and improvement. If the Greeks invented Geometry, they were ſtrangers to the method of ſimplifying its demonſtrations by the application of numbers. Phyſics therefore remained ſubjected to hypotheſes, and were not fitted to introduce extenſive views of Nature, or to correct the elegant ſubtilties which had fettered Ethics.

3. The political eſtabliſhments which ſucceeded the fall of Grecian and Roman freedom, could only favour the Arts which

* Vid. Bruckeri Inſt. Hiſt. Philoſ.

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gratified the accidental taſte of Emperors, or thoſe which more commonly miniſtered to the taſteleſs ſenſuality of deſpots. The nations that ſubverted the Roman empire were too barbarous to perceive, or to reliſh ancient arts or wiſdom; but gradually ſunk into the ignorance and ſuperſtition which ſeemed to extinguiſh all the powers of thought and of action.

CHAP. II.

History of Modern Ethics.

SECT. I.

Of Modern Ethics as an Art.

CHAP. II.

IF conjectures were uſeful in bringing forward the views of ancient, events in hiſtory will diſcover to us the aſpects of modern Ethics as an Art.

First aſpect of Modern Ethics as an Art, in the caſuiſtry of the Eccleſiaſtics.

I. The Barbarians who ſubverted the Roman empire were not fitted to preſerve the expiring remains of ancient Arts and wiſdom, which therefore languiſhed and diſappeared. The views of Art which we have now to contemplate, aroſe from the ſituation and accidents of a rude and ſuperſtitious people. The conqueſt of a province was made with ſuch rapidity, that a military arrangement was neceſſary to preſerve it. The leader of a tribe portioned his territory among his principal officers, who bound themſelves to aid him in maintaining the new eſtabliſhment. His reſidence

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dence became a capital, and he gradually aſſumed the titles and the powers of a ſovereign.

Chriſtianity had been the religion of the vanquiſhed, and the conquerors by degrees embraced it. Their maſculine minds were ſtruck with the ſimplicity and rigid manners of the monks. The ignorance of the new proſelytes and their great power ſoon became temptations, which the morality of the Prieſts was neither fitted nor ſolicitous to reſiſt. The Romiſh hierarchy was therefore eſtabliſhed, and kings and ſlaves equally ſubmitted to its awards*.

The moſt inferior kinds of learning gave the Clergy a decided ſuperiority over the Laity. A barbarous Latin, and the corrupted ſyllogiſtic art of the ſchools, were ſufficient to give probability to polemical noſtrums, and to the legendary ſtories of ſaints and ſacred relics. It was taken for granted, that if men reaſoned, they muſt diſcover truth†.

The ignorance of the times allowed the Prieſts to introduce a diſtinction betwixt the natural ſanctions of morality and the ſanctions of the church. If a murderer could pay a fine, and undergo a penance, his guilt was waſhed away. Services and pil-

* Moſheim's Eccleſiaſt. Hiſt.

† Bruckeri Inſtit. Hiſt. Phil. Pars ii. Lib. 2, cap. 2.

grimages

grimages multiplied. If the ſinner could enrich the altar of the Prieſt, he generouſly enſured him peace of conſcience and future remuneration. If he was refractory, and refuſed the expected oblation, excommunication gradually reared its thunder, one ſtroke of which cut off at once from all intercourſe with this world, and from admiſſion into heaven. The caſuiſtry of the church thus furniſhes the firſt aſpect of Ethics as an Art among the moderns. The queſtions in this Art were very different from thoſe which ancient Ethics had ſtated. The enquiries were not now, "What is the foundation of virtue?" and "What are the conſtituents of happineſs?" but, "What is merit and demerit in the eſtimation of the Prieſts?" "What ſervices and what ſums can purchaſe and entitle to merit; what neglects, or what degrees of inability or diſinclination to pay, withheld indulgences, or conſtituted demerit?" We almoſt wiſh that it had not been poſſible for the human faculties to ſink into ſo low a ſuperſtition; but when the uſeful and elegant Arts had for ages been unknown, when arms, not obſervation, were the marks of character, religion loſt its purity and the human mind its true dignity.

Second aſpect of Ethics as

II. The ſucceeding events in hiſtory will bring forward better views of man, and with

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with them a new aſpect of Ethics as an Art.

an Art among the Moderns, in the caſuiſtry of the Civilians.

After the more complete eſtabliſhment of the European ſovereignties, monarchs, by commanding great though temporary armies, began, if not to queſtion the power of the church, at leaſt by addreſs and by views of intereſt, to influence its deciſions. This innovation was however ſlow and unequal in its progreſs. The Pontiffs, ſometimes partially ſometimes completely eluded theſe encroachments. If they equalled not princes in power, they ſurpaſſed them in art and addreſs.

The accidental and abſurd ſcheme of conquering the Holy Land, ſeemed for a moment to be the engine which was finally to ſubject ſovereignties to the church; but, on the contrary, it ultimately relieved them from her thraldom. Property in land was made transferable to defray the expences of this ſacred war; the Eaſtern Arts and magnificence were copied by the adventurers; the communication with the army in Paleſtine gave vigour to the commerce of the Italian ſtates; the acquiſition of riches from foreign Arts, brought forward the ſpirit of invention in the uſeful Arts, and of enterpriſe in commerce; the changes in private, led to revolutions in political ſituations; monarchs foſtered the Arts and trade,

trade, because they wished to narrow the pretensions and the power of the nobles. This, in some instances, rendered the government absolute, in others free. Liberty offered new objects to talents and to enterprize; monarchs copied the industry of freemen, for they wished to be powerful and rich*.

During this progress, questions respecting rights became numerous and frequent; and an event occurred which facilitated the discussion of them, and rendered jurisdiction precise and intelligible.

A copy of the Roman laws, as compiled by the orders of the Emperor Justinian, had been discovered in Italy: compared with the rude feudal institutions, its accuracy and refinements were confessed and admired. It was introduced into colleges as a branch of education. In many countries it was adopted as the spirit of jurisdiction; and even in those where rising municipal institutions had created national prejudices against its doctrines, it was tacitly used as a means of refinement. The church itself wished to share in its fame, and compiled a body of canon laws, which were to comprehend all the Roman wisdom, and superadd the purity of a sacred institution†.

These events and circumstances produced a new species of Art in Ethics—the casuistry

* Mosheim, Ecc. Hist. Hume's Hist. of Eng.

† Cocceii Com. ad Grotium Proleg.

of

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of the Civilians. In this the ſyllogiſtic Art ſtill directed the powers of reaſoning; for it could be ſucceſsfully applied to ſhelter the caſes of right, under principles which were reputed to be comprehenſive and infallible*.

The writers on the civil law became numerous and voluminous. The diſcovery of the art of printing facilitated the diffuſion of this unwieldy knowledge. It was not till curioſity had been ſated with erudition, that this aſpect of the Art yielded to a new and a better one.

Third aſpect of Ethics as an Art among the Moderns in the ſyſtems of Juriſprudence.

III. Events in hiſtory will (as with the preceding articles) bring forward this more liberal aſpect of Ethics as an Art.

The cultivation of the Italian language began to ſhew the firſt dawnings of a native taſte. The Greek refugees who fled into Italy after the taking of Conſtantinople, if they ſtopped its progreſs for a moment, contributed, in a ſhort time, to render it chaſte and refined. The ſtudy of the ancient languages offered alſo to view their fine Arts and their Philoſophy. It was eaſier however to copy defects, than to perceive beauties. The ſatires of Eraſmus mark this circumſtance in the character of the Scholiaſts. The theories of the ancients were however not only admired and underſtood, but began to be oppoſed to each other.

* Introd. to Canon Law.

The

The Platoniſts firſt compared their doctrines with thoſe of Ariſtotle; the Stoics had next their patron *; the Epicureans their profound and learned defender†; at laſt Des Cartes ſubverted the long eſtabliſhed Ariſtotelian philoſophy, while ſo many contradictory opinions produced the extremes of Quietiſm and of Scepticiſm‡.

Luther had already given bold views in religion, and laid bare the caſuiſtry, venality and tyranny of the Romaniſts. By degrees the Reformation was eſtabliſhed; freedom of thinking on one ſubject foſtered a ſpirit of liberal enquiry on every ſubject.

The Natural Sciences had already begun to appear. The diſcoveries of Galileo and Kepler were founded on experiment, and contradicted ſcholaſtic doctrines. The comprehenſive mind of Lord Bacon perceived in diſcoveries the path to ſucceſsful obſervation, and prepared mankind for the diſcoveries of Newton ‖.

It ſeems paradoxical, that when the ſimple method of obſervation was in one part of Nature confirmed by practice, it ſhould have been but partially introduced into the other. The great principles of

* Juſtin, Lipſius, &c.

† Gaſſendi, &c.

‡ Bayle, &c.

‖ Bacon, Nov. Organ. Pemberton's View of the Newtonian Philoſophy.

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morality and of national juſtice experienced not the ſame cool and ſcientific inveſtigation with the laws of motion and gravitation.

The conqueſts of barbarians had for ages divided mankind into nobles and ſlaves. Ignorance and cuſtoms had either made them forget they once had been free, or ſuperſtition and oppreſſion had darkened and enfeebled the powers of the human mind. The rights of nations, as founded on the great principles of juſtice, were not perceived, and their relation to thoſe of citizens, and of both to morality, was unknown.

The moment when theſe diſplays of Nature could be opened to the view of mankind was now arrived. The great Chancellor Bacon gave the firſt ſketch of the ſubject. The rights of citizens regard their ſelf-enjoyment and their actions; the rights of nations, the offices of civil ſociety, and the mutual obligations of ſtates to each other: both were fitted to ſuggeſt univerſal juſtice as the fountain of law, and the ſpirit of good government *. Theſe views of Lord Bacon are ſuppoſed to have ſuggeſted to Grotius his doctrines in his treatiſe on the laws of war and of peace †, in which he endeavours to point

* Vid. Bacon, de Dig. et Aug. Scien. Lib. vii. cap. 1, 2, 3.

† Puffendorff's Law of Nat. and Nations, by Barbeyrac, in his Hiſt. and Crit. Account of Morality. Vid. Cocceii Com. in Grot. de Jur. Bel. et Pac.

out the cauſes of a juſt war, the duties of nations in a ſtate of hoſtility, and the obligations which ariſe in a ſtate of peace. He appears not to have underſtood the ſimple method of philoſophizing taught by Lord Bacon, but embarraſſes his reaſonings with erudition, and with unneceſſary appeals to authority.

The views of Lord Bacon were more ſucceſsfully realized by Monteſquieu in his Spirit of Laws, where comprehenſive views of government and of rights are explained, as they regard the ſucceſſive objects and ſituations of civil ſociety *.

The aſpects of Ethics during this progreſs of taſte, erudition, liberal ſpeculation and ſcience, though artificial, are ſtriking. They preſent us with the revived theories of the Greeks and with ſyſtems of juriſprudence and politics, but we do not find them terminating in the diſcovery of the law of Morality as a law of Nature, fitted to aſcertain and explain the great rights of citizens and of nations.

* Vid. L'Eſprit des Loix.

SECT. II.

Of modern Ethics as a Science.

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ETHICS as an Art had carried obſervation to a conſiderable extent, when the curioſity of Philoſophers led them to ſtudy and inveſtigate the principles upon which the Art ſeemed to proceed.

It had been allowed by the reſtorers of the Greek theories, and in the ſyſtems of juriſprudence, that moral approbation exiſted. The ſpirit of enquiry which was becoming general, led to the queſtion, "From "what principles do the approbation of vir- "tue, and the diſtinctions of good and evil, "happineſs and miſery, proceed?"

General queſtion ſtated in the ſcience of modern Ethics.

In Phyſics, principles have been ſhewn to be maxims deduced from demonſtrated laws of Nature; but a demonſtration of the law of moral Nature ſeems not to have introduced the profound and (in ſome inſtances) elegant illuſtrations of the moral principle. In detailing the ſolutions of the great modern queſtion in Ethics, the moſt

diſtinguiſhed theories will ſufficiently point out the ſtate of the Science *.

Solution of it by Mr. Hobbes.

I. Mr. HOBBES ſuppoſes that neceſſity leads man into ſociety; that the tendency of virtue is to improve; the tendency of vice, to diſturb the order of civil government. Society is a machine, of which virtue is the ſpring, and vice the ruſt which throws it into diſorder. The approbation of virtue, according to this ſyſtem, reſolves itſelf into *ſelf-love* †.

This ſelfiſh ſyſtem led the Duke of Rochefaucault and Dr. Mandeville to infer, that there is no real diſtinction betwixt virtue and vice ‡.

Solutions of it by Malebranche, Cudworth, Clark, &c.

II. *Pere Malebranche*, Dr. *Cudworth*, Dr. *Clark*, &c. gave a more ſcientific aſpect to moral theory.

Malebranche taught, That a diſtinction muſt exiſt betwixt virtue and vice from the nature of the thing, and that the powers of reaſon are fitted to diſcover it §.

Dr. Cudworth ſaid, There is an agreement or relation in Nature, when we perceive virtue, a diſagreement when we perceive vice: there is (for example) a relation

* See the elegant review of moral theories, compared with his own, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Dr. Smith, Part VI.

† See Hobbes's Leviathan.

‡ See Fable of the Bees, Luxury and Luſt.

§ See his Works.

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between a benefit and the gratitude which ought to follow it, between an injury and the revenge that is proportioned to it: In general, between virtues and their objects, vices and their conſequences; the underſtanding perceives theſe relations and proportions as they exiſt in Nature. According to this theory, we approve of virtue and diſapprove of vice, from the operations of reaſon, which diſcover the nature of virtue and of vice, as they do any other truth in Nature *.

Dr. Clark, in ſubſervience to this theory, places virtue, in acting according to the fitneſs and congruity which appears in certain actions and relations in Nature. Mr. Woolaſton, in acting agreeable to the truth of things, according to their proper nature; and Lord Shafteſbury, in reaſon maintaining a proper balance of the affections †.

Solution of it by Dr. Hutchinſon.

III. Dr. *Hutchinſon* invented the theory, That we approve of virtue from a particular ſenſe in the human mind. Taking the diſtinction betwixt virtue and vice as an eſtabliſhed fact in Nature, he directed his obſervation to the human mind itſelf, with the view of diſcovering, whether it did not poſſeſs a diſtinct faculty which fitted it for the approbation of virtue. He obſerv-

* See Immutable Morality.

† See the Works of theſe Philoſophers.

ed, that virtuous actions not only afford complacency to the actor, but excite love and esteem in the spectator, and that vicious actions have opposite tendencies and effects. There is a resemblance in this faculty, to what the mind experiences in examining external nature—A field covered with rich herbage gives pleasure to the eye, independent of its utility; colour, proportion, and expression in animated objects, give pleasure independent of their other qualities; virtuous actions, in a similar manner, please, independent of our employing the understanding to examine their nature and consequences. It would seem then, that moral good and evil are originally distinguished from each other, and that unless we were possessed of these feelings, we never could arrive at the knowledge of this distinction. Such original feelings, however, are not in contradiction to the understanding, on the contrary, when it examines them, it finds them to be agreeable to the order of Nature. To the feeling this Philosopher gave the name of the *moral sense* *. The followers of Dr. Hutchinson have varied this term. Dr. Butler calls it conscience, but conscience applies only to our own actions, not to the actions of other men.

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* See Enquiry concerning Virtue.

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Solution of it by Mr. Hume.

IV. Mr. *Hume* admitted, That the moral ſenſe was original; but endeavoured to analyſe its nature, and to ſhew, that it is not one ſimple feeling, but a compound of ſeveral feelings. Virtuous actions (ſays he) have a tendency either to promote the happineſs of the actor himſelf, or of ſociety; on theſe accounts they are agreeable to the ſpectator, both from the conſiderations of ſelf-love and of benevolence. It is the general tendency of an action which ſtamps it with the name of beneficial or hurtful. It is their ſalutary effects, therefore, which render virtuous actions agreeable to mankind; it is their pernicious effects which render vicious actions diſagreeable. The ſelfiſh and the benevolent principles, therefore, concur in exciting the moral ſentiment, as well as the effect which it is calculated to produce. We often confound the effect with the cauſe, but this is an error common to all the ſenſes. A field may be beautiful in itſelf, but its beauty is heightened by the ſenſe of its utility. The contemplation of utility in an engine is attended with no affection, but in the action of an intelligent being, with love and eſteem. The underſtanding promotes only the good of the being who exerciſes it, the affections of the heart, the good of mankind.

kind. Abilities united with vicious diſpoſitions produce miſery to mankind; the vices of a fool bring only miſery on himſelf. Selfiſh inclinations pleaſe from a regard to ourſelves; benevolent, both from a regard to ourſelves and to mankind; and both unite in procuring approbation of virtuous actions, from a *ſenſe of their utility* *. CHAP. II.

It has been objected to this analyſis of the moral ſenſe, that praiſe and blame are often immediate and previous to reaſoning, and that the approbation is not always proportioned to the utility of an action, for generoſity is more admired than juſtice.

V. Dr. *Smith*, with great ingenuity and elegance, reſolves moral approbation into propriety, ariſing from a fellow-feeling or ſympathy. I enter into the feelings of another, when I imagine that in the ſame ſituation he would feel with me. I am pleaſed with my own feelings, when I imagine that another placed in my ſituation would feel as I do. The ſentiment then of the diſintereſted ſpectator, becomes, in all caſes, the ſtandard of *propriety*. Solution of it by Dr. Smith.

Such are the aſpects of modern Ethics as a Science. It will be aſked, Whether the preſent ſketch aims at a theory more comprehenſive than any of theſe Philoſophers have eſtabliſhed? It will at once be granted, that Conclu-

* See Hume's Eſſays.

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all has been done, which genius can do, in theoriſing. I have often attempted to become an Ecclectic among their works, and in vain tried, to glean from their doctrines the ſame ſimple and decided deſcription of the law of morality, which experiments on the qualities of body have given of the law of gravitation.

It will be aſked, Whether Ethics admit of the ſame ſcientific certainty with phyſics? Ethics treat of Nature, phenomena are open to examination; we are only to try, whether they admit of a ſcientific analyſis like phyſics. The time was, when this ſubject too had its theories. The acute Des Cartes ſuppoſed the planets revolved by the power of a vortex. Had Newton offered a theory, he probably would have been more ingenious than Des Cartes, but perhaps as diſtant from truth. Let elegant decypherers of the human mind theoriſe, our enquiries aſpire only at a hiſtory of Nature.

PART II.

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAP. I.

Of the different Methods of ſtudying Nature.

CHAP. I.

Method in the ſtudy of Nature neceſſary.

THE faculties of the human mind, and the ſubjects to which they can be directed, have determined characters in Nature. If it is the employment, or the neglect of theſe faculties, which diſtinguiſhes the Peaſant from the Philoſopher, it is the method of directing them to their proper ſubjects, which diſtinguiſhes one Philoſopher from another.

Hiſtory ſhews mankind in different and diſtant ages, ſometimes advancing, ſometimes retiring from Nature, and from uſeful diſcoveries. We are ſtruck with the inventive powers of one, we are taught by the ſolid obſervations of another Philoſopher. We ſee one part of Nature emerging from myſticiſm and obſcurity, we ſee another

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another feeding, but deluding the eye with fantaſtic ſcenes. We aſk the queſtions—Is there a fixed method of directing the mind in the ſtudy of Nature? And does this method apply to all the poſſible demands of man? The anſwers to theſe queſtions will draw out to our view the different methods of ſtudying Nature, and ſhew us, that the method which has been employed in Natural Philoſophy, is fitted to diſplay the true hiſtory of every part of Nature.

Of the methods of Art and of Nature.

The human mind has but two obvious methods of acquiring the knowledge of Nature.

1. It is addreſſed by ſome general rule or principle, under the authority of which it is to explain every particular phenomenon or caſe.

2. It is to obſerve particular phenomena or caſes, and from their coincidence in qualities and relations, it is to deduce the rule or law of Nature by which they are diſtinguiſhed.

General characters of theſe methods.

Theſe methods of ſtudying Nature are ſimple, but oppoſite to each other in their characters. The firſt is artificial, and the method of communicating inſtruction; the ſecond is natural, and the method of obſerving or of diſcovering. By the one we depend, or reſt on the precepts of other men;

men; by the other, we depend on our own exertions and induſtry. CHAP. I.

The ſtudies of mankind in every age have been directed by the one or by the other of theſe methods, and we can beſt judge of their comparative merits or value, by their ſpirit, and by the effects or conſequences which they have produced.

From the ſpirit of the method of Art, it ſeems to bind the underſtanding in fetters. Inſtead of drawing its philoſophy from Nature, it is to draw Nature from its philoſophy. The Philoſophers offer us rules or principles; and we are to think as they thought, reaſon as they reaſoned. When we copy from Ariſtotle or Locke, we copy from great artiſts, but we have not obſerved ſimilar objects to thoſe, which addreſſed their ſenſes, their taſte, and their underſtanding.

From the ſpirit of the method of Nature, it gives freedom to all the active and aſpiring powers of the mind. Inſtead of binding the underſtanding to any doctrine, it deduces all its principles from the qualities of phenomena. While it reveres the philoſophical leſſons which have done honour to human reaſon, it meaſures theſe very leſſons by the ſubjects they profeſs to explain. It ſees their approaches, or it detects their wanderings from truth, diſcriminates the objects

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objects of ſenſation, of taſte, and of the underſtanding, and determines, from their characters, what are the laws of their Nature.

Value of the method of Art examined from its ſpirit and from hiſtory.

If we decide from the range which the powers of the mind have in theſe different and oppoſite directions, we ſhall pronounce the method of principles, to be narrow in its character; the method of obſervation, to be liberal and aſpiring in its objects and in its application. The effects of theſe methods in the actual hiſtory of mankind will furniſh a ſimilar concluſion.

The method of Art appeared very early in the ſchools. This is by no means a proof of defects in the faculties of the firſt Philoſophers, but a natural circumſtance common to all early enquirers. When men began the ſtudy of Nature, phenomena were new, qualities were imperfectly perceived, opinion therefore could only be formed. When the luſtre and diſtance of a ſtar ſtruck the eye, when its places of riſing and ſetting in the horizon were obſerved and deſcribed, if knowledge was narrow it was ſolid. This ſlow obſervation, however, neither ſuited the pride of the ſage, nor the credulity of barbarians, the one thought he could draw principles from his own mind, not from the ſubjects which his mind obſerved; the other liſtened

tened to theſe principles, as more ſeemingly profound, more coincident with his feelings, and better fitted for his prejudices. The ſtar was thought to be the reſidence of an inviſible being, and its motions were accounted for, like thoſe of the human body which are under the direction of the will. The Greeks thus learned the obſervations and ſuperſtitions of the Orientals, and though poliſhed by the fineſt productions of taſte, they adopted the hypotheſes of their Philoſophers, without ſubjecting them to obſervation and experiment. They attempted to arrange all the ſubjects of human knowledge, and invented an art, which was to direct the powers of reaſon in the diſcovery of truth; the firſt conſiſted of abſtractions, which were not deduced from the hiſtory of Nature; the ſecond exhibits the mechanics of reaſoning, not the deductions of ſcience.

It ſeems paradoxical how ſuch inventions could ariſe, and not leſs ſo, how ages could implicitly adopt them. The firſt may be explained, as the reſult of an imperfect obſervation of Nature, terminating in the paſſion for ſophiſtry; the ſecond can be accounted for, by the character of the ſubjects to which both the arrangements and art of reaſoning were applied.

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The Greek language was cultivated, and their political diſputes had created and perfected ſophiſtry, when the Sciences were unknown. An arrangement, therefore, which correſponded with the genius of the Greek language, and with the prevailing taſte for ſophiſtry, was received as comprehenſive and perfect. The ſubjects to which it was directed, and the apparently decided power of the ſyllogiſtic art confirmed its authority. If this method had been directed to the natural hiſtory of body or of mind, the fixed qualities of the ſubjects would have diſcovered its defects. Body preſents the qualities of ſolidity, figure, motion from impulſe, &c. Experiment, not abſtraction, leads forward in forming its hiſtory. Mind preſents the ſtriking qualities of ſenſation, underſtanding, and will, &c. Attention to the manner in which theſe faculties exert themſelves, (which is the ſame with experiments dictated by the characters of a ſubject), would have ſhewn, that here alſo obſervation not abſtraction, can create a natural hiſtory.

The ſubjects, however, to which the artificial method was directed for a ſucceſſion of ages, were neither the natural hiſtory of body nor of mind.

The ſects had their ſecret and popular doctrines. The ſecret doctrines were myſteries

teries and abſtractions, the popular were addreſſed to the paſſions. The ſecret pretended to explain the origin and laws of Nature, when neither the hiſtory of Nature nor its laws were underſtood; the popular deſcribed contemplation, pleaſure, and active virtue, as oppoſite, and yet true eſtimates of human nature. The ſubjects thus, to which the artificial method was applied, were not by their character fitted to detect its weakneſs. The decline of civilization in Greece and in Rome, and with it the diſappearance of original genius, took place before the defects in the Greek hypotheſes were perceived. Genius has often appeared among a barbarous people when they are riſing to freedom; but when once the ſpirits of freemen are depreſſed, it languiſhes and diſappears. If the Romans were not diſtinguiſhed by original obſervations, but fettered by foreign and artificial leſſons, their ſucceſſors were loſt in the mazes of eccleſticiſm, or in the nominal diſtinctions and unmeaning topics of the ſchoolmen. The method of Art thus, by its ſpirit, narrowed the range of the original powers of the mind, and, in its conſequences, affords not one important or uſeful diſcovery.

Value of the method of Science

If we decide, on the other hand, on the value of the method of Science, either from

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examined from its ſpirit and from hiſtory.

from its ſpirit or from its conſequences, we ſhall find, that it gives to the mind its proper direction, and that it has led to all the diſcoveries which do honour to human reaſon.

By the method of Science the mind fixes on phenomena in Nature, follows them till it learns their hiſtory, and continues its purſuit till it diſcovers their laws. It is the method of interpreting Nature.

By the method of Science the modern Philoſophers have made all their fine diſcoveries. Lord Bacon taught, That mankind had been amuſed with diſtinctions, which exiſted in Imagination not in Nature; and the prejudices in their favour muſt be blotted out, whether they ſpring from defects in the mind itſelf, or from the authority of Philoſophers. The effects which are diſcernible in the uſeful Arts will ſhew the effects which take place in the great machine of Nature, and their cauſes will thus be evolved. The laws in mechanics, in aſtronomy, and in optics, have in this manner been demonſtrated, and the diſcoveries of the Philoſophers, by enlarging the ſphere of the Arts, have changed the aſpects of Society from rude to refined.

Is it a vain demand to aſk, whether this method can be applied to moral Nature? The

The Art of War was thought to be perfect among the Romans, till the ſuperior diſcipline of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal obliged them to learn from their enemies. The Art of Reaſoning was thought to be perfect in Ariſtotle's leſſons, till, by reverſing them, the Natural Philoſophers made their diſcoveries.

The progreſs of the human mind when it makes a diſcovery, is to obſerve phenomena, arrange them by their qualities, and to infer what are the laws by which they are characteriſed. This we may conſider as the method of diſcovery.

Branches of the method of Science.

The progreſs of the mind in forming the hiſtory of any part of Nature, is the Science of Analyſis. The progreſs of the mind, in deducing from this hiſtory the laws of Nature, is the Science of Induction.

As both of theſe Sciences appeared in the diſcoveries made in Phyſics, we have only to delineate the ſteps of obſervation in making them. We may then perceive the true character of the principles of Natural Philoſophy, and attempt their application to moral Phenomena.

CHAP. II.

Of the Science of Analyſis *.

PART II.

General characters of a Science.

SCIENCE ſignifies the knowledge of the Laws of Nature. It is particular, when it affords the knowledge of any particular branch, as of mechanics; it is general, when it affords the knowledge of any great branch, as of the planetary ſyſtem, or of the human mind.

In acquiring any Science, the human mind has a determined progreſs; it obſerves phenomena, it arranges them into the claſſes which their qualities point out, and it infers from the ſame qualities what are the rules of acting peculiar to each, or what are the laws of their Nature.

Of that of Analyſis and Induction.

The Science of Analyſis explains the laws which the human mind follows when it obſerves and arranges the hiſtory of Nature. The Science of Induction ſhews the laws which the mind follows when it

* See Bacon, Nov. Org. et de Dig. et Aug. Scien. Eſſai ſur l' Art d' Obſerver par Carrard. Newton Principia. Firſt Principles of Philoſophy, third edition.

infers what are the great truths or laws in any department of Nature.

It is more difficult to trace and aſcertain the laws of the human mind in ſucceſsful obſervation and diſcovery, than it is to trace and underſtand the laws which theſe diſcoveries eſtabliſh. But the path which Newton purſued, is not itſelf a ſubject of leſs curioſity or importance, than the diſcoveries to which it conducted him.

We ſhall firſt ſtate the great characters of the Science of Analyſis, and then ſhew, that it is ſpecific to the different Sciences.

Of the particular characters of Analyſis.

When we analyſe any part of Nature, we proceed from the obſervation of particular phenomena to the diſcovery of real arrangements; or we deſcend in the ſcale, and return from arrangements to the particular phenomena which they comprehend. By theſe means we become acquainted, not only with the greater claſſes into which Nature divides her works, ſuch as body and mind, but with the ſubordinate branches of both.

Analyſis on the one hand examines phenomena in their qualities and relations, till it aſſembles all of the ſame kind, or forms a ſpecies. It is here equivalent to a Natural Hiſtory. Analyſis, on the other hand, carries back the natural hiſtorian to the ſteps

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by which he has aſcended, and either confirms or explodes his principles.

Every ſtudent of Nature is not to expect to beeome a diſcoverer, he is only to read from the diſcoveries of others; but in reading the arrangements of Harvey and of Galileo in the animated and mechanical branches of Nature, we place ourſelves in their ſituations and tread their ſteps, with the hope that we ſhall either find their principles coincident with Nature, or diſcover the phenomena which contradict them. We are thus to reap a double profit from their labours, not only to perceive the order of Nature, but the progreſs of the mind in reaching the knowledge of it.

The progreſs of the mind in analyſing, may be marked by an aſcending and deſcending ſcale of obſervation. To the firſt we ſhall give the name of *Analyſis by Compoſition*, to the ſecond of *Analyſis by Decompoſition*.

Of Analyſis by Compoſition.

Analyſis by Compoſition traces objects by their qualities, to the relations which they hold in Nature; Analyſis by Decompoſition examines claſſes and relations which are apparently general, by reducing them to the ſimple phenomena which they comprehend.

The

The ſcale of the firſt may be marked in the language of the natural hiſtorian, by the terms, individual or variety, ſpecies and genera, in organized Nature; variety, kind and genera, in mineral Nature. The ſcale of the ſecond has only to reverſe theſe terms.

We ſhall ſuppoſe an obſerver of Nature analyſing by compoſition. The very firſt effort of attention would diſcover to him, that ſome objects addreſſed his ſenſes, others his underſtanding: he would diſtinguiſh the one by the name of body, or matter; the other, by the name of mind, or intelligence. This diſtinction once made, his curioſity would render his attention more minute and particular. The objects of the ſenſes, from their obviouſneſs, and uſes in life, would claim his firſt examination. He would diſtinguiſh bodies by the comparative adheſion of their parts, into ſolid and fluid. From ſtriking qualities, his obſervation would direct him to effects: he would perceive that changes are continually taking place. His curioſity would induce him to examine the origin of theſe changes.—One claſs of them he would diſcover referable to attraction and repulſion, another to the production and deſtruction of motion. He would give the name of cauſes to the powers which

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produced theſe effects. By the powers which ſeemed to direct in the different parts of material Nature, he would divide its hiſtory into ſo many diſtinct ſpecies or claſſes. His Analyſis would gradually become more preciſe. He would obſerve, that ſome objects moved from place to place, ſome were fixed to the ſoil, ſome compoſed it. His curioſity would ſoon lead him to diſcover, that ſome of theſe objects were organized, ſome of them non-organized; that the former had a birth, a vigour, a decay, and a ſucceſſion; that the latter were inert, and ſubject to different and diſtinct conditions. His obſervations would ſtill become more particular: he would diſtinguiſh the external figures, ſtructures and tendencies of the animated tribes, and thus form the hiſtory of one branch; he would diſtinguiſh the ſtructure, foliage, and germination of the vegetable ſpecies, and form the hiſtory of a ſecond branch; he would diſcover the appearances, intrinſic qualities, and uſes of the mineral ſubſtances, and thus add a third branch to the kingdoms of Nature.

Analyſis by Compoſition thus directs him in examining all the parts of material Nature. It firſt diſcovers the great objects of the ſenſes, points out the qualities of theſe objects, as the ſimple means of arranging them;

them; and thus in paſſing through the ſteps of individuals, ſpecies, and genera, affords a natural hiſtory which may be made the foundation of a ſubſequent Science.

Of Analyſis by Decompoſition.

We ſhall next ſuppoſe an obſerver of Nature analyſing by Decompoſition. In this ſituation he is not addreſſed by phenomena, but by ſome hiſtory already formed. Newton himſelf was taught by the diſcoveries which Galileo and Kepler had made: he had therefore to bring back the arrangements in their hiſtories of Nature, to the ſimple phenomena which they comprehended. Analyſis by Decompoſition is therefore the means which an obſerver employs to detect error, to examine an hypotheſis, and to reconcile Philoſophy to Nature. Sir Iſaac Newton ſummed up the hiſtory of Nature, by diſcovering that all bodies gravitated to a center. Our obſerver is not to adopt even this principle with implicit deference; with the ſame ſpirit he might have adopted the Vortices of Des Cartes! Though he obſerves, that ſolids and fluids yield to this law, he muſt repeat the experiments in Mechanics, Pneumatics, and Optics, and carry forward his obſervation, from them, to the auguſt phenomena in the planetary world. If his argument is, that the laws of matter are uniform and univerſal, he muſt ſupport it by return-

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ing from the centripetal and centrifugal forces calculated in the motions of the planets, to the ſame phenomena in Mechanics, till at laſt he reaches the ſimple facts with which he ſet out when he analyſed by compoſition.

The ſcale of his obſervation is here only reverſed, for he has brought back the genus to the ſpecies of Bodies which it comprehended, and each of theſe to their ſimple phenomena.

If an obſerver of Nature ſhall direct his views to the other great department of Nature, or to Mind, the ſcale of his progreſs in aſcending and deſcending is equally ſimple.

After diſtinguiſhing Mind as a part of Nature, he perceives that it reaſons, acts, and is ſuſceptible of pleaſure and pain. He obſerves that certain objects act on his organs of Senſe, and that this action is followed by perceptions of the Mind reſpecting the qualities of theſe objects. He obſerves that he can remember, abſtract, imagine, reaſon, and judge, and that he is conſcious of all theſe operations. Effects thus direct him to the ſources of his knowledge, as they did to the general qualities of Body. He next obſerves that he has the power of beginning and continuing Action, and that the feeling of right and of wrong modifies

and

and refines this power. Effects thus ſhew him the ſources of Action.

He obſerves, that beſides the pleaſures and pains of the animal œconomy, he experiences from different objects emotions, paſſions and affections, which become intenſe and permanent as their exciting cauſes and their ſpecific pleaſures and pains have been ſubjects of reflection. He obſerves, that beſides the mere organic pleaſures of ſeeing and hearing, the objects of theſe ſenſes have qualities with which the imagination and paſſions can aſſociate the pleaſures of the heart. Effects thus direct him to the ſources of Pleaſure and of Pain.

Analyſis by Compoſition is thus fitted to afford an equally faithful picture of Nature, in the mental, as it has done in the material department; while by Decompoſition, it examines the ſhadings and colours which approach the eye, and diſcovers whether they repreſent fantaſtic or real ſcenes.

Analyſis has decided and marked characters; and it is ſpecific to the different Sciences.

Analyſis is ſpecific to the different Sciences.

1. Mathematics as a ſcience, explain the relations of Quantity numbered and meaſured. An obſerver begins with tracing the progreſs of the mind, in acquiring a ſimple conception

Analyſis in Mathematics.

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conception of Quantity. He finds that it diveſts objects of every quality, but their individuality and their extenſion. That it employs cyphers to repreſent the one, lines the other. That it combines unity with itſelf, in Arithmetic; lines with themſelves, in Geometry. That it can ſimplify the laſt by the aid of the firſt, and thus riſe from individual units or lines to all their ſpecies and genera. In Decompoſition he only reverſes this order, by deſcending from the moſt complicated propoſitions, to the ſimple perceptions of Quantity, on which they primarily reſted.

In Phyſics.

2. Phyſics explain the laws that are common to Matter or Body in general. An obſerver of Nature perceives, that in ſome caſes the parts of Body adhere cloſely, or have figure, that they have gravity, and are apparently at reſt or in motion, and that theſe phenomena can be meaſured. In other caſes, he perceives that the parts do not adhere cloſely, or that the Body is fluid, but ſtill they have gravity, or weight, and motion, which can be meaſured. Such circumſtances lead him to perceive, that there are common qualities which ſeem to unite the whole department of Bodies, as that they occupy ſpace, have gravity, and are ſuſceptible of motion, and that all theſe phenomena are meaſurable by the ſcience of Quantity.

Quantity. He thus preſerves the chain of his perceptions reſpecting Body, from their moſt ſimple phenomena to their moſt complicated aſpects, and has a perfect meaſurement of his progreſs.

In Natural Hiſtory.

3. Natural Hiſtory deſcribes the qualities which diſtinguiſh the claſſes into which Nature has divided her material productions. An obſerver begins with the external figures of animals, plants, and foſſils. He next examines the ſtructures of the two former, and finds them organized; of the latter, and finds it non-organized. To render his knowledge of the ſtructures of animals more complete, he diſſects, aids his eye with glaſſes, or injects liquors into the blood veſſels. He finds ſuch proceſſes muſt be waved in tracing vegetable productions, and he uſes maceration in place of injection. If he cannot employ either of theſe proceſſes in examining mineral ſubſtances, he can add to his obſervation of the natural aſpects of earths, ſtones, metals, inflammable ſubſtances, &c. the chemical agency of heat, cold, and mixture, and thus aſcertain by their qualities their place in the hiſtory of the kingdoms of Nature.

Of Ethics.

4. Ethics explain the great qualities in human nature, upon which the happineſs of individuals, citizens, and nations depend. If an obſerver of Nature analyſes by Compoſition,

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Compoſition, he traces from the objects of the moral faculty, the diſpoſitions and actions which produce the happineſs of the individual; he follows the law of the moral faculty, when it becomes the ſpirit of municipal inſtitutions, and he finds that it is only extended in its application, when it becomes the meaſure of national felicity. If he analyſes by Decompoſition, he deſcends from the apparent aſpects of national happineſs, to the principles of municipal laws, till, in the diſpoſitions of the mind itſelf, he diſtinguiſhes the characters of the moral faculty.

The difficulty of preſerving the chain of moral phenomena, in the aſcending or deſcending ſcale of Analyſis, has probably created the erroneous opinion, that this part of Nature does not admit of obſervation and experiment.

Such is the Science of Analyſis, or the laws which the human mind follows, when it forms the hiſtory of Nature. The ſubjects of the different Sciences ſhew that it is ſpecific to each of them.

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Of the Science of Induction.

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Character of the Science of Induction.

IF the Science of Analyſis delineated the progreſs of obſervation in forming the hiſtory of Nature, the Science of Induction is to trace its progreſs when it aſcertains the laws of Nature.

The writings of the ancients do not furniſh a deſcription of this Science. Their views of Induction were ſubſervient to the ſyllogiſtic art.—Whatever you affirm or deny of any individual of a ſpecies, or of any ſpecies of a genus; may be affirmed of all ſuch individuals, ſpecies, or genera. Truth thus was to depend on the form of the argument.

Views of philoſophers reſpecting it.

Lord Bacon was the firſt philoſopher who offered a deſcription of the Science of Induction. " Man (ſays that Philoſopher) " has been inattentive to Nature, and to " the ſtrength of his own capacities. He " is but the interpreter of her works; all " prejudices muſt be blotted out from his " mind; it muſt be a *tabula raſa*, on " which

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" which the hand of Nature alone is to
" write; he muſt read the laws of Nature
" from real phenomena, and he will find
" them in the uſeful Arts. He can riſe
" from them to general inductions, and
" theſe are the axioms which he muſt uſe
" in the interpretation of Nature."

The Reſtorer of the Sciences had not the advantage of ſeeing a full interpretation of the laws of Nature in any one branch, but he gave a view of that diſtant land, into which he was never to enter.

Specific characters of it.

We can now rear the Science of Induction on that of Analyſis. It conſiſts in deducing from the claſſes of phenomena aſcertained by Analyſis, what are the laws of Nature in each of them. While the obſerver of Nature was arranging phenomena, their qualities directed his attention. By the ſame means he is now to conduct the progreſs of his reaſonings, till he diſcovers the rules which obtain in the different departments of Nature. " Give me (ſaid Archi-
" medes) a place to ſtand on, and I will
" move the world." Give a man of obſervation and induſtry, the means of riſing from the hiſtory to the laws of Nature, and he will do more than Archimedes promiſed, he will tell how worlds are moved. Theſe means are comprehended in the terms, *phenomena*, *experiments*, *evidence*, *demonſtration*.

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Characters of the Phenomena which afford it.

I. The Philoſopher gives the name of Phenomena to any appearance or fact in Nature; as, the ſun, the earth, man; the ſun ſhines, the earth gravitates, man thinks. When he attempts to reaſon, he continues the chain of phenomena from the claſs to the law. When phenomena are fitted to direct him in this progreſs, they have the marked characters of *obviouſneſs*, *uniformity*, and *univerſality*.

They muſt be obvious.

Phenomena in Matter muſt either be obvious to the ſenſes, or be made ſo by art. When art is uſed to extend this ſphere of the eye, the very phenomena in this art itſelf muſt be obvious, otherwiſe, inſtead of a more diſtinct view of Nature, the ſenſe might be deceived with ſhadows and monſters. The organization of animals has thus been rendered obvious by the microſcope, and by the injection of fluids of different colours.

The Phenomena of Mind are either obvious ſimply, or made ſo by art and addreſs. Though the perception that ſolidity is a quality of body indicated by the organ of touch, is obvious, yet art is employed to diſcover the characters of the organ, of the ſenſation, and of its attendant perception. Memory is a ſimple faculty, but its characters are rendered obvious, by the art of directing obſervation to the relations by which it

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it aids itſelf. Though obſervation of any part of Nature is bounded by the qualities of the ſubject, it muſt be continued till it renders them obvious.

They muſt be uniform.

The Phenomena which afford an induction, to obviouſneſs muſt add uniformity. It is not enough that an obſerver ſee the lever raiſe a weight in ſome particular caſe, he muſt try it in every poſſible caſe. In one, or in a few inſtances, he might have been deceived. What he aſcribed to the inſtrument, by which his ingenuity had leſſened his labour, might be owing to a very different cauſe. If he concluded haſtily, he might conclude erroneouſly. His eye can follow the uniformity of the Phenomenon in all its concealed forms, of the wedge, the ſcrew, the pulley. He thence deduces his certainty of mechanical effects, he riſes from them to the knowledge of forces, till at laſt he diſcovers, that the Phenomena which at firſt appeared to him to be particular, are uniform in material Nature.

In the moſt changing aſpects of Nature, this uniformity muſt be obtained before we can advance in the chain to induction. When Harvey diſſected the heart, and obſerved how it propelled the blood by its muſcular contractions, he gave obviouſneſs to a law of Nature. Succeeding Anatomiſts have

have ſhewed, that theſe phenomena are uniform. By injections of mercury, wax, &c. they have not only traced the courſe of the circulation, but by experiments on different animals aſcertained the degrees of its velocity.

When the human mind is examined, its power of beginning and continuing action is an obvious phenomenon. Propenſities may impel this power, opinions may ſway it, judgments may direct it, ſentiments may lead it, but the uniformity of the power itſelf is fixed. The weight may be too great for the lever, but the uniform power of the lever is not on that account deſtroyed. The blood may preternaturally increaſe and deſtroy life, but the dependence of life on circulation is uniform. Chains and a priſon may conſtrain actions, but they change not the power of the mind to begin and to continue action.

They muſt be univerſal.

The phenomena which afford induction to the qualities of obviouſneſs and uniformity, muſt add the character of being univerſal. When Newton made his great diſcovery he compared all the diſcoveries of former natural Philoſophers, and endeavoured to find out, how far phenomena in each of the aſpects of body coincided. He ſaw that bodies on the ſurface of the earth

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gravitated, he carried forward his obſervation to the moon, and concluded from mathematical evidence, that it was retained in its orbit by the united effects of projection and attraction, or that it gravitated. In a ſimilar manner he extended his views to the planetary ſyſtem, and demonſtrated the phenomena of gravitation to be univerſal.

When we examine external objects, we diſcover, that they are fitted to act on our organs of ſenſe, that every ſenſation is attended with a perception in the mind, and we conclude, that the organ, the medium, the ſenſation, and the perception are univerſal.

Characters of the experiments which aſcertain Phenomena.

II. The characters of Phenomena which afford an induction are aſcertained by experiment. Repeated obſervation directed by the qualities of the ſubject obſerved, explain the ſimple meaning and character of experiment. Every part of Nature, therefore, has experiments which are ſpecific to it. It is by attending to this circumſtance that we ſhall learn how to fix our reaſonings on Nature.

In Natural Hiſtory.

1. *Natural Hiſtory*, as a ſcience, diſcovers the general facts which characteriſe what are termed the kingdoms of Nature. The manner in which Naturaliſts have either ſucceſsfully

ſucceſsfully conducted, or have failed in their experiments, will afford a plain deſcription of them in this department. Swamerdam and Ruiſch, by the injection of fluids, had exhibited the organic ſyſtem of animals. It was thought that the ſame means would exhibit the organization of plants: ſuch analogy has ſometimes been uſeful, but more frequently been dangerous in ſcience. Du Hamel tried it on plants, and failed; he next boiled the vegetable, to extract its natural juices, but he only deſtroyed its fibres; at laſt he thought of maceration, and then put the fibres into a coloured liquor, and ſucceeded. Nature thus is not to be forced; experiments muſt be dictated by her procedure.

Though there may be analogies in the ſame part of Natural Hiſtory, we are not to direct our experiments by them. In comparative anatomy we diſcover many phenomena, which we try to reconcile to known cauſes in the human body, and yet can find, from more minute obſervation, that we have been deceived. Mariot corrected Haller's obſervations on the eyes of fiſhes.

It is neceſſary, when we find any new appearance, to decide from qualities only. Though platina has qualities which have an affinity to thoſe of gold, it wants others;

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and experiments have fixed its own character as a metal.

The reſources which gratify curioſity ſharpen the ſpirit of invention. Before the invention of the barometer, it was difficult to fix the ſpecific gravity of fluids. The hints of Galileo led Torricelli to ſubſtitute mercury inſtead of water, and thus eaſily to meaſure the weight of the atmoſphere.

Gold and ſilver in fuſion form a maſs which does not eaſily ſeparate; a nitrous acid will act on the ſilver, though it has no effect on the gold. It appears from theſe familiar inſtances, that experiments in Natural Hiſtory conſiſt in repeated obſervations on the Phenomena of body, and that they take their character or deſcription from the qualities of the ſubjects on which they are made.

In Phyſics.

2. *Phyſics* aſcertain the phenomena which are common to the whole of material Nature. Analyſis enables an obſerver to diſtinguiſh the claſſes of ſolids and fluids; he has now to deſcribe that progreſs by which he acquires the knowledge of general facts.

(1.) In mechanics he is directed by a kind of inſtinct, when, as a rude artiſt, he collects the materials of which he is to build his cottage or his canoe; or of which he is to make his bow or his ſword. The poſts

on

on which the roof is to hang are placed at diſtances fitted to ſuſtain its weight; the beams have a ſtrength proportioned to the weight of the leaves and ſtraw which exclude the heat or the cold. If the raiſing of the beams exceeds the power of the arm, a lever is uſed, and a greater weight ſuggeſts the unwieldy pulley. Taſte gradually unites with the ſenſe of utility in forming the rude arch; at laſt he infers, that all bodies have weight, and may be moved by proportioned forces.

The experiments which were at firſt in ſubſervience to a rude Art, are now directed by a kind of Science. He examines the effects produced by lengthening the lever, by doubling the ſcrew, and by multiplying the pulley; he perceives the motion of bodies in the direct and oblique lines. He inſtitutes a compound mechanics; the centripetal and centrifugal forces appear. To keep obſervation on the chain of theſe experiments the exact meaſurements of quantity are employed: all the effects which he perceives admit of encreaſe, diminution, and meaſurement; at laſt the laws of mechanical motion and gravitation are found to be general facts in this part of Nature, and the experiments which have conducted

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to them have uniformly been directed by the qualities of the ſubject.

(2.) In Hydroſtatics we can trace a ſimilar progreſs, leading to the ſimple deſcription of experiments. Directed by inſtinct and neceſſity the Savage hollows the tree and floats it on the ſurface of the water. The paddle and the oar are levers, whoſe powers begin and accelerate its motion. The ſail, filled by the gale, wafts it without labour to or from the ſhore; the oar, or rudder, direct its courſe. The mariner thus employs the mechanical powers, and as perfection in his Art advances, he diſcovers the general qualities of body, meaſures them by lines and cyphers, and deduces the reſult as a general fact.

When Archimedes went into the bath, and found that the ſurface of the water was raiſed, he ſaw that a ſolid body immerſed in a fluid diſplaced a quantity equal to its volume, but no accident occurred to ſhew him, that water in a tube will riſe to a height equal to its ſource.

When ſolids and fluids were firſt compared, it was not ſuppoſed that the hydroſtatic balance was to aſcertain the true weight of the former; nor was it imagined, that fluids in motion followed the ſame laws with ſolids.

Experiments

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Experiments on fluids thus, either when they diſcovered their ſpecific gravities, or the laws of fluids in motion, conſiſted in repeated obſervation on Phenomena, and were dictated by the qualities of the ſubject.

(3.) In Pneumatics the diſcovery of the true character of experiments has been equally ſlow. Like the other parts of Nature, the action of the Air firſt appeared in rude Arts: when the wind ſifted the chaff, or filled the rude ſail, mankind were contented with effects; the cauſe was not obſerved. Accident, or the ingenuity of an artiſt, raiſed water in a pump by the action of the air; and fancy ſaid, abhorrence, a paſſion of the human mind, was the cauſe. Though Galileo traced this effect, he did not diſcover the cauſe. By carrying a tube filled with mercury, to the top of a mountain, and obſerving that as he aſcended the mercury ſunk, ſo that when he was at the ſummit the mercury was ſeveral inches lower in the tube than it had been at the baſe, Paſcal concluded that a column of one fluid could be balanced by a column of another. The effects of heat on the atmoſphere were next noticed, and the Thermometer and Barometer invented. The courſe of obſervation was

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now fixed, and the common and mephitic ſtates of the air explained. The qualities of the ſubject have guided and decided the character of experiment.

(4.) In Optics, experiments have had an equally marked progreſs. The peaſant enjoyed the pleaſures of ſight, before the Philoſophers began to examine their ſource; and when they made the attempt, they conſulted imagination. The illuſions of ſight made it difficult to aſcertain the true characters either of the eye or of its medium. Hence it was conjectured that an image paſſed from the eye to the object, and an idea was excited in the mind. The coats and humours of the eye have been diſſected, ſenſibility aſſigned to the nerve, the laws of reflection and refraction of light analyſed, the nature of colours from refraction diſcovered, the velocity of a ray from the planets to the earth calculated, and the ſyſtem of Nature laid open in this ſenſe by Newton. In all this progreſs, the qualities of the ſubject have guided the experiments.

In Phyſics of every department, experiments conſiſt in repeated obſervation on the qualities of Body; tracing them through all the aſpects of ſolids and fluids, the exact meaſurements of Mathematics preſerving the

the chain unbroken, till at laſt the eye could read in effects the great cauſes which act in material Nature. CHAP. III.

3. *Pneumatology* explains the laws of the human mind. Do theſe laws admit of repeated obſervation, bounded by the qualities of the ſubject, or of experiment? In Pneumatology.

The rude Arts, which firſt diſcover the employment of the powers of the mind, appear in the opinions and conduct of a ſimple people. They are ſo warped with feelings and prejudices, that till degrees of refinement on them begin, they do not take the aſpects of Arts; at laſt when language and maxims of conduct become objects of attention, ſpeculations reſpecting the characters of the mind appear. They aim not ſo much at obſervation, as at reaſoning: ignorant men reaſon much about a few facts, and receive the moſt limited deciſions of the underſtanding for truth. At laſt the ſources of knowledge, of action, and of pleaſure and pain, begin to be obſerved, but the progreſs of mankind in diſcriminating them has been gradual and unequal.

The ſources of knowledge, viz. Senſation, Underſtanding and Conſciouſneſs, admit however of repeated obſervation, limited by the nature of the ſubject. In Senſation, we can follow the nerve from the brain, feeding

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ing the organ; we can examine the ſtructure and characters of the organs and media, and decide on the kind of Senſation, and its accompanying perception. In the Underſtanding we can obſerve the faculties of Memory, Abſtraction, and Judgment in their exertions, and decide on their characters. The very Conſciouſneſs of all this progreſs, becomes itſelf a ſubject of attention. The ſources of Action, either the ſimple power of beginning and continuing it, or the power which directs Actions to ſelf, or to common preſervation, admit of obſervation, bounded by the ſubject. There is not a paſſion, nor a reflex feeling of the mind, that will not yield their character to obſervation, when it decides from their qualities.

In this Science, therefore, the ſubjects admit of experiment; if experiment means obſervation, that is continued, and bounded, by the qualities of the ſubject.

In Ethics.

4. *Ethics* explain the principles which direct man in domeſtic and public conduct. If, as in Phyſics, we follow the Phenomena from the rude Art to the Science, we ſhall find, that becauſe they did not admit of the ſame kind of experiment with material objects, it was concluded that experiment could make no part of this Science; but

but if experiments in Phyſics are dictated by the nature of the ſubject, the nature of the ſubject of Ethics may ſurely be appealed to with equal ſcientific propriety.

As in Phyſics, ſo rude Arts in Ethics diſcover the firſt aſpects of Nature. Rude ſubordinations and juriſdictions precede legiſlation and municipal inſtitutions; the ſimple proverb, the allegorical inſtruction; the ſpeculation, the ſcience. In Phyſics, experiments were ſtopped in their progreſs by the fancies of Abhorrence of Vacuity, and the Intellect of a planet. Experiments in Ethics have been ſtopped in their progreſs by refined ſpeculations to ſupport particular hypotheſes. In the one Science, experiments have rolled on, till they held out the great fact of Gravitation. Experiments bounded by the nature of the ſubject, are the only means which can ſimplify the multifarious Phenomena of the other Science, and exhibit general facts in moral Nature.

Characters of the Evidence which Experiments require.

III. The characters of the Phenomena and experiments which afford Induction being known, *Evidence* is the next link in the chain of Induction.

Evidence ſignifies the means which Nature furniſhes to diſcover the reality of the objects and relations which addreſs the human mind. Theſe means muſt themſelves be

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be Phenomena, and ſubjects of obſervation and experiment. Without this requiſite they might draw aſide inſtead of keeping the mind fixed on the order of Nature.

Scientific evidence is partly drawn from the Phenomena of the mind itſelf, partly from the objects which addreſs its faculties; and the following ſeem to be its natural claſſes.

1. Evidence of Conſciouſneſs and Intuition. This ſpecies refers entirely to the mind. It is conſcious of itſelf in all its operations, as when it thinks, acts, &c. The perceptions which we have when the qualities of objects mark at once their coincidence, give us a certainty equal to Conſciouſneſs. Things equal to the ſame third are equal to one another, is ſo obvious, that we refer the Intuition to Conſciouſneſs.

2. Evidence of Senſation. This ſpecies refers partly to the material objects and organs which miniſter to the mind, and partly to the mind itſelf. When it refers to the former, ſuch claſſes of Phenomena are appealed to, as the following:—A ſolid ſubſtance acting on the ſkin, which is the organ of Touch; a luminous body, on the eye which is the organ of Sight; the kinds of material objects and the degree of impreſſion are thus fixed by Nature; and the organ

muſt

muſt be in its ſound or perfect ſtate. When they are referred to the latter, the phenomenon appealed to is the act of Nature in intimating through a material organ, a Senſation to the mind which perceives the qualities and uſes of the object.

3. Evidence of effect and cauſe, or of the Underſtanding. The changes obſervable in Nature indicate cauſes or powers which produce them. A weight is raiſed by a lever; the raiſing the weight is the effect, the power of the lever is the cauſe. This ſpecies of evidence is collected, partly from the objects, partly from the operations of the Underſtanding. When it is collected from the objects chiefly, effects in Nature carry forward the mind to the diſcovery of cauſes. The motions of the planets are effects in Nature, which led the mind of Newton to obſerve the cauſes which produce them. When it is collected again from the operations of the Underſtanding chiefly, then, as in mathematics, the ſimple perceptions of quantity, whether numbered or meaſured are carried on in a train of intuitive judgments, and applied to demonſtrate the Phenomena of matter. In this view it is termed mathematical Evidence.

The original, or ſcientific kinds of Evidence are uſed in common life, though mankind

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kind are ſtrangers to the means they are employing.

The appeal is common and univerſal, to the Conſciouſneſs of any thought, to the having ſeen any object, or heard any ſound; or to the having ſeen any effect, and judged it to ariſe from ſome cauſe. The difference between the philoſopher and the peaſant is, that the former knows the Phenomena upon which Evidence reſts, the latter inſtinctively appeals to them, and without being able to explain their character, conſiders them as the fixed order of Nature *.

Characters of the demonſtrations which Phenomena, Experiments, and Evidence produce.

IV. Demonſtration is the laſt ſtep in the formation of an Induction. It ſhews the underſtanding, after a chain of intuitive judgments, aſcertaining a truth, as in mathematics, or a law of Nature, as in Phyſics. In obſerving Nature, the Philoſopher has diſcovered the characters of Phenomena by analyſis, by experiments, and by evidence; he has rendered qualities obvious and certain; at laſt his mind infers, that it has ob-

* When the original kinds of Evidence are not offered, but only a deſcription is brought of having uſed them, the Evidence is termed Teſtimony. The perſon giving the teſtimony does not contradict the original kinds of evidence, but only relates, that he himſelf had them for the fact or event which he is verifying. Experience is the effect of having uſed Evidence. It expreſſes the ſum of our knowledge or acquirements in Science or in common life.

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tained a perception of a truth, or of ſome fact in Nature. This progreſs of reaſoning is termed a Demonſtration. CHAP. III.

In *Mathematics*, Analyſis enables him to ſeparate from objects every quality but individuality and extenſion.

By experiments on the nature of quantity, he follows it through all the relations of arithmetic and geometry; its fixed characters enable him to preſerve the chain of intuitions, or to have a demonſtration.

In *Phyſics*, experiments, with the evidence of ſenſe and of the underſtanding, give a new character to Demonſtration. The ſimple mechanical powers addreſs the ſenſes, effects diſcover all the poſſible combinations of theſe powers, quantity is applied to meaſure them, and to continue the meaſurement by a chain of intuitions, to the demonſtration of the great laws of Nature.

In *Natural Hiſtory*, experiments ſhew, in the animated kingdom, that circulation and reſpiration are neceſſary to life; evidence proves the univerſality of this fact; and, if the Phenomena cannot, as in Phyſics, be meaſured by quantity; ſuch meaſurement is not neceſſary, the intuition from the experiment being ſimple and decided.

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In *Ethics*, analyſis and experiment diſtinguiſh the pleaſures and pains which are tranſient, as of the appetites, from thoſe which are refined, as of taſte; and both, from thoſe that are eſſential to domeſtic and public enjoyment. The Philoſopher traces the laſt of theſe by the evidence of Conſciouſneſs in the rights to life, to reaſon, and to induſtry; he calls in the evidence of effect and cauſe, and forms the intuitive judgment, that happineſs depends on the enjoyment of them. He continues, with a like experiment and evidence, his obſervation of the Phenomena of rights, to citizens governed by municipal, and to nations by public laws. Thus, by a chain (not meaſured like Phyſics by mathematics, becauſe the ſubjects are different, and the evidence is different, but equally perfect), he has a demonſtration of the law, that the happineſs of man depends on the preſervation of his rights. It is an error ariſing from limited views of the meaning of demonſtration, to ſay, that it is only to be found in Phyſics; the diſcoveries of Harvey and of Boyle have ſhewn it in Natural Hiſtory; and if the qualities of Phenomena aſcertained by Experiment and Evidence are purſued, it may be introduced into Ethics.

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Laws of the Science of Induction.

The following general laws of the Science of Induction ſpring from the hiſtory of the mind in ſucceſsful obſervation of Nature.

1. The human mind reaſons from the arrangements of Analyſis by experiments, which continue the chain of phenomena to the moſt general facts and laws of Nature.

2. The evidence of the truth of an Induction muſt be the obvious means which connect particular phenomena and arrangements with general facts and laws of Nature.

3. The laws of Nature diſcovered by Induction muſt be the rules and theories, which form, improve, and explain the Arts.

Effects of theſe laws in Phyſics.

Theſe laws of the Science of Induction may be illuſtrated both from the hiſtory of Phyſics from which they are drawn, and from the Phenomena in Ethics to which their application is to be directed.

When the Science of genuine Phyſics made its appearance in the accidental diſcoveries of Galileo, reſpecting the laws of falling bodies, the pendulum, &c. all was ſimple analyſis. When the teleſcope was drawing the planets within the ſphere of the human eye, the Philoſopher was ſtretching after the circumſtances which influence bodies, whoſe diſtances, motions, and magnitudes,

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he was to eſtimate. The experiments in mechanics had already diſcovered, that the qualities of bodies and their effects were fixed. The bold conjecture was made, that theſe qualities and effects alter not in any poſſible ſituation in which body can be placed. Des Cartes furniſhed his mathematical analyſis to keep the mind fixed on phenomena in examining this bold hypotheſis. Newton's eye followed the forces which obtain in mechanics, to thoſe which appear in the great machinery of Nature, and drew all the diſcoveries which former Philoſophers or himſelf had made into the ſimple diſcovery of gravitation.

Had the ancients been told, that a Philoſopher was to ariſe, who could explain all theſe ſecrets of Nature, and the geometers been told, that their ſcience was to guide his reaſonings, both would have worſhipped him in imagination, and held him to be a god.

Conjecture reſpecting the probable effects in Ethics.

May the moraliſt borrow from Natural Philoſophy, and by its principles limit his Science? Obſervation will ſhew him, that governments unequally ſecure the rights of nations, and laws thoſe of citizens. He muſt ſcrutinize the mind itſelf in ſearch of the real conſtituents of happineſs. Is it (he will aſk) appetite, paſſion, or reaſon? Is it wealth,

wealth, fame, or power? No!—He muſt obſerve what man univerſally feels and purſues. He feels his rights to life, to reaſon, to induſtry, and draws his ſword to defend them. To allow that all men have rights, is to have probity; nations combine to maintain them, and introduce juſtice among citizens. Society gives the trueſt proof of refinement, when it improves them, or is benevolent.

The Science of Analyſis and Induction can alone ſhew what are the great facts which obtain in the moral, as they have demonſtrated thoſe which regulate the phyſical world.

PART III.

SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

CHAP. I.

Preliminary Sketch of the General Hiſtory of the Human Mind.

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All Nature the ſubject of hiſtory.

NATURE preſents two claſſes of objects to the obſervation of man, matter or body, and mind or intelligent beings. The ſlighteſt effort of obſervation can diſtinguiſh them by their qualities.

The qualities of matter or body are of two kinds—The qualities, in the firſt place, which deſcribe it, as ſolidity, or having parts, occupying ſpace, and being ſubjected to motion from impulſe;—the qualities, in the next place, which fit it to act as an exciting cauſe of ſenſation in us. In this laſt caſe we give a name to the ſenſation, but have none for the quality in the body, ſuch are, heat, cold, moiſture, dryneſs, ſound, colour, &c. The former have been

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been termed the primary, the latter the ſecondary qualities of body.

The qualities of mind, or of intelligent beings, diſcover another department of Nature. Our obſervation may begin with other beings, or with ourſelves. We obſerve, that all animated natures ſeem to poſſeſs ſome inſtinct or intelligence, which directs them to the objects neceſſary for preſerving life and continuing their ſpecies; that though there is a conſtant ſucceſſion in Nature, a birth, a vigour, a decay, a diſſolution, ſtill the different ſpecies of animated beings are preſenting ſimilar objects, inſtincts and tendencies.

Natural hiſtory of the human mind.

If from other animated natures we direct our attention to ourſelves, we diſcover the ſame inſtinctive love of life, and the ſame power of acting. We find, that at one moment we are obſerving, or receiving knowledge; at another, we are acting for our own, or for the enjoyment of others; at a third, that we are experiencing pleaſure or pain. We employ Analyſis to diſtinguiſh theſe ſources of character in the human mind; and we find the Phenomena obvious, we can repeat our obſervations on them, and yet bound theſe obſervations by the qualities of the ſubject. We thus decide on the leading attributes of the human mind.

PART III.

Of its ſources of Knowledge.

Of ſenſation.

I. *The ſources of knowledge* are diſcovered by obſerving the manner in which the various kinds of it flow in upon the mind.

Senſation ſignifies the intimations which the mind receives from the impreſſion or agency of objects external to itſelf. Every ſenſation is followed by a perception of the mind. In this article the material objects and the organs of ſenſe form one ſubject of Analyſis, the ſenſations and perceptions form another.

The material objects which miniſter to ſenſation are fitted to act on the organs of ſenſe; the organs themſelves are a part of the animal ſyſtem. The qualities of material objects which fit them for this office have already been deſcribed: the qualities in the organs themſelves are ſubjects of anatomical analyſis. The brain is found to be the ſeat of ſenſibility, and the nerves, or branches, which come off from it, give ſenſibility to the ſolid parts of the ſtructure. A diſtinction is here, however, to be made between feeling and ſenſation. Feeling is the quality of a nerve, ſenſation of the organ of ſenſe. The ſkin which is the organ of touch, or the eye which is the organ of ſight, give ſenſations of hardneſs and colour; but if the ſkin is deſtroyed, or if the coats and humours of the eye are injured, theſe organs feel

feel pain, but give no ſenſation. The five organs of ſenſe have a ſtructure and have media, which ſhew them to be inſtruments fitted for the end or purpoſe of conveying different and diſtinctive intimations to the mind.

The ſenſations and their accompanying perceptions are ſubjects equally obvious. Touch both intimates the preſence of the qualities of body (as ſolidity, figure, &c.), which deſcribe it, and of thoſe (as heat, cold, &c.) which ſeem only to be fitted to act as an exciting cauſe of ſenſation in us. Taſting, ſmelling, and hearing, diſcover matter acting in different ways, as exciting cauſes of ſenſation; but the ſenſation itſelf, not its object, has the name. Sight, like touch, has a mixed character; colour and viſible extenſion are proper to the organ, ſolid dimenſions and diſtances are acquired.

Of the underſtanding.

In the Underſtanding we diſcover a higher ſource of knowledge. It obſerves, compares, arranges, and decides. For this purpoſe it employs memory to recal paſt perceptions: abſtraction, to arrange and generalize them: imagination, to form them into new combinations, which Nature ſometimes juſtifies, ſometimes contradicts: intuition, immediately to perceive the agreement of perceptions: reaſoning, to carry on intui-

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tions in train; and judgment, to infer the general fact or law of Nature.

Of Conſciouſneſs.

Conſciouſneſs marks the mind to have diſtinct perceptions, both of its own exiſtence, and of its ſenſations and judgments of every kind.

Of the Sources of Pleaſure and Pain.

II. *The ſources of pleaſure and pain* are diſcovered by obſerving the circumſtances which accompany their production.

Pleaſures and pains have their ſources in the animal œconomy, and in the mind with which it is connected.

Of Animal Pleaſure and Pain.

The pleaſures and pains of the animal œconomy are ſimple in their character. When they originate from the animal œconomy, they ſpring from its ſound or morbid ſtate. The animal is liable to a thouſand accidents both during the growth, when the fluids exceed the ſolids, and during its decay, when the encreaſe of theſe laſt inſenſibly uſhers forward death. When they originate in the appetites, they have an equally marked character. The appetite for food is a demand of Nature, which, when ſated, diſappears, and, when forced, terminates in the languor and diſeaſe of the ſenſualiſt. The appetite of the ſexes has a ſimilar limited character; with this difference, that the imagination can aſſociate it with the moſt elegant and virtuous feelings

ings of the heart. When viewed as an appetite only, its pleaſures are merely animal, and exceſs terminates in the pains and languor of the voluptuary; when viewed in its connection with the imagination, the appetite is forgotten in the refinement and delicacy of the paſſion which ſucceeds it.

Of the Pleaſures and Pains of the Mind.

When pleaſures and pains have their ſource in the mind, they ariſe from the emotions, paſſions, and affections, and from the reflex or refined ſenſes.

An emotion is a ſimple mental feeling, accompanied with pleaſure or pain; as that which we experience from viewing the riſing ſun, or hearing the loud thunder. If we look to animated Nature, the objects which excite emotions are numerous, if to intelligent natures they are endleſs.

Of the Paſſions.

When the mind can dwell on the emotion or on the characters of its objects, then deſire or averſion indicate that a paſſion has begun. We have a ſimple emotion of pleaſure in viewing beauty; but if intelligence or diſpoſition in the object render it and the feelings which it has produced ſubjects of attention or remembrance, the paſſion of love is produced. We have a ſimple emotion of pain in viewing deformity; but if cruel or unjuſt deeds fix attention on the object, or on the feeling, the paſſion of hatred ariſes.

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vation and ſcience, than the language in which muſic deſcribes the heart. The objects of the ſenſe of muſic are fixed, but the ſtudy and aſſociations of them with the other pleaſures of the mind, diſcovers the ſenſe to be reflex.

The organ of ſeeing has pleaſures from its medium being ſuited to the exact conformation of all the parts in its mechanics. The objects of the eye have not leſs a fixed character in the qualities which ſuggeſt the ſenſe of beauty. Colours which are ſoft give more pleaſure than thoſe which are ſtrong. Figures which have eaſe and grace, as of an Apollo, than figures which have ſtiffneſs and irregularity, as of a dancing-maſter, or a dwarf. Situation places an object in the points of view where its effects are felt by the eye. If animation appears in an object, and does not break the effects of the preceding qualities, the pleaſure is heightened; but to expreſſion, we muſt aſſign the greateſt power in commanding the ſenſe of beauty. Such objects as the blue ſky, the variegated flower, the floating ſail, the paſturing herd, are beautiful. It is the union of colour, figure, motion, and animation, with the expreſſions of intelligence and diſpoſition, that renders the human form beautiful. It is

the concentering of theſe qualities in points of view which encreaſe their effects, either in natural objects, in imitation, or in deſcription, which marks the efforts, and gives the pleaſures of taſte.

The organic pleaſures of the eye, and the qualities of the objects which excite the feeling of beauty, are fixed; but the ſtudy of both heightens and refines the pleaſure.

The organic ſenſations of the eye and of the ear may riſe above the exertions and qualities which excited the ſenſe of beauty. When, either in Nature or in Art, they paſs this meaſure, the depreſſing paſſions and the imagination are rouſed, and the ſenſation takes the name of Sublimity. Such objects as have extent of ſpace or darkneſs, the red flaſh (for example) which precedes the uncertain thunder, or the apprehenſion of inviſible agents, excite the depreſſing paſſions, and being heightened by the imagination, addreſs this ſenſe. The fine artiſt, either in the exhibition or in the deſcription of them, gratifies and refines taſte.

When the objects of the eye and of the ear, inſtead of exciting the ſenſes of muſic, beauty, or ſublimity, have incongruity either in Nature or in Art, they act on the ſenſe of ridicule. The ſtudy of the circumſtances in which the incongruity appears refines the ſenſe,

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ſenſe, and renders the ſenſations derived from it, either in natural or artificial objects, ſtill more forcibly (perhaps) in deſcription, ſources of the pleaſures of taſte.

Of the ſources of Action.

III. *Action*, like pleaſure and pain, muſt be followed to its ſources, by obſerving both the energies of the mind itſelf, and the effects of the objects which addreſs them.

Of the Will.

The *Will* is a general term, deſcriptive of the active energy of the mind, and ſeems to ſignify the power of beginning and continuing action. Its activity accompanies it whether its deciſions are poſitive or negative. All the objects which are external to this faculty, but fitted to addreſs it, are termed Motives. Ambiguity has been introduced into this ſubject, by ſuppoſing, that the ſame relation ſubſiſts between a motive, or between an object or circumſtance external to the Will, but fitted to addreſs it, that ſubſiſts between a mechanical effect and its cauſe. Whenever Philoſophers attempt to explain one part of Nature, by the phenomena and laws of another, they may be ſubtile, but they loſe ſight of the method of interpreting her works. The effects of gravitation are ſo fixed and uniform, that we can meaſure them by mathematics. The operation of motives, or objects external to the Will,

or

or to the faculty of beginning and continuing Action, are different in different men, and in the ſame men at different times. Sometimes a merely animal propenſity will influence the Will, ſometimes an opinion is too ſtrong for a propenſity, ſometimes a judgment of the underſtanding can controul both, and ſometimes ſentiments, which paſſions and affections have rendered habitual, decide our reſolves. We may thus collect the circumſtances in the hiſtory of Man, which are fitted to addreſs his faculty of beginning and continuing Action; we can obſerve it yielding to them, or repelling the whole, and being negative; but we ſhall loſe ſight of Nature, if we attempt any thing beyond the hiſtory of her procedure.

Sir Iſaac Newton deſcribed the effects which he ſaw in the machinery of Nature, and diſcovered gravity to be the cauſe; but he did not ſeek explanations from the analogy of objects external to the Will, being fitted to addreſs it: we may follow the example, and deſcribe the objects which ſeem to be fitted by Nature to influence the Will, without ſeeking explanations by analogy from Phyſics. The concluſion which we can draw, ſeems to be, that propenſities, opinions, judgments, and ſentiments, ſum up

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up the hiſtory of the objects or circumſtances which are fitted to addreſs the Will, and that the general fact or law of this faculty is, that it has the phyſical power of beginning and continuing Action, and acts from motives, as they regard the real or apprehended ſafety or pleaſures of our nature.

Of the Moral Faculty.

The Moral Faculty is the power of perceiving the objects which regard the happineſs or enjoyments of human nature. If the phyſical power of the Will, or of acting, comprehended all the energies of the mind, propenſities might lead to actions that were abſurd; and opinions, to ſuch as were unjuſt, or inconſiſtent with common ſafety: our reaſon or judgment is often clouded by paſſion; and ſentiments, inſtead of being refined, are too often depraved. To controul the exertions of the Will, the Moral Faculty diſtinguiſhes the diſpoſitions and deeds which connect enjoyment with activity, and render happineſs the common patrimony of human nature. It is for this reaſon that the Faculty aſſumes the name of Moral.

In vain would mankind poſſeſs knowledge, in vain be ſuſceptible of pleaſure and pain, in vain would the powers of activity be given, if they poſſeſſed not the faculty

culty of reconciling all these powers to the happiness of the individual, the citizen, and the nation.

Its particular history the subject of this enquiry.

The history of Ethics has shewn the precarious knowledge which springs from ingenious and eloquent speculations. We are now to copy from Physics, and attempt the history of the Moral Faculty, its law, and the manner in which it enters into the Arts of Living.

CHAP. II.

Natural Hiſtory of Moral Phenomena.

SECT. I.

General Aſpects of Moral Phenomena.

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Moral Phenomena ſubjects of Analyſis.

HUMAN nature preſents aſpects equally numerous and diverſified with material Nature. If the order, eſtabliſhed in the one, appeared complicated to the firſt naturaliſts; that of the other, at firſt ſight, appears endleſs and inexplicable. Obſervation of Phenomena and arrangement by qualities unravelled the firſt; they are equally fitted to afford the natural or analytical hiſtory of the laſt.

Moral Phenomena may be obſerved in the two great aſpects of Man, his character in ſociety, and his character as an individual. In ſociety, we have to view groups of men with common objects and intereſts; in the individual, we have to view a being having objects and intereſts which are peculiar.

CHAP. II.

Aſpects of Moral Phenomena in the character of Society.

The aſpects of Moral Phenomena in ſociety appear in governments and civil laws; the aſpects of them in the individual, appear in diſpoſitions and actions. We ſhall ſuppoſe an obſerver of Nature tracing them in both ſituations, in their advances from rudeneſs to refinement.

Government and civil laws.

I. *Government and Laws* accompany each other in the progreſs of civilization; the one ſhews the general rules of ſubordination, the other the particular rules which define and defend the rights of ſubjects.

In rude ſituations.

1. In the moſt rude ſituations of Man our obſerver diſcovers ſingle families, or ſmall tribes formed by conſanguinity. Inſtinct directs a father to rear and protect his children. The habit of protecting ſtrengthens natural affection; the habit of being protected, eſtabliſhes inferiority and dependance. The children become the ſervants of the father, and when age unfits him for toils and dangers, they ſtep forth to endure the one, and meet the other. The oldeſt, the moſt brave, or the moſt intelligent, as accidents decide, ſucceed to his rank and to his power. When years give maturity, the ſons of a family claim their equal ſtations in the little circle, and though they look up to a common ſire, they become attentive to their mutual claims

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and rights. The aſpects of morality, during this infancy of government and law, partake of the private virtues of the individual:—on the one hand, parental affection and humanity; on the other, filial obedience and attachment: but theſe virtues ſeem rather the fruit of inſtinct and of ſituation, than of moral perception or of judgment.

In civilizing ſituations.

2. The ſtate of a limited chieftainſhip ſucceeds that of a family. Individuals, though connected by conſanguinity, begin to hold diſtinct domeſtic ſituations. The bond of kinſmen continues, becauſe it is founded on natural affections. Prejudices unite with ſituation in creating a chief. The tribe has to defend itſelf againſt other tribes equally ſavage. If the means of ſubſiſtence ariſe from hunting or fiſhing, the numbers of a tribe are ſmall. If paſturage and a precarious agriculture have begun, the numbers proportionably increaſe. In the firſt ſituation the chief has a rank ſomewhat ſimilar to that of the father of a family, in the laſt to that of ſovereign. When civilization is advancing to this latter aſpect, property begins to be annexed to birth and to talents. When united, they confirm power. The ſons, and ſervants and ſlaves of a patriarch, as they depend on him for the means of ſubſiſtence, form his firſt rude army. If his

his reſidence is fixed, it becomes the ſtrong hold, or the rude fortreſs. It is the retreat from danger, and gradually extending forms the rude city, or ſeat of government. The ſovereignty in this ſituation is limited, and laws are only rude uſages and opinions. In ſchemes of war, a chief is controlled by the opinions of his tribe and by ſuperſtition. In peace, the ſame reſtraints prevent his becoming abſolute. Though he is the arbiter of the claims and intereſts of parties, he muſt decide by common feelings and uſages. As the parties have their friends, he has to eſtimate the conſequences, not the equity of his decrees. The party apprehending himſelf injured may take arms: if he ſucceeds, he may himſelf become the ſovereign: if ſubjugated, he either flies to ſome other tribe, or is reduced to ſlavery. Accidents thus perpetually vary rude ſubordinations and juriſdictions. CHAP. II.

The aſpects of Morality during this forming period of government and law may be comprehended in the rude maxims of polity which ſecure tribes againſt each other, and in the opinions which form the ſpirit of a riſing juriſdiction. In the former ſelf-intereſt ſeems predominant; generoſity, much leſs juſtice to an enemy, is unknown;

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in the latter, paſſions and prejudices diſcover juſtice to be weak and precarious.

In poliſhing ſituations.

3. In poliſhing governments the aſpects of Morality become broader and more fixed, and the ſituation and objects of a people render them ſo.

The idea of a tribe gradually and inſenſibly diſappears. The rude city becomes a capital. The firſt circumſtances which had drawn the inhabitants to it are obliterated and forgotten. Different purſuits now diſtinguiſh the peaſant, the ſoldier, and the artiſan. Capacity, virtues, accidents create diverſity of ranks. Sometimes the ancient chief becomes a monarch. Sometimes the individuals who had themſelves ſtemmed the encroachments of tyranny become tyrants; ſometimes oppreſſions intended to ſubvert liberty create it. Situation ſometimes ſtrengthens the uſurpations of tyrants, at other times renders them impoſſible.

It is amid theſe ſtruggles for freedom and for power that Morality begins to have its effects on government and on law. If the Perſian monarchs copied the deſpotiſm of the tyrants they had dethroned and murdered, the kings of Greece and Rome, by graſping at tyranny, created liberty. If tyranny continued in Sicily from ſituation,

ſituation

ſituation in Greece formed the cluſter of republics which made tyranny impoſſible.

The aſpects of Moral Phenomena in government ſeem to appear in the forms which ſubordinations are aſſuming, and in the conduct of nations with reſpect to each other. Civil inſtitutions riſe out of the uſages of a people, and dictate decrees to juriſdictions. In the formation of governments the generoſity and juſtice of kings have ſeldom appeared, the courage and patriotiſm of citizens often, while the principles of equity begin with the more numerous claims of rights which require to be more accurately defined. Governments however are unequal in their moral tendency, from the ſway of the deſpot to the equal power of citizens. The laws of nations with reſpect to each other are dictated by intereſt and ambition, rather than by any apprehenſions of common claims to independence; while the rights of ſubjects depend on rules which the ſpirit of a government preſcribes. In abſolute ſtates, the ſubject may plead againſt the ſubject, but the ſovereign, whether he covers his tyranny with pretenſions, or leaves it openly to awe his ſlaves, is equally the ſubverter of their rights. In free ſtates, Morality begins in the form of municipal inſtitutions,

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and in the decrees of judges to define and defend Rights.

In poliſhed ſituations.

4. In the poliſhed ſituations of nations, government and laws take more decided characters. The kinds of ſubordination are now eſtabliſhed, and the reſources of nations known. Monarchs, fixed in their power, begin to ſeek fame from foreign conqueſts, or from domeſtic proſperity. They encourage the valour, the ſubmiſſion, the talents of their ſubjects, and dignify them with the names of patriotiſm, loyalty, wiſdom, and refinement. Free ſtates too ſeek conqueſts, to extend that dominion over others which among themſelves they have ſucceſsfully limited. Valour with them, however, is but one part of patriotiſm, the maintenance of freedom is its chief conſtituent. Talents and taſte create the Arts which miniſter to luxury and refinement, and both give ſcope for induſtry and the domeſtic virtues.

The monarch during this progreſs, fixed in power, acts from caprice, or perhaps from the determined love of oppreſſion. The magiſtrate of a free people, by all the arts of fraud and hypocriſy gratifies ſimilar propenſities.

The civil laws however of free ſtates refine both in their ſpirit and in their application.

plication. The numerous objects which arts and commerce afford create a proportioned number of claims among citizens. Not only the ſoil and its produce, but induſtry and enterprize give property; even reputation becomes a patrimony. To mark out theſe rights, to aſcertain them in the progreſs of affairs, to redreſs a wrong and repair an injury, produce thus all the variety of juriſprudence.

The aſpects of the laws of nations, or the rules of their conduct with reſpect to each other's intereſts and claims, experience correſponding refinements. In the field of battle, valour is accompanied with magnanimity, while the treaties which national advantage and humiliation dictate, aſſume the language of the love of peace and of juſtice, though neither of theſe motives have the leaſt ſhare in their formation.

If civil laws refine in their ſpirit in free ſtates from the neceſſity of juſtice in defining rights, in monarchies they refine from the ſenſe of honour and propriety. In practice, however, in both ſituations they are perverted by a race of men who live on the diſtreſſes of the friendleſs and unhappy.

In corrupting ſituations.

5. The declining ſituations of nations ſhew only the forms of that morality from which government and laws had ariſen; as with

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with a fading light the eye is here left to darkneſs and deſpair. In abſolute governments, that order which ſerved to mark out the power of the ſovereign and the ranks of the ſubjects begins to be narrowed, till at laſt it ſinks into deſpotiſm. In free governments, that liberty which equally ſecured the lives of magiſtrates and of citizens degenerates into the licentiouſneſs, which either terminates in anarchy or in ſlavery. Fineſſe and violence on the one hand, perfidy and cruelty on the other, are ſubſtituted in place of public faith and national valour. Treaties the moſt ſolemn are violated with indifference, benefits the moſt ſubſtantial are forgotten, the laws of nations diſappear.

Civil laws during this decline undergo a correſponding corruption. The forms of juſtice between deſpots and their ſlaves ceaſe to be obſerved. Caprice and venality dictate the decrees which the minions of power pronounce. In ſtates that were free, the forms of law remain for a time. They ſerve to awe into ſubjection the expiring rights of perſons and of property, till at laſt either tyranny ſweeps away the wretches who had lived by their perverſion, or the people ſink into their primitive barbarity.

In

In theſe corrupted ſituations Moral Phenomena hardly appear either in government or in civil laws. They are loſt amid the gloom which hangs over human nature. The juſtice of nations may be pleaded from the ſingular character of a ſovereign, but the contagion is too general to be ſtopped by the efforts of an individual. The juſtice of citizens having ſunk into forms, cannot be reſtored to a people who are too corrupted to perceive the value of its application, and therefore ceaſe to have the rights which it is fitted to protect.

Aſpects of Moral Phenomena in the character of the individual.

II. *The diſpoſitions and actions* of man as an individual, uniformly accompany each other, and ſhew Moral Phenomena in his advances from rudeneſs to refinement.

We ſhall ſuppoſe an obſerver of Nature attending to them with the view of offering a faithful hiſtory of facts. We ſhall ſuppoſe him directing his attention, firſt to the diſpoſitions and actions, which, by affording the individual pleaſure, receive his own approbation; and next examining, whether the ſame diſpoſitions and actions, which give pleaſure to the individual, meet the approbation of mankind.

He will at once diſcover, that every man is purſuing the attainment of the means of ſubſiſtence, accommodation, and pleaſure.

Theſe

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When they are accompanied with the approbation of the mind.

Theſe may vary in their kind in rude and poliſhed ſituations, but the purſuit of them is uniform. The firſt is neceſſary to preſerve life; the ſecond to enjoy ſafety; the third to fill up the moments of relaxation. The claim on theſe objects he ſees to be a common one. The competition of individuals ſhew, that each is but one of a number. So deep-rooted is the opinion of a common right, that the actions which accord with it, in the moments of retirement and reflexion receive the approbation of the mind itſelf. The pains and pleaſures of the individual, he diſcovers are all referable to this touchſtone. Are the appetites gratified with injury to the life, the virtue, or the property of another? the pleaſures from them become ſubjects of reflection, and terminate in ſuffering. Are the ſame appetites gratified in the degree that is conſiſtent with the life, the property, or the virtue of others? then both the pleaſure of the appetite is increaſed, and the reflection on it receives the approbation of the mind. In common life, the term conſcience deſcribes this ſurvey with the accompanying approbation or diſapprobation of the mind.

If the paſſions of ambition or avarice (for example) ſhall impel to invade the rights of liberty or induſtry, reflexion on the

the encroachment or violence becomes the ſource of ſuffering, from which the politician and the miſer ſeek relief in new objects of the ſame paſſions. If without ſuch encroachments, the ſame paſſions lead on to fame and to opulence, the purſuit of new objects, inſtead of being checked, is encouraged by former ſucceſs and enjoyments.

The ſurvey of the mind meaſuring its enjoyments by the common rights of human nature gives riſe to the deſcriptions of the different virtues of private life, probity, juſtice, and benevolence, and to the oppoſite vices, deceit, injuſtice, and malevolence.

When they are accompanied with the approbation of mankind.

It is a ſtriking proof of the ſimplicity and perfect order of Nature, that the ſame Phenomena on which an obſerver of Nature can perceive the enjoyments and ſuffering of the mind itſelf to turn, command the approbation and diſapprobation of mankind. All the enjoyments of the mind itſelf turn on the ſingle point, of their being conſiſtent with the common claims which all men have to the ſame enjoyments. The approbation of mankind is only a teſt, that an individual in his purſuit of happineſs has gratified no appetite, has indulged no paſſion that was inconſiſtent with the rights of others. If he has had the ſelf-command to control

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control the appetites and paſſions to which other men yield, if, in the moment of danger, he has averted the evils which threatened, and might have overwhelmed his country, the ſimple approbation of mankind riſes to eſteem and veneration. If, on the contrary, he has concealed ſelfiſh paſſions under the maſk of public ſervices, till the moment when he could ſubvert and tyrannize over the rights of others, then diſapprobation changes into hatred and execration.

The enjoyments and ſufferings thus of the mind itſelf, and the approbation and diſapprobation of mankind, ſhew only the ſame Phenomena producing apparently different effects.

Such are the aſpects of Moral Phenomena in ſociety and in the character of the individual.

SECT. II.

Of the manner in which all Moral Phenomena reſolve themſelves into the Rights of Mankind.

CHAP. II.

Rights in Ethics, like gravitation in Phyſics, are general Phenomena.

WHEN the hiſtory of material Nature was analyſed, general qualities were diſcovered, which diſtinguiſhed its kingdoms from each other, and others ſtill more general, ſuch as gravitation, which diſtinguiſhed it as a department of Nature.

Moral Phenomena in the aſpects of government, civil laws, diſpoſitions and actions have riſen to obſervation. The queſtion comes now to be ſtated, Whether there are not ſome general qualities in theſe Phenomena, which, like gravitation in Phyſics, ſhew the point in which they all meet and conſtitute a department of Nature?

We ſhall find an anſwer in an analyſis of the rights of mankind—in the proper apprehenſion of which the morality of governments, laws, diſpoſitions, and actions conſiſt.

Rights

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Deſcription of Rights.

Rights are the original means which Nature has given to man for his preſervation and happineſs, either as an individual or as a member of Society.

They divide themſelves, by their nature, into Rights of Perſons, and Rights of Property; and this diviſion has been introduced into the laws of every country.

Rights of Perſons.

I. The Rights of Perſon may be comprehended under the following titles; the Rights to Life, to Liberty, and to Reputation.

To Life.

1. The Right to Life is eſtabliſhed, both by the inſtinct which makes it a part of our nature, and by the obſervation which makes it the baſis of civil union. The inſtinct is common to all animated natures. In man it is ſuperior to every other circumſtance. If he was coolly to decide from reaſoning on the pains or pleaſures of life, it is a queſtion, Whether he would eſtimate it as a good or an evil. To preſerve it, however, he endures heat and cold, and ſupports the hardeſt viciſſitudes of fortune. But this inſtinct is the ſource of his feelings, and when they impel the pains and the difficulties of life can neither command nor depreſs him. It dictates the plain and obvious conditions on which civil union begins.

begins. The ſtrong muſt not take away the life of the weak, the wiſe muſt not delude the ignorant to their ruin, otherwiſe ſtrength and capacity would annihilate order, and be the ſources of miſery. CHAP. II.

2. The Right to Liberty comprehends the free uſe of the powers of the body, of the faculties of the underſtanding, and of the moral faculty, limited only by the claims which ariſe from the common nature of man. To Liberty.

The uſe of the powers of the body (what the civilians term of the arms and limbs) is neceſſary to procure the means of ſafety and ſubſiſtence. In the employment of theſe powers, men in every ſituation are preſumed to allow the ſame freedom to others. Individuals may be unequal in ſtrength and ſkill, but they are equal in the title to uſe that portion of ſtrength and ſkill which they poſſeſs.

The uſe of the faculties of the underſtanding is equally neceſſary with the uſe of the objects on which they are exerciſed. If they ſhall point out ſuperior means of ſafety to any individual, he has a right to that ſafety. If they ſhall invent arts, which while they diminiſh labour improve paſtural and agricultural ſituations—if they ſhall enable him to acquire and deſerve the

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approbation of a people, and they chuſe to entruſt him with their government—or if they rather lead him to prefer the humble retreat—he has a right to his ingenuity, to the confidence of his country, and to the retirement of his cottage.

The uſe of the moral faculty is equally eſſential to liberty. Our diſpoſitions are the ſources of our enjoyment or of our ſuffering. If they were vague, and one man might apprehend that to be good which another apprehended to be evil, they would be the ſource of ſuffering; but as they are fixed in character and in conſequences, they can no more be relinquiſhed than life. If one man could compel another to commit murder, that other would by compliance relinquiſh his right to the uſe of his moral faculty. The uſe of it makes a man amenable to his own mind, or to mankind, and its conſequences place it among the articles on which his right of liberty depends.

To Reputation.

3. The Right to Reputation refers to the place which a man holds in Society. The citizen, the artizan, the ſoldier, and the ſtateſman, are characters among every people, and they are acquired by the reputation for virtues, talents, and public ſervices.

Virtue in character juſtifies, in the opinion of mankind, the rank to which it may have

have raiſed an individual. Theſe virtues have deſcriptions in every language, candour, juſtice, generoſity. The reputation which the poſſeſſion of them creates, as it inſures the confidence of a people, is conſidered as a patrimony in the laws of every civilized nation. Capacity has the like protection. Take from an artiſt the reputation of ſkill, and of uſing proper materials, and you deſtroy the means of his ſubſiſtence. Take from a merchant the reputation of being honeſt and exact in his tranſactions, and you annihilate his credit. Take from a ſoldier the reputation of being humane, as well as brave, and you blaſt his honour and his promotion. Take from a ſtateſman the fame of his talents and his patriotiſm, and you deſtroy equally his ſervices and his rewards. The virtues and the talents which belong to every individual form the reputation to which they have a perſonal right.

Rights of Property.

II. The Rights of Property ariſe from thoſe of Perſon, and may be traced in the progreſs of Society, from the aliment neceſſary to preſerve life, through the exertions of ſkill and induſtry which enſure the poſſeſſion of value of every deſcription.

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Of Poſſeſſion.

1. Poſſeſſion forms the firſt means of appropriation. What is neceſſary for mankind, and requires no labour or exertion in the acquirement, as light, air, water, &c. cannot be excluſively appropriated. What is neceſſary, but requires labour and ſkill in the acquiſition, may be appropriated; ſuch are eſculents of every kind, habitation, and ſoil. A ſavage pulls his fruit, and catches his fiſh and his game. The poſſeſſion of theſe articles requires exertion and ſkill; and as they are neceſſary to the preſervation of life, poſſeſſion conſtitutes them property. If more fruit or game are collected than ſatisfies the preſent demand, they may be preſerved to remove future wants, provided ſuch appropriation does not exclude other men from objects on which to exert like ſkill and induſtry.

When any particular unappropriated ſubject is ſeized, as a cave, or field, the poſſeſſion conſtitutes it property; but if it is relinquiſhed, then any new poſſeſſor may ſeize it by a ſimilar title.

To Induſtry.

2. Induſtry forms a ſucceeding mean of appropriation, and its progreſs marks the progreſs of property.

In the rude ſtates of man, ſkill and labour have a limited range. Wants, like

the appetites, are eaſily ſatisfied. The fruit, the wild animal, the cave, or the ſhade, conſtitute all the demands of the ſavage.

The taming of animals requires ſkill and labor. The tribe muſt migrate in queſt of the herbage which ſupports them. Property can now afford at leaſt a ſurplus of the neceſſaries of life.

The introduction of agriculture renders the ſoil at firſt a common property; by degrees it becomes particular. The ſhare of an individual increaſes, either from his ſuperior ſkill and induſtry, or from the violence with which he adds to it that of his neighbour. This forces numbers to cultivate Arts, the productions of which procure them the means of ſubſiſtence. The landholder, the farmer, the artizan, and the merchant thus ariſe. Property becomes transferable according to the manners of different nations, but the facts are the ſame.

All Moral Phenomena reſolve themſelves into proper apprehenſions of of Rights.

If ſuch are the rights of mankind, we have now to obſerve the manner in which all the aſpects of Moral Phenomena meet in the proper apprehenſion of them.

Of Government.

1. *Governments* are formed, to ſecure one tribe, or ſtate, or nation, from the deceit or violence of another. Nations have exiſtence or life to defend; they have liberty or independence to maintain; they have

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reputation in their tranſactions with other nations to vindicate; they have property in the ſoil and in the fruits of their ſkill and induſtry to protect. Theſe qualities accompany them, whether they are in the rude ſituation where parental authority and filial obedience are the bonds of union; in the poliſhing ſituation where the ranks of the governing and the governed are known; in the poliſhed ſtate where they are accurately defined; or in the corrupting where forms only remain as the melancholy veſtiges of better order. Governments may be free, or they may be deſpotic, in their ſpirit; but the exiſtence and claims of all nations ariſe from the rights of perſon and of property which they aſſert.

Of Civil Laws.

2. *Civil Laws* admit of ſimilar deſcriptions. Strength, talents, and virtues are unequal. One man governs, another is governed. One man fights as a ſoldier, another invents as an artiſt. One man ſpeculates as a politician, another toils as a labourer; but all have life, liberty, reputation, and property. They cannot relinquiſh the former without ceaſing to be men; they cannot relinquiſh the latter without ceaſing to be independent. To encroach on any of theſe articles is injuſtice and violence. The rude arbiter is appealed

appealed to, and he gives his precarious deciſion. The arbitrary Judge, like the ancient Prætor of the Romans, is appealed to, and he pronounces his imperfect decree: the refined Civilian is appealed to, and he decides from principles of equity which have been introduced into poſitive law: the corrupted minions of a tyrant are appealed to, and they baſely ſhelter iniquity under the forms of juriſdiction. All refer to the rights of citizens, but each differs in his Morality from the others, in proportion as he apprehends with accuracy, and determines with firmneſs on the rights of mankind.

Of Diſpoſitions.

3. The *Diſpoſitions* upon which the happineſs of the individual depends, reſolve themſelves into the ſame fact in nature. To poſſeſs the approbation of the mind, pleaſure muſt be pure. No appetite muſt be ſated, no paſſion gratified with injury to the life, the liberty, the reputation, the property of another. If ſuch injury has been done, reflection involuntarily ſteals in on ſuch deeds, and in a moment diſſipates the temporary enjoyments with which the appetite or the paſſion deluded their object, leaving the ſtings which ſelf-condemnation and hatred inflict.

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4. The *Actions* upon which the happineſs of the individual depends all meet in the ſame fact in Nature.

Of Actions.

The approbation of mankind given to Actions accords with the chaſte deciſions of the mind reſpecting its Diſpoſitions. Actions, in fact, are but the practice which Diſpoſitions dictate. If as a magiſtrate, no intereſt ſways the judgment; if as a ſoldier, no dangers can damp courage; if as a patriot, no ambition can taint the love of his country; the preſervation of their rights meets with gratitude and veneration; the oppoſite characters meet with abhorrence and execrations. The eſteem of mankind for the actions of an individual, bear a proportion to their ſenſe of what conſtitutes their rights: their hatred turns on the ſame point, and is only a deſcription of the degree in which they wiſh to puniſh every attempt to violate them.

Hence in the hiſtory of Human Nature, Moral Phenomena, whether they are obſerved in the aſpects of Governments, Laws, Diſpoſitions, or Actions, are accompanied with the approbation of the mind itſelf, and of mankind, when they reſolve themſelves into proper apprehenſions of rights.

SECT. III.

Of the Rights of Mankind as the proper Objects of the Moral Faculty.

CHAP. II.

All the faculties of the mind are explicable by the hiſtory of their objects and modes of acting.

EVERY faculty of the mind has fixed claſſes of objects which addreſs it, and the manner in which it exerts its own power diſcovers its character. Matter in different forms addreſſes the organs of ſenſe, and through them intimations are given to the mind of its preſence and qualities. The qualities of the objects of ſenſe, as well as all the perceptions of the mind, addreſs the underſtanding, which forms a judgment reſpecting their coincidence with Nature and with each other.

Propenſities, opinions, judgment and ſentiments addreſs the will, or the faculty of beginning and continuing action, and its own exertions diſcover its unconfined character. The rights of mankind addreſs the Moral Faculty, and the obſervation of its modes of exerting itſelf will diſcover to us its true character, or its Natural Hiſtory.

When

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The rights of Human Nature the objects of the Moral Faculty.

When the rights of mankind addreſs the mind in ſuch a manner that the obſervation of them forms its Diſpoſitions, then it uniformly has its own approbation. When they addreſs it in ſuch a manner that they give a character to its Actions, then, to its own, it adds the approbation of mankind. When they ceaſe to addreſs it, then it meets with the diſapprobation of both. If we compare the pleaſures or pains which accompany the Moral Faculty, with the other pleaſures or pains which the mind experiences, we ſhall find them more fixed in their character, and more permanent in their conſequences. The pleaſures of the ſenſes are tranſient, for they depend on the preſence and qualities of the objects of the ſenſes: the pleaſures of the appetites are tranſient, and ceaſe when the appetites are ſated: the pleaſures of the paſſions are tranſient, unleſs the imagination ſhall aſſociate with them objects whoſe qualities we eſteem or deteſt. Though the pleaſures of the underſtanding are more permanent, from the new objects which the purſuit of knowledge is perpetually introducing into the mind, yet even they muſt be aſſociated with the objects which procure the eſteem of mankind. But the pleaſures attending the Moral Faculty, when the rights of human nature ſucceſsfully

fully addreſs it, are both fixed in their cha- CHAP. II.
racter, and become intenſe from reflection and from the uniform eſteem of mankind. If we had only the faculty of Will then Action would be unreſtrained, but the Moral Faculty directs Action to the happineſs of the individual and of Society.

" When I am juſt (ſaid the Stoic) my " virtue has its own reward ;" he ſaid ſo, becauſe his diſpoſitions, formed on proper apprehenſion of the rights of mankind, afforded him a pleaſure which became intenſe as it became a ſubject of review.

Falſe views of this Faculty, ariſing from ſuperſtition and from caſuiſtry may pervert or debaſe its operations, but they are no more exceptions to its real office in the mind, than the unwieldy mechanics of a Barbarian are to the ſimplicity of the laws of gravitation and motion.

If man were ſolitary, as he would have no rights to acknowledge or maintain, he could have no virtue. Virtue conſiſts, both in our poſſeſſing the Diſpoſitions with which we think all men ought to be animated, and in our having performed Actions which we think every man in the ſame ſituation ought to perform. The eſteem of others adds to ſelf-approbation the proof that other men think we deſerve it. Ariſtides

ſaw

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ſaw that a divided command would ruin his country, and meaſuring his actions by her rights, preferred her ſafety to his own fame. Pericles amuſed the Greeks till their liberties were ſubverted, and preferred ambition to public virtue. So marked is the reference of virtue to rights, that nations aſſume appeals to them as the foundations of their moſt illiberal actions. The treaties of modern nations are all introduced with ſolemn expreſſions of regard to the rights of nations, when they are deſcriptions only of the iniquitous advantages which ſucceſs in arms have given to ambition and to tyranny.

Scale of the virtues which shew the observation of rights commanding the approbation of the Moral Faculty. Of Probity.

I. Probity, juſtice, and benevolence ſeem a natural ſcale in which the objects of the Moral Faculty addreſs it and receive its approbation.

1. *Probity* ſignifies the diſpoſition to acknowledge the rights of mankind.

The natural feelings of every individual ſatisfy him, that he has a perfect right to his own life, to his liberty, to his reputation, and to his property. Many prejudices ariſing from paſſions and from education induce him to infringe and narrow the ſame rights in other men.

A ſavage

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A ſavage ſecures the fiſh or wild animals on which he feeds, but without heſitation or remorſe he takes away the life of a rival, or reduces him to dependence and to ſlavery. The Barbarian adds to his followers, both for defence, and to increaſe his ſtore by free-booting and violence. Abſolute and free governments make ſimilar encroachments on each other's rights. It is difficult to ſay, at what ſtage of civilization, or by what accidents, the apprehenſion of the equal rights of all men begins.

In private life the very ſame circumſtances operate, though in a proportionably narrower ſcale. The parent accuſtomed to ſuperiority, with difficulty allows the rank of men to his ſons till age draws them forward to be his protectors. Citizens ſo uniformly ſeek advantages by invading the intereſts or reputations of their rivals in arts and trade, that criminal ſanctions are neceſſary to reſtrain them from mutual violence.

To confeſs that all men have equal rights to life, to liberty, to reputation, and to property, is to have probity. It is thus that it becomes an object fitted to addreſs the Moral Faculty; and when it has its effect, then a man acquires his own approbation and the eſteem of Society.

2. *Juſtice*

PART III. Of Juſtice.

2. *Juſtice* ſignifies the diſpoſition to maintain the rights of mankind.

The order which is eſſential to the very exiſtence of civil union early calls forth this virtue. The intereſts of the individuals who compoſe the moſt rude tribe are in oppoſition, and the paſſions which theſe intereſts excite require reſtraints correſponding to the tempers and objects of a people.

Appeals to a temporary arbiter mark the firſt beginnings of juriſdiction. They precede laws, which can only be enacted after the orders of Society begin to be fixed; when promulgated, they are rather the correction of uſages than maxims of equity. Time, and a multiplicity of caſes, gradually and inſenſibly beget the refinements of juſtice, though even in the better ſtages of Society the influence of the governing renders the equal diſtribution of it unfrequent and precarious.

To allow that the members of the ſame tribe or canton have a title to life and liberty, is the earlieſt virtue of civil union. It muſt be apprehended, before any civil arrangement can take place. It would almoſt ſeem that the influence of this original diſpoſition in a great meaſure diſappears as ſoon as the ranks of governing and governed

governed are underſtood. The former find, that the probity with which Society began is but a weak reſtraint on the individuals who compoſe it. When the general idea of ſafety was uniting individuals, it was eaſily practiſed; but when that ſtage was paſſed, ſelf-intereſt engaged the paſſions of love, hatred, avarice, and ambition, till reſtraints became neceſſary to maintain what probity at firſt had allowed.

The reaſon of man, as well as his ſituation, accords with the introduction of ſuch reſtraints. "Thou ſhalt not kill, or ſteal," are leſſons which all apprehend to be neceſſary and uſeful. The obſervation of them even engages the paſſions. If my father is killed, I muſt kill his murderer, is the virtuous revenge of a ſavage. He muſt ſatiate it, or he counteracts not only his own feelings but thoſe of his tribe. He follows the murderer, and ſacrifices him as a victim due to the manes of the murdered.

Tribes feel this paſſion ſo ſtrong, that it is the uſual ſource of their petty wars. When nations poliſh by a regular ſubordination and by laws, they take the revenge from the individual and transfer it to the public. It has loſt a member, and the delinquent muſt ſuffer in proportion to his violation of the right of an individual.

They

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They unite ignominy with death in his puniſhment; the one, to mark the odium of the crime; the other, retribution.

When the refinements of Juſtice begin to be underſtood laws breathe a different ſpirit. They puniſh the guilty becauſe the ſafety of the public requires it. They do ſo, not from the paſſion of revenge, but to ſhew, that the maintenance of rights is eſſential to the ſafety of the ſubjects whom they govern.

When Juſtice forms a part of private Diſpoſition, it appears in the thouſand forms of diſintereſtedneſs, which raiſe a character above the guilt and meanneſs of iniquity.

Of Benevolence.

3. "*Benevolence* ſignifies the diſpoſition "to improve the rights of mankind."

The appearances of this virtue are later in Society than thoſe of Probity and of Juſtice.

The diſpoſitions or actions which inſtinct or natural affection dictate to parents or to kinſmen cannot be viewed as benevolent. The firſt is common to all animated natures, for every ſpecies rears and protects its young; the laſt ſeems to be the effect of habits, which inſtinct began and which ſituation has confirmed.

To

To have probity, is to allow rights and to enter into combinations for mutual ſafety; to have juſtice, is to maintain ſuch combinations: but to have benevolence, is to apprehend that the happineſs of mankind ariſes from their poſſeſſing rights in the moſt perfect degree.

The variety of ways in which benevolence appears in public and in private ſcenes exhibits its true character in the ſtrongeſt light—generoſity and ſelf-command are its moſt ſtriking aſpects.

The warrior in ſavage ages goes to battle for booty and from revenge; his violence is ſo ungoverned, that the ſpoils and life of his enemy are the only ſubjects he can comprehend. When civilization is advancing, heroes, touched with the ſufferings and ſituations of the vanquiſhed, make war for glory not for ſpoils; they would think themſelves diſgraced by murdering an enemy who no longer reſiſted. In the firſt ages of Rome they killed and made ſlaves of their enemies; but the great Romans reſtored kings whom they had vanquiſhed, and gave the freedom of their city to their enemies. When Rome began to decline, ſhe firſt ceaſed to be generous, and next to be juſt; as if the virtues muſt

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diſappear in the order in which they had ariſen.

Self-command equally marks the aſpects of benevolence. Heroes diſcover it when they attemper war with humanity, and ſovereignty with mercy. Scipio has been equally celebrated for his humanity as for his courage, and the Romans for their liberality to the Greek cities as much as for the conqueſt of the world.

Benevolence in private life ſhews its effects on the preceding virtues of probity and juſtice in a thouſand amiable forms. Probity and juſtice may exiſt without benevolence, but in ſuch inſtances they muſt be conſidered as virtues ariſing from neceſſity not from choice. If one man ſhall do no more in the moment of danger than leave another to defend himſelf, he is not (it is true) immoral, but he is not an object of eſteem. If one man ſhall only aid another in preſerving his property from the neceſſity he feels of ſimilar ſervices, he is not (it is true) immoral, but he is not great. But if in the moment of danger, when no obligations of ſuch a deſcription can bind, one man ſhall ſtep forward and ſave the life or the property, or even feel for the reputation of another, he calls forth his gratitude and

gives

gives a language to the fineſt feelings of his heart. CHAP. II.

There is no inſtance in which benevolence ſeems more to improve the rights of mankind, than in the mildneſs which it infuſes into generoſity. A man who has probity alone will, with a cold indifference, give what he apprehends others have a right to demand; a man who has juſtice alone will meaſure his actions with an accurate but rigid eye; but a benevolent heart will ſoften probity, by ſeeming above the arbitrary diſtinctions of rank, and be juſt, by ſeeming to pay a debt which the happineſs of mankind required.

Hence Benevolence, or the improvement of the rights of mankind, addreſſes the Moral Faculty, and is accompanied with the approbation of the mind itſelf, and the affection and eſteem of Society.

The chain of Phenomena can nowhere be more clearly marked, than in the ſcale of virtues which addreſs the Moral Faculty centering in the general fact of the rights of mankind.

II. There ſeems to be a ſcale of correſponding vices, of deceit, injuſtice, and malevolence, which diſtinctly marks the manner in which the violation of the rights of mankind commanding

Scale of the vices which ſhew the violation of rights com-

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the diſapprobation of the Moral Faculty.

mankind addreſs the Moral Faculty and command its diſapprobation.

1. "Deceit ſignifies the concealed viola-
"tion of the rights of mankind."

Of Deceit.

Though the rights of human nature to Life and to Property may be apprehended, numerous circumſtances induce individuals to violate them—An appetite is to be gratified, or a paſſion is to be indulged. Concealment of the intention may be dictated both by natural temper and to enſure ſucceſs. In the firſt caſe deceit is the vice of the coward, in the laſt of the villain. Fear may reſtrain the thief from his prey, and caution, the aſſaſſin from his murder, till ſolitude or the dark hour of night enable them to ſteal or ſtab with impunity.

Theſe are ſtrong and prominent features of the vice; but it has a thouſand forms in common life againſt which neither prudence, foreſight, nor experience can guard. It aſſumes all the aſpects of probity; is apparently open, cheerful, and thoughtleſs; praiſes the talents, the virtues, the actions, the fame of its deluded objects; and when an honeſt confidence in the virtue whoſe ſemblance it aſſumes offers the opportunity for violating the right of life, liberty,

reputation, and property, then taking its real character, it violates them all. CHAP. II.

In rude ſituations it is conſidered as baſe to friends, but neceſſary towards an enemy. In poliſhed and corrupting ſituations it is a part of education which, under the names of addreſs, fineſſe, and of talents, bring forward to buſineſs and to power.

Whenever it is an object of attention to the individual or to mankind, it addreſſes the Moral Faculty and commands diſapprobation.

2. "Injuſtice is the open violation of "the rights of mankind." Of Injuſtice.

In its moſt general aſpect, Injuſtice is the ſequel of Deceit. Nations deceive each other with treaties till the moment when they can lead armies into the field, though ſometimes they dare to be unjuſt without this puſilanimous precaution. In private life it exhibits the ſame lineaments, though its conſequences are partial and unequal. The pettifogger and bankrupt ſteal with impunity, the pickpocket and highwayman are hanged. Wherever the vice is obſerved, it addreſſes the Moral Faculty, and commands its diſapprobation.

3. "Malevolence ſignifies Deceit and In- "juſtice united with Paſſion." Of Malevolence.

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The paſſions once excited or become habitual either make men more virtuous or more vicious. If in the one caſe they are the ſources of refinement, in the other they are the ſources of debaſement. Deceit conceals its violence till it can invade rights with impunity. Injuſtice ſometimes appears the ſequel of Deceit, ſometimes it is deſperate and deciſive; but when the paſſions mingle their power with either, or with both, a man is vicious from the love of vice and acts as if he neither poſſeſſed reaſon nor the feelings of the heart.

Malevolence is leſs a national than a private vice. The numbers which compoſe a nation feel unequally. Reaſon, experience, and foreſight of conſequences, variouſly control the paſſions. It is only when a ſovereign is unlimited in power that his paſſions can make his people wretched.

In private characters Malevolence aſſumes an infinity of forms. They ſpring from rivalſhip in intereſt or in fame. Sometimes the ſmooth, fawning, ſmiling coward acts with cool and ſtudied malice. Sometimes the hardened villain avows his intentions, and is at leaſt honeſt in his rancour. Sometimes the fear of puniſhment ſtifles his malignity; at other times, impelled by it

it to madneſs, he ruſhes on his own deſtruction. CHAP. II.

In whatever form Malevolence, or Paſſion united with Deceit and Injuſtice, appears, it is accompanied with the diſapprobation of the mind itſelf, and is an object of contempt and deteſtation to mankind.

All the objects of the Moral Faculty reſolve themſelves into the rights of mankind; and the manner in which they addreſs it, appears from its approbation or diſapprobation. All theſe objects reſolve themſelves into the rights of mankind.

The Moral Faculty has as marked a character as the other powers of the mind. Material objects addreſs the ſenſes, and a perception follows. The qualities and relations of objects addreſs the underſtanding, and a deciſion or judgment follows. Motives addreſs the Will, and it acts. The rights of mankind addreſs the Moral Faculty, and it approves or diſapproves, has the eſteem or the hatred of mankind.

Analyſis of Phenomena thus exhibits the arrangements of Moral Nature; Induction here, as in Phyſics, will diſcover the law.

CHAP. III.

Scientific or Inductive Hiſtory of Moral Phenomena.

SECT. I.

Of the Moral Law as a general Law of Nature.

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Character of a general law of Nature.

EVERY law of Nature is a general fact in ſome branch or department of Nature. In Phyſics the laws or rules by which Nature acts have been diſcovered by keeping obſervation fixed on experiments, till the point in which they centered was perceived. In mechanics (for example), after ſeparating by Analyſis the claſſes of ſolids and fluids, experiments on the motion of bodies in perpendicular and oblique directions kept the eye fixed on Phenomena, till the rules by which bodies move with given forces were aſcertained, or the laws of motion diſcovered. The evidences of ſenſation, and of effect and cauſe, which enabled

enabled the underſtanding to draw the inference, were ſuch as the exact meaſurement of quantity could demonſtrate; the certainty therefore was perfect.

The Moral Law admits of the ſame deſcription.

Moral Phenomena muſt follow a ſimilar line, and, like Phyſical Phenomena, have the reaſonings which continue the chain of Phenomena to the diſcovery of the law bounded by the nature of the ſubject, and they muſt be ſupported by ſuch evidence as will enable the underſtanding to draw the inference. The evidence will indeed be of a different kind from the exact meaſurements of quantity which were applicable to Phyſics, but the ſubjects are different, and therefore the kind of evidence muſt be ſuch as the characters of the Phenomena demand. This is no more than what takes place in demonſtrating the different laws of material Nature. We have not mathematical evidence for the dependence of life on the circulation of the blood and on the ſound ſtate of the nerves, but we have equal certainty from experiments preſcribed by the ſubject, as we have for the gravitation of bodies to a center.

In a ſimilar manner Moral Phenomena by obſervation and experiments, bounded by their qualities, and by the aid of the different

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different kinds of evidence, of conſciouſneſs and intuition, and of effect and cauſe, may conduct to the rules by which they act, or to the law of their nature.

The Analyſis of the Moral Faculty has diſcovered the claſſes of objects which addreſs it; Induction muſt now point out the rule, or the law of its nature: The demonſtration of the following propoſitions will carry forward the chain of obſervation to the diſcovery of this law.

Of the law of Probity.

1. Probity, or the acknowledgment of "rights, is uniformly approved of by the "Moral Faculty, and conſtitutes the en-"joyment or the good of mankind."

Though man inſtinctively diſcovers his own rights, it is with difficulty, and by ſlow degrees, that he apprehends them to be a common patrimony of human nature. His ſelfiſh feelings, ſtrengthened often by his real or imaginary wants, obſcures this liberal view.

In ſavage ſituations it may be felt for a friend or a kinſman, but indolence, which is the prevailing tendency in private life, and bravery, which is the only virtue in public ſcenes, ſhuts the mind againſt the circumſtances which diſplay the common rights of man.

When

When ſituations change the ſavage into the citizen, men indeed begin to compare their feelings and their talents; but the ſelfiſh paſſions on the one hand, and the malignant ones on the other, withdraw human nature from impartial examination. One man diſcovers that he poſſeſſes talents and capacity which fit him for important and difficult ſituations, and yet (perhaps) he is doomed to move in the humbleſt walks of life; another man, propped up on artificial diſtinctions, without talents or virtues, poſſeſſes power only to make the deſerving wretched. "My ſubjects (ſaid a "tyrant) are born my ſlaves, they have no "rights but what I give them." In ſuch a mind every feeling was ſelfiſh. It requires both circumſtances and an enlarged mind to eradicate prejudices which ſelf-love and the pride of cuſtom have matured. Theſe circumſtances chiefly appear in free ſtates, where the common danger leads every individual to feel his own importance, or where the remembrance of tyranny makes men jealous of inequalities. Greece ſhewed free men of the firſt deſcription, and Rome of the ſecond. The enlargement of the mind accompanies theſe circumſtances. In Greece, laws were enacted to preſerve the ranks and privileges of republican ſubordination

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nation before the Philoſophers aroſe to inſtitute the enquiry, What are the foundations of virtue? Till the relations of good and evil become the objects of attention, the connection of either with the rights of mankind can never be perceived, or the acknowledgment of them underſtood to conſtitute a branch of happineſs. When once this fact in Nature is perceived, the approbation given to probity is fixed and uniform.

Of the law of Juſtice.

II. "*Juſtice*, or the maintenance of "rights, is uniformly approved of by the "Moral Faculty, and conſtitutes the enjoy-"ment or good of mankind."

Civil union muſt begin with the acknowledgment, that all have life and the fruits of induſtry to preſerve; but the rules which maintain theſe rights after ſociety is formed, advance in a ſlow and in a gradual manner. In the rude ſtages of ſubordination, the maintenance of the rights of friends or kinſmen may be admitted as neceſſary, and the paſſions engaged to preſerve them; but Juſtice extends not its power to a people at large. "He is my brother (ſaid an Ame-"rican ſavage), he has fought by my ſide, "and a belt of wampum ties us together: "another warrior ſhall not hold his hatchet;

"I

"I would die to give him the ſcalp of his "enemy." The rights of a brother are here to be maintained, but human nature muſt ſuffer, to gratify what paſſion, not the virtue of juſtice, authoriſed.

The union of theſe two barbarians was cemented by the conſideration that they had rights, but that the reſt of mankind had none which their affections did not impel them to violate.

When nations are poliſhing, the virtue of Juſtice is with difficulty introduced, and with ſlow and imperfect meaſures applied. In their legiſlation the Greeks had rights. Every citizen could vote in the aſſembly of the people, but the Helots had no rights; they were property; and a Greek could kill his Helot as he could one of his herd of cattle.

The Roman Citizens had rights; but their ſlaves and their very children they conſidered as property.

When Juriſprudence became ſo far a Science, that an arrangement of laws under the titles of Rights and Defences was introduced, and when Juſtice was conſidered as a cardinal virtue by the refining Sects, ſtill its application was partial and unequal.

When

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When Philoſophy itſelf began to examine the principles on which the approbation of virtue depends, none of the numerous and oppoſite principles into which it was reſolved viewed Juſtice as one of the objects which addreſſed the Moral Faculty. They did not affirm that it commanded equally the approbation of the mind, and in practice conferred happineſs. When this fact is apprehended, then another branch of the law of the Moral Faculty will diſcover itſelf to be fixed and uniform.

Of the law of Benevolence.

III. "Benevolence, or the improvement "of rights, is uniformly approved of by the "Moral Faculty, and conſtitutes the enjoy-"ment or good of mankind."

The riſe of this refined virtue is more gradual and ſlow than either that of Probity or of Juſtice. Civilization is advancing before generoſity to a rival is felt. Men are civilized before liberality to an enemy appears. When generoſity firſt ariſes, it appears a ſpecies of contradiction in character. It ſeems a momentary check on the ambition and cruelty which accompany the conqueror. When Ptolemy returned the equipage of Demetrius, and ſaid, "That "princes made war for glory, not for plun-"der," perhaps it was oſtentation: When Demetrius

Demetrius reſtored one of Ptolemy's generals, ſaying, "That he valued victory leſs "than the opportunity of rivalling him in "humanity;" this too might be oſtentation, but it gave birth to virtues. Benevolence is more ſlowly introduced among a people than into the minds of heroes. Demetrius reſtored liberty to the Athenians, and they ſaid he was a God, and yet in a ſhort time they ſhut their gates againſt him. When Benevolence begins, its advances are ſtriking. When the ſame Demetrius had it in his power to maſſacre the Athenians, he pronounced them free, and gave them an hundred thouſand meaſures of wheat. CHAP. III.

When the influence of the ſelfiſh paſſions extends with the introduction of arts and luxury, the mind (as it were) changes the honeſt warmth of its affections; and the man, who once was kind, generous, and had open arms, becomes dark, and hollow, and unfeeling. In youth, friendſhips are unmixed and ſincere. Young people entruſt each other with their little cares and wants; the heart appears in every action; they know not deceit till they begin to reliſh and be in love with ambition and avarice: friendſhip then declines, politeneſs becomes the ſubſtitute of affection, and intereſt ſuperſedes the attachments of the

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the heart. If an individual ſhall appear with a temper too ſenſible to forget early attachments, he has but to lament the loſs of that benevolence in others, which in himſelf is the ſource of melancholy reflection. The firſt dawning of benevolence thus appears in natural affection, the firſt application of it in generoſity; but numerous objects in the latter ſtages of ſociety prevent its cultivation, and make it rather a virtue praiſed and admired, than one either practiſed or imitated by mankind. Where its real character, however, of improving the rights of mankind makes it an object of the Moral Faculty, it commands its approbation, and enſures happineſs to its poſſeſſor.

Science thus carries forward the chain of Phenomena, from the objects which addreſs the Moral Faculty to its law. It proceeds by repeated obſervation, or by experiment bounded by the qualities of the ſubject, and by the evidences equally of conſciouſneſs and intuition, and of effect and cauſe. Hence Phenomena are obvious in the manner in which they addreſs the Faculty, uniform in the enjoyments which they confer, and univerſal in the rude and poliſhed ſituations of man.

The union of the Laws of

If we aſk, In what the phyſical law of gravitation conſiſts? the anſwer is, In the uni-

Probity, Juſtice, and Benevolence, form the Moral Law.

uniformity of the effect in material Nature. If we aſk, In what the Moral Law conſiſts? The anſwer is, In the uniformity of the effect, that the obſervation of rights is the ſource of enjoyment. The Law of Morality then, like any other Law of Nature, depends, for our knowledge of it, on Phenomena fixed in their characters, and in the qualities which they uniformly exhibit by experiment. The concluſion is, That probity, juſtice, and benevolence, conſtitutes the virtue and the happineſs of man.

This general fact is eſtabliſhed by a progreſs of obſervation ſimilar to what diſcovers gravitation in inert matter, circulation of blood in animated natures, ſenſation in ſentient natures. The experiments which evolve all of theſe laws are different, becauſe the ſubjects in which the laws occur are different, but the laws are equally certain.

If it is aſked, How does the Moral Law appear in actual life? It appears in the practice of that conduct which the Moral Faculty approves. Does it admit of a ſimilar deſcription with other phyſical laws? Like them, the deſcription muſt be an abridged view of Phenomena. What is the Law of Gravitation? All material objects tend to ſome center. What are the Laws of Mo-

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tion? Bodies put in motion move in direct lines, unleſs their motion is interupted by counteracting powers. What is the Law of Viſion? Light acts on the eye, and affords a perception of external objects. What is the Law of the Animal Oeconomy? The circulation of the blood is neceſſary to the continuance of life. What is the Law of the Moral Faculty? Probity, juſtice, and benevolence are approved of by this faculty, and conſtitute the chief good or happineſs of mankind.

The Law of Morality thus ſhews a chain of Phenomena, or a demonſtration ſupported by experiment and evidence. In ſcience, the underſtanding aſſents to the certainty of this truth; and in actual life, men uſe it as a criterion by which to try the value of actions and of inſtitutions.

SECT. II.

Of Moral Obligation.

IF the Laws of Nature are diſtinguiſhed from each other by their characters, they are not leſs ſo by their effects or conſequences. Gravitation has its effects or conſequences in the mechanical arts of life; circulation, its effects and conſequences in the animal œconomy; probity, juſtice, and benevolence their effects in the conduct of life.

Every Law of Nature has effects or conſequences.

In Phyſics, after the Laws of Nature were diſcovered and deſcribed, the conſequences of their application were obſerved in the uſeful Arts. In Ethics, after diſcovering the Law, we have to trace its conſequences in the mind itſelf, and in the actual ſituation of mankind. If it ſhall be found, that by becoming the ſpirit of the diſpoſitions of the mind, it both refines and annexes pleaſure to them; if it ſhall likewiſe be found, that where it becomes the meaſure of actions, it both refines them and confers the approbation of mankind; then in the ef-

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fects of the Law we can read the moſt complete proof of its character and operation in Nature.

Thoſe of the Moral Law have been termed Moral Obligation.

Science and common life have employed the term *Moral Obligation* to deſcribe the effects of the Moral Law; and give the happineſs which reſults from the obſervation of it, and the miſery which ſprings from the violation of it, as the reaſon why this ſtrong language ſhould deſcribe the effects of this Law of Nature.

We muſt view the effects of each of the branches of Moral Law, if we would ſee its full conſequences; and then uniting the whole, we ſhall diſcover the force of the obligation.

Scale of the virtues which mark the Moral Obligations to Probity.

I. PROBITY, or the diſpoſition to acknowledge the rights of mankind in its effects, diſcovers a ſcale of virtues which are accompanied with pleaſure, and a correſponding ſcale of vices which are accompanied with pain. The obligation to obſerve it ariſes from poſſeſſing the firſt and avoiding the laſt.

The following terms may be uſed to mark the ſcale of virtues comprehended in the Law of Probity, Innocence, Candour, Liberality, and Friendſhip.

1. Innocence

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1. Innocence ſeems to ariſe from the perception of rights common to all men, and is a tendency of the mind to abſtain from the ſmalleſt violation of them. A man is ſaid to be innocent in common life, when he not only reſiſts every temptation to private vices, but when he ſhews the ſame diſpoſition with reſpect to the rights of others. Innocence is ſometimes viewed as conſtitutional, oppoſed to the innocence which is dictated by ſelf-command. The former kind hardly deſerves the name of virtue, the latter only proceeds from proper views of probity. "The captive, who "pled, that ſhe never had refuſed aſſiſtance "to the wretched, and that ſhe aſked only "the preſervation of her honour, which "was more ſacred to her than her life," had the innocence which firſt felt the rights of others, and pled this feeling as a reaſon for preſerving her own. The hero, who ſaid, "That his paſſions forbade him to hear "her prayers, but reaſon and the Gods "ſaid they were juſt," had the ſelf-command to perceive and acknowledge the rights of the unhappy. This virtue is followed by the approbation of the mind and of mankind.

2. Candour riſes in actual life, as a ſucceeding virtue comprehended in the Law of

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Probity. It ſeems to be founded on the perception of rights common to all men, and is an acknowledgment, that diſpoſitions to encroach on them exiſt, or of actual invaſions of them. Candour of the firſt kind is an eaſy and a common virtue. It is eaſy to allow that mankind have ſelfiſh paſſions; that they frequently liſten rather to them than to judgment. Such acknowledgment of the general defects of human nature is candid, but requires no great effort of Probity. Candour of the ſecond kind is more difficult. To ſay that a man has been the ſlave of an appetite, is to confeſs that he is a ſenſualiſt; to ſay that he ſecretly wiſhes the deſtruction of a rival, is to confeſs inferiority and ſelfiſhneſs; to ſay that he has infringed on the rights of another, is to overcome ſhame, and allow that he is defective in the virtues which claim the confidence and eſteem of mankind. Cicero thus deſcribes Catiline—"He was a foe to "the republic by his paſſions, he ſchemed "its ruin by arms, and yet with effrontery "took his place in the ſenate." Candour would have allowed the guilt, and reſtored him to the approbation of his own mind and to the opinion of the public.

3. Liberality is a higher link in the chain of Probity. It is founded on the perception of

of rights common to all men, and marks the diſpoſition to allow evety man to improve his rights. The feelings of the heart here begin to appear, and to extend to thoſe over whom we feel a ſuperiority. "A Roman knight ſaw his ſlave weeping, "and aſked him if he was ſorrowful be- "cauſe he was a ſlave. No, ſaid the cap- "tive, but becauſe I once was free. The "man who loves freedom ſhould have "been born a Roman, ſaid the liberal Re- "publican, but, as he was not, a Roman "can make him free." The ſuperiority of ſituation here gave a field for the liberality, which felt the equal rights of a ſlave, and overcame ſelf-intereſt to make an inferior happy.

Liberality in manners aſſumes a variety of aſpects. Civility from a ſuperior ſmooths over the arbitrary diſtinctions of rank; among equals it gives to the intercourſe of life confidence and friendſhip, from inferiors it diſpoſes to good offices. In actual life men feel theſe truths, and under the title of politeneſs, ſubſtitute the affectation of civility; but the maſk is contemptible. Liberality is accompanied with the approbation of the mind and of mankind.

4. Friendſhip is founded on a perception of equal rights, and is a kind of double Li-

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berality. It begins with kindneſs in the one party, and is nouriſhed by gratitude in the other. Cicero ſays, it is the mutual deſire of mankind to promote the happineſs of each other. Sometimes, indeed, it is produced by accidents, ſometimes it is an aſpect of the Law of Probity. Such accidents as inſtincts and conſanguinity produce friendſhip, which habit confirms and raiſes to the kindeſt affection. "I trained my "ſon for war, I taught him indifference "to pain, and my enemies tremble for "him," was the parental eulogium of a Barbarian. "He was my ſword, when I "could not yet wield one; I will meet his "enemies when he ſhall be too old to "go to battle," was gratitude from the remembrance of protection.

Friendſhip may ariſe from the effect of Probity only. An honeſt heart has no feeling ſo ſtrong as gratitude, and a liberal one none ſo ſtrong as the delicacy with which it receives it.

The virtues comprehended in the Law of Probity ſhew, in the moſt obvious manner, its effects or conſequences. Innocence feels the rights of human nature, it abſtains from injuring them, and is followed by ſelf-approbation. Candour allows the ſame rights, and admits of the ſelfiſh paſſions which

which may lead to the violation of them; or that these passions have in particular cases predominated, and it is followed by self-complacency. Liberality allows the rights of mankind, and is attended not only with the satisfaction of having deserved esteem, but with the actual reception of it; while friendship makes the rights of its object equally matters of regard with its own, and marks a mind that is innocent, candid, liberal, and susceptible of the virtues which ensure the happiness of human nature. The sum of the enjoyment from these virtues forms the obligation to observe them, and is the natural sanction of the Law of Probity.

Scale of the vices which mark the Moral Obligations to Probity.

The enjoyments which accompany the observance of the Law of Probity are not the only obligations to the practice of it. The sum of the sufferings from the opposite vices must be added to make up the whole of the obligation.

1. *Violence* disregards the equal claims to rights of life or industry, and seizes the moment when it can successfully encroach on them. Shame, in the mind itself, accompanies its detection, and contempt or punishments are inflicted by the world.

2. *Dissimulation* either explains away the existence of defects or vices, or arrogates an

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an exemption from them. It aſſumes the aſpects of Virtue, and ſucceſsfully impoſes on the credulous. It is attended with remorſe, and, when detected, with the diſtruſt of mankind.

3. *Illiberality*, prompted by ſelfiſh or malignant paſſions, ſees the opportunities of invading rights, and is the vice of the coward or the oppreſſor. The one, by mean artifices, ſelects an unguarded moment to injure the rights of an opponent; the other, conſcious of power, has the meanneſs to uſe it in bringing ſufferings on the defenceleſs: anguiſh and remorſe are their accompaniments.

4. *Enmity* is a ſpecies of reciprocal illiberality. A bad office is returned by a bad office. The paſſions are kindled, Deceit may for a moment conceal them, Illiberality may await the moment of ſure revenge, but Enmity once confirmed leads to the crimes which, with rooted and deliberate paſſion, violate the rights of human nature. When the paſſions terminate in deeds, they loſe their force. In its formation Enmity is accompanied with anxiety, in its gratification, with anguiſh.

The ſum of the obligations to Probity are, on the one hand, the enjoyments which reſult from Innocence, Candour, Liberality,

berality, Friendſhip, and of the ſufferings conſequent to Violence, Diſſimulation, Illiberality, and Enmity; both ſhew the effects of the Law of Nature in actual Life; and, united, form the obligation to obſerve it.

Scale of the virtues which mark the Moral Obligation to Juſtice.

II. JUSTICE, or the diſpoſition to maintain the rights of mankind, will exhibit a ſcale of virtues with their accompanying pleaſures, and of vices with their accompanying pains, which, united, will mark the obligation to this branch of the Law.

To maintain the rights of others requires ſtrength and vigour of conſtitution, wiſdom in the conduct of affairs, and the firmneſs which can baffle difficulties and dangers. The diſpoſition indeed might exiſt in theory in a mind that was defective in the virtues which it owed itſelf, but the effects of the Law in practice cannot appear if theſe virtues are wanting. The ancients very properly divided the virtues into thoſe which a man owes to himſelf, and thoſe which he owes to others; but they adverted not to the fact, that Temperance, Prudence, and Fortitude, which comprehend the former, were neceſſary to practice Juſtice, the virtue which comprehends the latter.

We

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We ſhall avail ourſelves of this relation, and borrowing the terms of the ancient cardinal virtues, mark the effects of the Law which enables a man to be juſt or to maintain the rights of mankind.

1. *Temperance* ſignifies the diſpoſition to preſerve the conſtitution of the body and the powers of the mind in the ſound ſtate in which they are conferred by Nature. If either are impaired, a man is unable to maintain his place in Society either in the moment of ſervice or difficulty. "Your "hands are like the hands of a child (ſaid "a Cherokee to an European priſoner) they "are unfit for the chace or for war. In "the winter's ſnow you muſt burn a fire, "and in the ſummer's heat you faint in the "ſhade. The Cherokee can always lift the "hatchet, the ſnow does not freeze him, "nor the ſun make him faint. We are "men." This Savage, in comparing his own manners with thoſe of a poliſhed people, deſcribes the temperance which fits a man for maintaining the rights of Society or for being juſt.

The faculties of the mind require their natural exertions; if they are neglected, or if they are directed to improper objects, like the powers of the body, they loſe their vigour, and ſink into inaction.

The

The health of the body, and the capacity of the mind, give the independence and the conſcious approbation of itſelf, which fit a man for maintaining the rights of others and receiving their deſerved confidence.

2. *Prudence* ſignifies the capacity to examine in what the rights of human nature conſiſt, and to ſelect the means which are beſt fitted to preſerve them. When Cicero ſaw the conſpiracy of Catiline ripening; when he compared with the danger the value of the liberties of Rome; when, inſtead of a raſh effort to ſave them, he drew together all the evidence of the criminality, and ſeized the moment when the effrontery of the conſpirator led him to the Senate, whom he was about to maſſacre; catching at this inſtant the fire of patriotiſm, and rouſing the paſſions by the ſenſe of danger, he expoſed the ſcheme, its author, and the deſtruction intended their country, and led them to arms and revenge. He had the capacity to diſcern in what the rights of country conſiſted, and to ſelect the ſureſt means for their preſervation. His reward, beſides that of conſcious merit, was the gratitude of the Romans, and the glorious epithet of Father of his Country.

3. *Fortitude*

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3. *Fortitude* ſignifies the firmneſs which bears ſuffering, or meets dangers undaunted. If temperance fits for active ſcenes, and prudence diſtinguiſhes the moment proper for ſucceſs, there muſt be a firmneſs of mind during this progreſs which the paſſions in vain aſſail, and an intrepidity which danger in vain attempts to turn from the defence of rights. Adverſity may tempt the indigent to violate the life or property of an individual, the paſſions of ambition and avarice to infringe on the rights of nations, but theſe are only proofs of defects in the virtues which fit for the private or public ſtations of Society, and ſhew, that unleſs Fortitude is poſſeſſed, man cannot be juſt, or maintain the rights of mankind.

If the firſt Romans could not have lived on ſimple fare, they would not have been fitted for the hardſhips of a campaign without reſources: If they had not, amid freedom, had the prudence to be obedient in the field, they could not have conquered their enemies: If they had not poſſeſſed firmneſs in adverſity, and been ready to die in the cauſe of their country, they could not have been juſt, nor have maintained its rights either againſt treacherous citizens or public enemies. Self-enjoyment and

the confidence of mankind accompany the virtue of Fortitude.

The virtues comprehended in Juſtice, conſidered as the diſpoſition to maintain the rights of mankind, carry with them each its obligation. Temperance has health and unimpaired talents to enjoy rights; prudence, capacity to diſcern and ſecure them; fortitude, ſafety amid the viciſſitudes of life, and the honour of preſerving the rights of a people.

Scale of the vices which mark the Moral Obligation to Juſtice.

The oppoſite vices have their ſpecific ſufferings, which doubles the obligation to maintain the rights of mankind.

1. *Intemperance* ſignifies the debilitating the powers of the body and of the mind by exceſs and improper objects. The appetites and paſſions which have bodily pleaſure for their objects, terminate in ſenſuality, accompanied with languor and diſeaſe. If the faculties of the mind are directed to invent and employ means which injure, inſtead of maintaining the rights of human nature, they terminate in debaſement and incapacity. "How (ſaid Zeno) can the "debauchee ſpeak of pleaſure, he has loſt "the mind that could feel it. A wiſe man "indeed will live agreeably to Nature, but "Nature requires that we be able to diſcern "the rights of freemen, and fitted to defend "them."

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"them." Intemperance, or the vice which unfits men for maintaining their rights, theſe Philoſophers conſidered as the greateſt injuſtice to Society, and that imbecility and contempt were its natural conſequences.

2. *Imprudence* ſignifies the directing the faculties of the mind to mean or improper objects. If to the firſt, it debaſes them; if to the ſecond, it perverts them. "The "gamblers of Athens (ſaid Demoſthenes) "are more active than the magiſtrates, and "the Athenians are ruined by the ſelfiſh-"neſs of the one and the indolence of the "other." Diſappointment accompanies the one vice, contempt the other.

3. *Puſillanimity* ſignifies incapacity to endure the accidents of life, or to repel the the dangers which threaten our own or the rights of mankind. When Puſillanimity is conſtitutional, like every other deficiency from Nature, it is not a ſubject of praiſe or blame; it appears in the habitual prevalence of the depreſſing paſſions. When Puſillanimity is the fruit of vicious habits, theſe depreſſing paſſions are all that remain of the impaired faculties of the ſoul. "How "(ſaid Cato) can the Romans continue "men, when they waſte the hours which "fit for war, in learning the Grecian effe-"minacies."

"minacies." This republican thought that every circumſtance which tended to leſſen the vigour of a ſoldier's conſtitution, had an influence on his mind, and unfitted him for the hardſhips of the field. The improvement of taſte and underſtanding, on the contrary, has a tendency to correct the paſſions which engender puſillanimity. Scipio Africanus was as brave and virtuous as Cato, and far more amiable in his character. Dejection and deſpair are the conſequences of puſillanimity; mankind treat it with ſcorn and deriſion.

The ſum of the enjoyments from the virtues of Temperance, Prudence, and Fortitude, which enable us to maintain the rights of mankind, and the ſum of the ſufferings from the oppoſite vices, conſtitute the obligation to the virtue of Juſtice.

Scale of the virtues which mark the moral obligation to Benevolence.

III. BENEVOLENCE, or the diſpoſition to improve the rights of mankind, in its effects, diſcovers a ſcale of virtues with ſpecific degrees of pleaſure, and of oppoſite vices with proportioned pains. The pleaſures and the pains ſum up the obligation to the practice of that conduct which the Moral Faculty approves. The virtues and vices comprehended in this branch of the Law, diſcover one ſpecific circumſtance diſtinct from the

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preceding branches. Each of them is accompanied with the influence of the paſſions.

1. *Compaſſion* ſignifies attention to the ſufferings of human nature accompanied with a wiſh to relieve them. There is a ſympathy or fellow-feeling, when we reflect that in the ſame ſituation other men ought to enter into our ſufferings *. We cannot call the virtue ſelfiſh, though we wiſh to relieve ourſelves from a pain which we experience in viewing diſtreſs; for the pain is evidently for another, not for ourſelves. If common to our nature, we ſhrink from it as if by inſtinct. Though it ſhould even ariſe from vice, we liberally forget the vice, and feel for the ſufferings of the object. We pity a criminal at his execution, though our paſſions were engaged, as well as our ſenſe of duty, in bringing him to juſtice. Compaſſion thus, which from ſympathy wiſhes to improve the ſituations of mankind, is followed by gratitude from the objects to whom it has been directed, and by the pleaſure which the heart experiences in having felt for and alleviated diſtreſs.

2. *Charity* riſes on compaſſion; it both feels for the ſufferings of mankind, and relieves them. It is Benevolence reſtoring the common birthrights of men: it is the union

* See Theory of Moral Sentiments.

of the paſſions, with the probity which allows, the juſtice which maintains, and the benevolence which improves the rights of our nature: it conſiſts not in the actual diſtribution of gifts, for then the rich only could be charitable; but in the uniform diſpoſition to improve the ſituations of mankind. When the feelings of the heart ſmooth over the embarraſſments which attend humble merit; when they ſeek out objects to the induſtry of the deſerving; when they bring forward talents to their place in ſociety, they improve the rights of human nature. The approbation of the mind, and the deſerved eſteem and gratitude of mankind, accompany the virtue. CHAP. III.

3. *Generoſity* ſhews the advancing diſpoſition to improve the rights of mankind. The paſſions which accompany this virtue are not only ſtrong, but rendered habitual by indulgence. The compaſſionate feel for the ſuffering, the charitable relieve them, whether the objects are friends or fellow-citizens; but the generous ſcorn theſe common motives, as fitted only to rouſe our inſtincts, and are benevolent to human nature. "He is my enemy (ſaid a Celtic "chief), and he ſhall hang on the oak "under which I worſhip the god of war." The paſſions of this barbarian diſcovered no

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generoſity. "I ſcorn the ſervices which "my ſword can command," ſaid the great Tamerlane; "my grave ſhall be ſtrewed "with the tears, not with the ſpoils of "my enemies;" a wiſh which could only ſpring from the generoſity which deſerved its accompliſhment. A conſcious dignity of mind which the viciſſitudes of fortune cannot alter, and the approbation and confidence, not only of friends, but of enemies, accompany this virtue.

4. *Patriotiſm* is the marked tendency of the mind to improve the rights of a people, in conſiſtency with the common rights of nations. Ambition may addreſs the patriotic mind with an offer of power; avarice may ſpread out her treaſures to entangle it, tyranny may hold up the whip and the rack to deter it, but elevation and wealth are as ineffectual to ſeduce, as cruelty and ſufferings are to intimidate or depreſs it. Hiſtory affords not a finer example than in the character of Ariſtides. If Athens were preſerved, it was to him indifferent, whether by himſelf, his friends, or his rivals. A moment's diſcontent would have ruined the Athenians—he yielded the command to Miltiades. When Themiſtocles, his enemy, conducted the Athenian army, it was enough to Ariſtides if they con-

quered; he therefore promoted the ſchemes of Themiſtocles. He was equally compliant in peace as in war. When he ſubmitted any propoſal to the ſenate, or to the aſſembly of the people, he uſed the name of ſome other perſon, that jealouſy of himſelf might not interfere with the intereſts of his country. When he became too old for the dangers of the field, or the buſtle of politics, he ſaid he ſtill could be of ſome ſervice to his country, in teaching the young Athenians to be in love with virtue and its laws. With the treaſures of Greece in his hands, he left not money of his own to bury him; but he left the memory of his virtues, and the tears with which the Athenians bedewed his urn, formed at once his eulogy and his reward. CHAP. III.

5. *Love to mankind* forms (as it were) the laſt ſtep in the ſcale of Benevolence, and ſignifies habitual affection for the rights of human nature. It is the virtue of Ariſtides transferred from Greece to mankind. Wherever a ſpark of this virtue kindles in the breaſt, it holds up to view the dignity of human nature. When the hero led out his army, marſhalled and formed to conquer, reflecting on the incidents which might ſully his glory, he felt for the ſuffering his ambition was about to bring on thouſands. "How

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" many bleeding groans does ambition pro-
" duce? How many mothers and widows
" ſhall deplore my victory or my fall?
" How few ſuns ſhall ſet, when the world
" ſhall hardly remember whether I con-
" quered or fell?" The trumpet ſounded the alarm, the ſoldier called for battle: the paſſion for glory veiled from the eye the wounds and mangled carcaſſes over which he had wept in imagination, and darkened thoſe fine feelings which were changing the hero into the god.

Hiſtory perhaps affords no example of this virtue, but imagination can picture it, and hold it up as the fineſt rudiment of education; and even in fancy, it is accompanied with almoſt the idolatry of mankind.

Scale of the vices which mark the Moral Obligation to Benevolence.

The ſum of the pleaſures from the ſcale of Benevolence, forms however but one part of the moral obligation to its practice; we muſt look therefore to the conſequences of the oppoſite ſcale of vices.

1. *Natural Inſenſibility*, the oppoſite of compaſſion, ſeems to be either a defect in, or a neglect of the finer ſenſations of the heart; and it ariſes from the habit of counteracting them. The former admits of obſervation, but not of explanation; the latter is the fruit of a vicious education. " It is the

" wiſh

"wiſh of a wiſe man (ſaid Epicurus) to "fly from the pains that are not his, he "has enough to ſuffer from thoſe he can-"not avert." The habit of avoiding the ſufferings of others makes us indifferent to them. Moral Sceptics argue, that the inſenſible are the moſt happy. An eye ſtruck with a palſy is inſenſible to pain, but its poſſeſſor is not ſo happy as when all the beauties of Nature broke in upon his ſight. The objects of our feelings may give us pain, but they lead to diſpoſitions and actions which produce the moſt refined enjoyment. Inſenſibility always procures the contempt of mankind, and when it is accompanied with power, their hatred.

2. *Hard-heartedneſs* is inſenſibility to the ſufferings of human nature, accompanied with malignant paſſions. When the mind can dwell on the ſufferings of an enemy, it is training to look on thoſe of a friend with indifference. Though Philip the Second was a bigot in religion, he was inſenſible to its duties: he heard of the executions of Egmont and Hoorne with one regret only, that he had not ſeen their bodies mangled and burned; he was always preſent at an *Auto de fè*, and was never ſeen to ſmile with ſuch complacency, as when he heard of the murder of the Prince of Orange.

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The ſame vice appears in a variety of forms in private life. The Roman mothers, after the eſtabliſhment of deſpotiſm, were ſo corrupted, that they abandoned their children to the care of their ſlaves. They wiſhed to teach them to forget that their fathers had been free. When their ſons fell by the order of the tyrant, they attended the Court, as if the life of a courtier had not been ſubjected to viciſſitudes. If ſuch a mind is too vicious to know remorſe, the ſcorn and deteſtation of mankind mark their diſapprobation of it.

3. *Cruelty* is the union of ſtrong paſſions with the habit of deſtroying the rights of mankind. In the rude ages of Society, cruelty is ſometimes viewed as a virtue; in civiliſed ages, uniformly as a vice. When the American Indians take a priſoner, they try to diſcover whether his character is like their own; they tie him to a tree, and dancing round him ſpit on him, to learn whether he can be indifferent to inſults: they next run round him and cut him with their knives; if he bears the pain without a ſhrink, they allow that he has fortitude: they then burn the wounds with lighted faggots; if he ſtands this rack, the old men pronounce that he has the ſoul of a Cherokee, and may become a warrior. The women ſing a ſong

ſong of joy; his wounds are tied up and healed; he attends the headmen and warriors. If he can bear cold and fatigue, and is brave, he gets a hatchet, and is adopted by ſome warrior to replace a ſon he has loſt in battle. Though there is a mixture of manly virtue in this cruelty, inſenſibility perverted by habits could only produce it. CHAP. III.

This vice in poliſhed ages, though blamed, is practiſed. The moſt poliſhed European nations diſcover it in the torture of criminals, though ſuch a ſcene is only fitted to train the ſpectators to inſenſibility, not to make them in love with virtue. When the Romans made no law againſt parricide, becauſe the remorſe which followed it exceeded in duration the moſt ſtudied puniſhments, they deſcribed the ſufferings which form the obligation to avoid the vice.

4. *Public Perfidy* is the decided tendency of the mind to ſubvert the rights of a people. If the oppoſite virtue of Patriotiſm marked a regard to the rights of our country in preference to ſelfiſh conſiderations of every kind, Public Perfidy diſcovers itſelf by a preference of ſelfiſh conſiderations to the rights of our country. Such a character ſprings not from any effort of reaſon examining the degrees of enjoyment a particular ſituation can afford, but from the perverſion

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verſion of reaſon, which concludes, that riches, power, or rank can give happineſs, though the ſentiments of the heart and the rights of mankind ſhould be equally violated in the attainment of them.

This vice is influenced in practice by the characters of individuals, and by the ſituations in which they are placed. Sometimes it is bold and deſperate, ſometimes it is cautious but decided.

With an unſuſpecting mind the generous Edward intruſted his brother Richard with the guardianſhip of his infant ſons. Their youth, their beauty, their helpleſs dependence had no attractions for his hard and cruel heart; they ſerved only to rouſe his perfidy and ambition. With talents he deluded the public, with art he drew the infants into his power; by his power he procured ruffians to murder them. The public vengeance awaited but the moment of a call, and the people only lamented that the fate of the tyrant was too honourable for his crimes.

The Romans brought forward Auguſtus to avenge the death of Cæſar, who had ſubverted their liberties. With a cautious and deliberate eye, Auguſtus turned their prejudices againſt his rivals, accepted of the public offices to ſubvert them, habituated the

the citizens to conſider his favour as the ſource of their ſafety, till at laſt the Senate, which had appeared an aſſembly of gods, ſunk into the gaudy pageant of a deſpot. If Auguſtus was not that deſpot, he formed the deſpotiſm, in which age, ſex, rank, all promiſcuouſly fell before the unguided and unprincipled violence of tyrants.

This ſhews perhaps the higheſt link in the chain of vice, for the remaining one ſeems to go beyond examples.

5. *Hatred to Mankind* ſeems to ſignify a perpetual violation of their rights, accompanied with the moſt malignant paſſions. It ſeems to ſum up all the preceding vices, inſenſibility of heart, hardened by habits, become cruel in deeds, and confirmed by public perfidy, till at laſt all the objects which virtuous men eſteem, all the rights on which they reſt their happineſs, all the ſcenes in which they receive approbation and confidence, become matters of abhorrence and deteſtation.

When Nero became inſenſible to the ſufferings of the Romans; when his hard heart could force a mother to curſe the hour ſhe had given him life; when his cruelty became ſo habitual, that friends and country left it unſated; when his Public Perfidy could ſcheme the burning of Rome, and

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his violence delight in ſeeing it in flames, he affords an example of almoſt hatred to mankind. The conſequences of his vices ſtrongly mark the obligation to avoid them. Every foot ſeemed the ſpeedy harbinger of an aſſaſſin. The looks of the Prætorian bands preſaged his approaching puniſhment; at laſt, the wretch who had been inſenſible, hard-hearted, cruel and perfidious, to foes, to friends, to country and to mankind, could not even obtain the mercy of his own ſlave to kill him. Trembling he awaited the fury of the Romans to drag his bleeding carcaſe over the ſtreets he had ſo often ſtained with their blood, that the Tyber might carry off an object which vengeance could no longer purſue.

This vice ſeems rather, like the oppoſite virtue, to be an object of imagination, than to exiſt in examples, but even in fancy it can be held up for the paſſions to deteſt and execrate.

The effects or conſequences of Malevolence ſhew the obligation to the practice of that conduct which Benevolence preſcribes.

The combined effects of the virtues and vices con-

After this review of the Moral Law and its conſequences, the character and extent of Moral Obligation riſes to obvious notice. The enjoyments reſulting from Probity,

bity, Juſtice, and Benevolence, all referring to the rights of mankind, and the ſufferings from Deceit, Injuſtice, and Malevolence, all referring to the violation of theſe rights, united in one point of view, are the ſanctions of Moral Law, or conſtitute Moral Obligation. CHAP. III. ſtitute Moral Obliga- tion.

The Law of Gravitation ſhews not its conſequences in a more legible manner than the Laws of Morality. It is ignorance of Nature which forms the Sceptic in Morality. Mankind have ſaid, that Philoſophy has been an enemy to Virtue, becauſe men who have aſſumed the name of Philoſophers have endeavoured to queſtion and explain away the principles of Moral conduct. But when Science lays aſide affected ſubtleties and refinements, Nature holds out the Moral Law and its effects in ſuch broad characters, that the certainty in Ethics is not leſs ſtrong than in Phyſics.

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Of Moral Principles.

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Principles in Phyſics, are maxims deduced from diſcovered Laws of Nature.

PRINCIPLES in Phyſics are maxims deduced from diſcovered Laws of Nature. While that branch of Science aſſumed principles, all was uncertainty and ſpeculation. Abhorrence of vacuity then accounted for Phenomena, which the relative denſity of fluids has ſince that time explained. After the Laws of Motion were demonſtrated, they were adopted as principles in mechanics. It is not to be ſuppoſed that a principle which is to direct mankind in uſing or applying the Laws of Nature can appear, till the Laws of which it is the reſult are underſtood and explained. It is not by this meant, that every mechanic who employs powers to produce effects, underſtands the full extent of the Law of Gravitation; he only has ſeen effects, or has been ſhewn how they may be produced, and by imitations and habit he appeals to facts as the foundation of his Art: But if he ſtudies theſe foundations, he ſoon finds that its principles

are

are ſimple maxims drawn from the Laws of Nature.

Principles in Ethics admit of the ſame character with thoſe of Phyſics.

Principles in Ethics, if they are to have the ſame fixed characters as in Phyſics, muſt be maxims deduced from the Moral Law, known and underſtood as a Law of Nature. This Science, though not in the ſame ſituation with that of Phyſics previous to the diſcovery and application of the Laws of Motion and Gravitation, is ſtill ſubjected to reaſonings from principles, which are not (at leaſt) ſimple maxims inferred from the Law of Nature. Such principles, it muſt be allowed, are ingenious. It is not, however, ingenuity, but obſervation and experiment, which eſtabliſh a Science. Theſe principles may have an intimate relation with the great Law of Morality, but they are not an obvious tranſcript of it. The rude arts of the ſling and bow are accidental uſes of the Laws of Motion from impulſe; but they are not like improved mechanics, where the known Laws of Nature are employed in Art. Till the principles of Ethics take the ſame character with thoſe of Phyſics, they muſt remain vague and undecided.

We muſt then ſhew, that the Moral Law, in its marked branches, as well as in their union, may be adopted as maxims applicable to the Art of Living.

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The Moral Law appears in the form of principles, like every other phyſical Law, either in the actual advances of mankind in civilization, or in the obvious relation which the particular virtues bear to the Law itſelf.

Principles deduced from Probity.

PROBITY, or the happineſs which ariſes from the acknowledgment of rights, may be obſerved in the aſpect of a principle, firſt in the progreſs of civil Society, and next in the different virtues of which it is the ſource. In both views it will preſent us with maxims deduced from a Law of Nature.

1. In the actual hiſtory of the virtue in civil Society.

1. The acknowledgment of rights muſt give an origin to civil union, but this ſenſe of rights is ſoon counteracted by the ſelfiſh paſſions. The appeals, however, to the original principle of union gradually appear. A people continue to make them, when they blame any violation of what they apprehend to be their rights. Cæſar ſays, "that the "Germans make it a principle to rob and "plunder other nations, but conſider it as "infamous to ſteal from each other." When this infamy was underſtood, it muſt mean, that the action was contrary to the original principles of their union.

By degrees the mind enlarges, and the rights of ſtrangers begin to be held ſacred. Cæſar

Cæſar deſcribes the ſame people, as prohibiting injuries to ſtrangers, to whom their houſes and proviſions were open. The principle of hoſpitality gradually refines. If a ſtranger has been protected by any individual, he conſiders that he alone is entitled on any future occaſion to give him protection. In Brazil, if a ſtranger takes up his reſidence once with any one man, he alone is entitled to receive him on any future occaſion, and he is offended if another ſhould ſhew him the ſame hoſpitality.

Probity, however, but ſlowly becomes a national virtue. The refined Greeks held the Barbarians to be lawful ſubjects of conqueſt. Rome thought ſhe alone had a right to command the world. In modern Europe, it is true, Probity is appealed to in the preamble to treaties; but theſe views of rights exiſt in deſcription only, not in practice. The peace of nations, like their credit, depends on exact calculation. The former arithmetic eſtimates their ſtrength, the latter their reſources.

2. Probity, as a Law of Nature, finds its way into the numerous principles to which mankind appeal in the art of living. In this view the ſame virtues which ſhewed the aſpects of Moral Obligation, will ſhew the aſpects of Moral Principles.

In the relation of the different principles comprehended in Probity to the Moral Law.

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When a man reſtrains the ſelfiſh paſſions from a feeling of the equal rights of life, reputation, and property, common to human nature, he is ſaid to act from the principle of Innocence. If he has his ſword at the breaſt of his rival, and, feeling that he too had his rights, ſhall retract the blow, he acts from the principle of Probity in its aſpect of Candour. When we allow that ſelfiſh paſſions ſtain the characters of mankind, much more that we ourſelves have yielded to their impulſe, we act from the ſame principle. Charles the Fifth ratified the treaty betwixt his grandfather Maximilian and the King of France, but privately proteſted that he was not bound by it. When the ill-fated Queen of Scots married the Dauphin, the French Court publicly ratified the articles with her Parliament, but took a private deed from the Princeſs, transferring her kingdom to France. The principle of Candour was in theſe inſtances aſſumed in public tranſactions, but diſregarded in private deeds.

When mankind not only feel the equal rights of each other, but in their ſentiments allow for the temptations which have induced individuals or nations to infringe on them, they decide from the principle of Liberality.

If

If the liberality is reciprocal, or if all that an honeſt heart can give, its gratitude, is felt and ſhewn, then men act from the principle of Friendſhip. An American Indian was betrayed on board a ſhip, and ſold as a ſlave. The cruelties even of a Weſt India Planter could not tame the high-ſpirited ſavage to labour: he refuſed ſuſtenance, and attempted to kill himſelf. Another ſhip-maſter, ſtruck with his diſtreſs, bought him for a trifle and carried him back to Canada. The joy which flaſhed in his eye on approaching his native ſhore, was checked by gratitude to his deliverer. He ſwam back to the ſhip—he was landed again with preſents—he left the preſents and ſwam back to his benefactor with the generous feelings of a mind which had ſtrongly felt misfortunes, but more ſtrongly the attachment to his deliverer. "I knew "no ſorrow (ſaid he) till I was betrayed, "inſulted, and whipped. I will return to "my nation, for they will give me my "hatchet. Though I had no preſents to "give, you gave me freedom, and now load "me with preſents. My eyes never ſhed "tears before. Promiſe but to remember "me, and to return after twelve moons, "and I will give you many furs, and lay "the ſcalps of my fierceſt enemies at your

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"feet." When he thus had given language to his heart, he walked off in ſilence. There is a greatneſs in this Savage's feelings, which could be equalled only by the liberality of the man who deſerved them.

If it is required to give a deſcription of the principle of Probity, theſe aſpects of the virtues which it comprehends ſhew it in the art of living, and enable us to decide on it as a maxim deduced from a demonſtrated Law of Nature.

Principles deduced from Juſtice.

II. JUSTICE, or the happineſs that ariſes from the maintenance of the rights of mankind, appears alſo to be a principle, both in the progreſſive ſtages of civilization, and in the relations which the virtues comprehended under it bear to the Law of Nature.

1. In the actual hiſtory of the virtue in civil Society.

1. The progreſs of the principle of Juſtice is ſlow, and mankind do not ſeem to form adequate conceptions of it till they begin to refine on its nature and importance to Society.

Among Savages whoſe wants are few, and whoſe rights to life and to ſuch ſcanty means of ſubſiſtence as they can procure, are felt and acknowledged, there can hardly exiſt any temptations to injuſtice. We are apt to aſcribe an honeſty to Savages which they do not poſſeſs. It is true they live in huts without

out doors, and leave their little ſtore of proviſions open; but then it is to be conſidered, that it is impracticable for any one of them to ſteal from any other. The circle is ſo narrow, that detection is immediate. A Savage muſt be ſeen collecting his proviſions, otherwiſe he is ſuſpected; and, as all injuries are perſonal, they are immediately puniſhed.

The moment, however, that temptations ariſe, theſe very Savages diſcover ſelfiſhneſs and addreſs. If a ſingle ſtranger viſit them, they practiſe hoſpitality; but if ſtrangers viſit them in numbers, they conſider them as other tribes and as enemies. They firſt try to reduce them by arms; if they find this impracticable, to ſteal from them and to betray them. The New Zealand Savages drew up to repel the ſouthern Navigators. When they found the ſuperiority of the ſtrangers, they uſed every art to delude them into their power, and when this art failed, they fled from them. The firſt circumſtance which induces Savages to believe that ſtrangers are not their enemies is, when they lay aſide their arms, offer them preſents, and put themſelves into their power. As they aſcribe this ſubmiſſion to an idea of their own ſuperiority,

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they uſe every art to violate the rights of the invaders.

When rude nations however underſtand that ſtrangers are to give goods in exchange for their giving up rights to their goods, then their ſenſe of right and wrong is wonderfully ſtrong.

Ulloa informs us, that the Savages of Chili carry on a very honourable traffic with the Spaniards ſettled on the coaſt. The Spaniards deliver large quantities of knives, muſquets, bridles, &c. and make bargains for horſes, oxen, ſkins, gems, and even children for ſlaves. They do not receive theſe articles till they are about to return to their ſhips. The departure of the trader is intimated, and the purchaſers immediately bring the goods agreed on. They give him a guard to carry him out of their territory; and there is not an inſtance known of their breaking their engagements. When property begins to be underſtood, then the ſelfiſh paſſions having new and numerous objects, require more poſitive reſtraints than the ſimple appeal to the principle of Juſtice. Its native ſanctions become ineffectual, and neceſſity and an encreaſing number of caſes lead to gradually extending and more poſitive views of the virtue,

The

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The uſurpations, aſſaſſinations, and crimes of ſovereigns force men to attend to their ſituations, and though they chuſe inadequate meaſures for introducing Juſtice into national inſtitutions, every ſucceſsful effort in improving uſages and public opinions brings the virtue nearer to view, and diſſipates the clouds, which though they have magnified its glare have never ſhewn its purer characters.

In a ſimilar manner, after the introduction of Arts and of wealth, the deceit and violence of individuals produce numerous caſes, to which neceſſity (ſlowly indeed) calls forward the application of the principle of Juſtice. The rude arbiter decides, not by the principles of equity, but by uſages, which the prejudices of a people admit, and with the uniform ſenſe of preſerving the opinion to which he owes his rank. When caſes become ſo numerous, that they ſeem to dictate a rule of equity to which the common feelings and the judgments of mankind aſſent, then equity appears in law and is appealed to as its principle. Juriſdictions, however, are long formed before the opinion of a judge can be limited by poſitive laws. The Roman prætors, if they decided by laws, at the ſame time introduced as many of their own opinions as the pre-

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judices of the people on the one hand, and the power of the magiſtrate on the other, would authoriſe.

It was not, however, till the Roman laws began to be methodiſed and refined by the introduction of maxims from the Grecian moraliſts, that the principle of juſtice had a poſitive deſcription. When this appeared, it immediately involved the ſpirit of the Law of Nature. The Stoics deſcribed juſtice to be the conſtant and perpetual deſire to give every man his own; or the rights which Nature and the laws of his country entitled him to claim.

Since juriſprudence has become a Science by the refinements of Grotius, the ſame ideas have been copied and illuſtrated by numerous caſes to which the principle thus underſtood ſeemed to be applicable.

In the laws of Great Britain the principle is accurately underſtood in practice; and if perverted in any particular caſe by intrigues or ſophiſtry, individuals perceive their rights in danger, and properly complain to the Public of the iniquity and depravity of their Judges.

The principle of Juſtice, however, receives its laſt poliſh when its foundations in Nature begin to be examined and underſtood. Though its character as a principle may

may not be apprehended in its ſtrict relation to the Law of Nature, yet even ſpeculative refinements on the approbation beſtowed on virtuous actions tend to bring forward more ſimple views of the characters of the virtue, and to ſhew its importance as a principle in civil Society.

2. In the relation of the different principles comprehended in Juſtice to the Moral Law.

2. Juſtice, as a Law of Nature, appears in actual life in the numerous principles to which mankind are appealing, either when they require characters fitted to maintain their rights, or expreſs their approbation of actions that have this end.

When the Moral Feeling is ſufficiently ſtrong to repel the objects of the appetites which form the ſenſualiſt, when it ſhews that to be fitted for maintaining our own or the rights of other men, the faculties of the mind muſt be kept in their natural purity and vigour, then a man is ſaid to act from the principle of Temperance.

When the Moral Faculty informs any individual, that the only pleaſures which deſerve his attention are thoſe which ſpring from a proper choice of the objects of purſuit, and from a proper application of them when obtained, to preſerve the rights of Society, then he is ſaid to act from the principle of Prudence. "If a man gain riches "(ſaid Epictetus), and with them infamy, he "loſes

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" loſes that love of mankind, which poverty " itſelf may obtain." It is from the want of prudence to ſelect the proper objects of activity, that injuſtice as a vice prevails. If the activity of the ſtateſman ſhall direct him to ſeize on the property and privileges of a people, his ſucceſs is dreaded and his fall regretted only as too mild a puniſhment. If the activity of a miſer ſhall be directed to the perpetual accumulation of riches, and at the ſame time he ſhall deny himſelf the common enjoyments of life, he meets the contempt which wealth cannot avert. It is only where the activity of the mind is directed to ſuch objects as connect individual with general good, that the pleaſure from the active propenſity itſelf is either intenſe or uniform, or that the ſubſequent conduct is referred to the principle of Prudence.

When a man poſſeſſes the firmneſs of mind which the viciſſitudes of life in vain aſſail, and the magnanimity which undaunted meets danger in the defence of rights, then he is ſaid to act from the principle of Fortitude. " What (ſaid the great Saladin) " do theſe Chriſtians expect? Do " they think to ſubdue a man who can live " on bread and water as eaſily as in all " the luxuries of a ſeraglio? Who can " watch for years to ſeize the moment of

" victory; whom a thouſand triumphs " elate not, whom a thouſand defeats can " as little depreſs; who has the armies of " the Eaſt ready to die for him, and yet " who daily can view his winding-ſheet; " who can riſe to battle in the morning, " without his ſleep being diſturbed with " the fear of death?" Suppoſe theſe qualities to be pretenſions, they are the qualities which fit a man to maintain his rights; and even in the inſtance of the deſpot here mentioned, made him an object of veneration to his ſlaves, and of terror to his enemies.

The Law of Nature in the practice of that conduct which enables mankind to maintain their rights, or to be juſt, appears in the qualities which are ſought in characters, and in the actions which are admired in life.

Principles deduced from Benevolence.

III. BENEVOLENCE, or the happineſs which ariſes from the improvement of rights, ſhews alſo its aſpects as a principle in the progreſs of Society, and in the particular virtues comprehended in it as a Law of Nature.

1. In the actual hiſtory of the virtue in civil Society.

1. In the progreſs of Society the principle of Benevolence is later in its appearance, than either that of Probity or of Juſtice. Savages cannot unite without ſome acknow-

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acknowledgment of rights, and their union can only continue by the introduction of rules to maintain them.

Probity and Juſtice, therefore, are gradually conſidered both as duties and as virtues. Benevolence, however, is conſidered as a virtue only. Mankind may by force be obliged to acknowledge each other's rights, and by reſtraints be bound down not to infringe on them, but no man can be forced to acts of compaſſion, generoſity, patriotiſm, or love to mankind. Hence the reaſon why the virtues of Probity and Juſtice are leſs admired than Generoſity.

Benevolence, from its nature, muſt be later of appearing, though the circumſtances which bring it forward as a principle are equally ſtriking with thoſe which marked the preceding virtues. Benevolence being a virtue only, is uniformly accompanied with the more gentle paſſions, and is emphatically referred in common language to the heart.

It firſt appears blended with inſtinctive or natural affections, and in its application gradually enlarges the number of its objects.

The natural feelings of a parent induce him to rear and protect his offſpring. Protection and dependence are rewarded by

love and gratitude. The rights of a family ſend the warrior to the field, and he values death as a leſs evil than an infringement on what he conſiders himſelf as born to protect. Old age in its turn receives the protection which in its better days it had given to infancy and youth. The virtue here is ſo blended with natural (and almoſt inſtinctive) feelings, that were we not able to obſerve its alternate influence on them, we ſhould be apt to conſider the whole as inſtinctive.

By degrees, however, the affections extend, and in the aſpect of Generoſity, ſtill in ſome meaſure dictated by natural affection, ſhew the virtue in more obtruſive forms. While the tribe of Abanakee Indians were going to glut their revenge on an Engliſh officer they had taken priſoner, one of them unexpectedly obtained his releaſe and carried him to his wigwam. He taught him the Indian language, the uſe of their arms, and their methods of procuring food. When the Spring returned, the tribe marched againſt the Engliſh, and coming in ſight of their camp, the Savage thus addreſſed his priſoner: "Thy bro-
"thers are come to invade our rights and
"to give us death—What ſayeſt thou? I
"taught thee to make bows and arrows, to
"catch the deer of the foreſt, to build ca-
"noes,

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" noes, to wield the hatchet, and all our " arts of war. Thy hands were like the " hands of a child, they neither could give " thee ſubſiſtence nor defence. Canſt thou " be ſo ungrateful as to go over to thy " countrymen and lift thy ſword againſt " us?" " As long as I live I will call thee " father (replied the officer), and thy tribe " my brothers." The Savage dejected fixed his eye on his priſoner, and aſked him if he had a father? Being told he had, " I " too (ſaid he) had once a ſon; he was " like thee; he fell like a warrior; he fell by " my ſide. But I revenged him!" Here he looked wild, but no tears came from his eyes. Recovering himſelf—" I had almoſt " (ſaid he) forgot that I was a man. That " ſun and blue ſky uſed to give me plea- " ſure, they now give me none. The tree " in bloom is it not like my ſon? When I " firſt ſaw thee, I thought I ſaw him again. " Thou art but his ſhadow. Fly! return " to thy father, that he may look on the " ſun and on the flowers of the ſpring with " joy."

Natural affections thus gradually transfer themſelves to ſuch objects as imagination aſſociates with their original ones, and Generoſity marks the firſt riſings of Benevolence. Such inſtances, however, are not common

common among Savages, or if they are, they eſcape the obſervation of ſtrangers who viſit them. CHAP. III.

Benevolence is long a particular virtue before it becomes a principle known to nations. The generoſity of conquerors precedes the introduction of principles of equity into civil inſtitutions. The heroes of Greece and Rome were capable of greatneſs of mind; it is a queſtion whether equity in their laws ever attempered the rigour of Juſtice. It is even a queſtion, whether any but the laws of England admit the ſituation of the accuſed to be pleaded from principles of equity in palliation of guilt; though even here the maxims of Benevolence alter not the force of the principle of Juſtice, yet they attemper its adminiſtration with mercy.

"Benevolence (ſays Lord Kaims) may "lead to ſome duties which are prejudicial "to intereſt, and to others which promote "it; in both reſpects its force is general "and great. Benevolence dictates equity "either to the mind of an intelligent indi-"vidual, or to a court, like the Engliſh "Chancery, which authoriſes the conſider-"ation of the caſe, that it may ſupply the "forms of Juſtice, without which the ig-"norant or the defenceleſs might ſuffer."

In

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In the poliſhed ſtates of Society, Benevolence is univerſally admired, but partially and unequally practiſed. It ſeems a kind of contradiction in hiſtory, that where Luxury has refined and encreaſed the vices, there the principle of Benevolence ſhould be moſt accurately underſtood and moſt generally admired. This is owing to the virtues of Probity and Juſtice being required by poſitive laws and ſanctions, to the unequal diffuſion of wealth, and to the refinements which the conſideration of the virtues that diſtinguiſh character receive. Violations of Probity and Juſtice are conſidered, not only as crimes, but as mean and contemptible vices. Though no law enforces Benevolence, or puniſhes a malevolent intention, the one forms an eſſential part in the character of a citizen, and the other is held as a crime which the meaneſt and moſt inſignificant men ſedulouſly conceal.

When Philoſophy refines on the principles of conduct, Benevolence, if it is not the ſpirit, is the moſt important branch of every theory. Ariſtotle conſidered it as the higheſt object of choice; Plato that it made men reſemble the gods; and even Epicurus practiſed the virtue.

virtue. Hutchinſon drew out a ſyſtem which embraces it as its principle; and the refined moraliſts who have ſucceeded him have ſtated its utility and propriety. Whenever nations or individuals begin to conſider Benevolence with indifference, and to treat it with contempt, they have thrown aſide the preceding reſtraints, and are haſtening, the one to barbarity, and the other to ruin.

2. In the relation of the different principles comprehended in Benevolence to the Moral Law.

2. Benevolence appears in actual life as a principle immediately deducible from the Moral Law, and diffuſes itſelf over the more elegant virtues to which mankind are perpetually appealing.

When the ſufferings of human nature addreſs the mind by a ſympathy of feelings, and excite the wiſh to alleviate or relieve, a man is ſaid to act from the principle of Compaſſion. If it is a bodily pain, we ſhrink from it as if we ourſelves were the ſufferers. When reflection tells us, as in the caſe of a criminal, that his death is deſerved, ſtill we pity and forget the crime. In caſes where we ſuffer from the depravity or misfortunes of others, the principle of Compaſſion continues to operate. We pity a bankrupt, and from the principle of Compaſſion give away the

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wrecks of that fortune of which he has defrauded us.

When we not only pity but relieve the diſtreſſed, we act from the principle of Charity. The mind here not only allows and maintains the rights of mankind, but reſtores what accidents have taken from the ſuffering. This principle operates in a thouſand amiable forms. It is at one time relieving diſtreſs, at another bringing forward humble merit, at a third preventing the acknowledgments which the deſerving are the moſt ſolicitous to pay. "How little "(ſaid the ancient Philoſopher) do men "know the true ſources of their enjoyment. "I ſaw one ſlave give part of his gar-"ment to another, and that other weep "for gratitude; the one parted with half "his all, becauſe the other needed it; the "other parted with his tears, becauſe the "firſt deſerved them."

When the mind not only feels for the diſtreſſes of human nature, and relieves them, but when it is ſuperior to any diſtinctions which the ſelfiſh paſſions commonly dictate, then a man is ſaid to act from the principle of generoſity. Themiſtocles fled from the ungrateful Greeks, and in the habit of a peaſant found admiſſion to the monarch whoſe power he had repelled.

pelled. He was received with an apparent generoſity which we hardly look for in a deſpot. It was unnatural. He loaded this diſtinguiſhed refugee with preſents, praiſed his valour, and ſought his counſels. Themiſtocles at laſt ſaw the tyrant's object; he offered him the command of the army which was to enſlave his country. This citizen and ſoldier ſcorned to repay with ingratitude the protection he had received, but he was too generous to his country to puniſh the vice in her, which he himſelf diſdained to commit, and he drank poiſon. —We deſpiſe the ſelfiſhneſs of the monarch, and we venerate the generoſity of the ſoldier.

When the love of our country ſuperſedes the ſelfiſh paſſions of ambition and avarice, and diſcovers a mind which ſeeks to preſerve her rights, and yet allows the juſt titles of other nations, then it is ſaid to act from the principles of patriotiſm. Camillus could leave his ſimple huſbandry, and ſave his country by his valour. He could return from a triumph to the ſimplicity of a private Roman. Pyrrhus found the ſenate as incorruptible as Camillus was brave, but Jugurtha could pronounce them ſo venal, that they only wanted a purchaſer. The principle of patriotiſm is the moſt exalted

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in the practical liſt of virtues which improve the rights of mankind; but its name often remains when its ſpirit has diſappeared. A nation is indeed haſtening to ruin, when men, without even the common and eſſential virtues of private life, dare, under the name of patriotiſm, to counteract the intereſts of their country. Such characters are known by foſtering factions, ſecretly aiding the ſchemes of enemies, and ſeeking power, that they may ſubvert the liberties, or ſeize the wealth of their fellow-ſubjects. In its genuine character, patriotiſm is the brighteſt principle of action; in its corrupted character, it is the cloak under which the worſt of men have ruined free nations. When the Patricians and Plebeians were ſtruggling for their privileges, Rome was in her glory: when privileges were forgotten in the intereſts of Pompey and Cæſar, Anthony and Auguſtus, Rome was falling, and her liberties were ſoon ſubverted.

When Benevolence extends to human nature at large, a man is ſaid to act from the principle of philanthropy, or love to mankind. Imagination here rather carries us to the perfection, than to the reality of moral feelings; but even this very circumſtance ſhews the obviouſneſs of the moral principle,

principle, and the elevated conceptions of it which the human underſtanding can form.

If a deſcription of the principle of Benevolence is required, the ſcale of virtues to which in the art of living men appeal, as the ſprings from which the beſt feelings and actions of the heart proceed, all meet in being maxims deducible from the Law of Nature, that the improvement of rights conſtitutes the happineſs of mankind.

The union of theſe principles affords a diſtinct view of the principle of Morality.

If we view the manner in which principles in phyſics were evolved or applied, we ſhall find, that allowing for the different characters of the ſubject, the principles in Ethics have an equally intimate relation with the Law of Nature. When the Laws of Motion and Gravitation were diſcovered in ſolids, they were either ſimply adopted as principles to direct in the mechanical arts, or practical inferences from them were drawn and meaſured out to thoſe who could only be tutored by imitation and habit. When the ſame laws were found to be uniform in fluids as well as in ſolids, a ſimilar adoption and ſubdiviſion of principles were embraced; at laſt it appeared, that the qualities of objects and their laws were uniform; that what obtained in ſimple mechanics, obtained in the great machinery of Nature. When theſe facts were

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eſtabliſhed as phyſical Laws, they were aſſumed as principles, to which appeals could be uniformly made, either when Nature itſelf was to be explained, or when the foundations of the Arts were to be unfolded.

If we turn back to the manner in which Phenomena eſtabliſhed the Moral Law, we ſhall find that it gradually opens itſelf to our view, till at laſt it ſeems, like the Laws of Phyſics, to be univerſal in its ſpecific department.

The ſimple approbation of the mind itſelf at firſt marked the diſpoſitions and actions which afford ſolid enjoyment. Theſe gradually appeared to receive the approbation of mankind, when they obſerved, that the rights which made a part of their nature were allowed, maintained, and improved. In the inſtitutions which bring them into ſociety; in the laws which protect their lives, their liberties, their reputation, and fruits of induſtry as citizens; in the diſpoſitions which give the mind its own approbation, and in the actions which command the eſteem of mankind, the apprehenſion, acknowledgment, and improvement of the rights of human nature not only diſcover one great law in the moral world, but ſhew that this law either may be ſimply

ply adopted as a principle, to create the Arts on which civilization and happineſs depend, or that practical inferences may be deduced from it, which by imitation and habit become the maxims that direct individuals in the different offices of domeſtic public life.

Ethics thus, like Phyſics, have proceeded on the hiſtory of Phenomena, on the diſcovery of a Law, on the effects of that Law appearing in its applications; and on the adoption of it, either as one great principle, or diviſible into many inferior ones, and applicable to the Arts of Civil Society.

SECT. IV.

Of Moral Theory.

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Character of a Theory in Phyſics.

IT has contributed to preſerve the ſpeculative aſpects of Ethics, that the Theories in this ſcience have rather been proofs of the ingenuity of Philoſophers, than doctrines ariſing from a demonſtrated Law of Nature. To give Moral Theory the ſame fixed character with Phyſical Theories, we muſt examine how theſe laſt are formed, and whether we can form a Moral Theory with the ſame ſcientific accuracy.

The progreſs of the Philoſophers who have formed Theories in Phyſics is obvious and ſimple. They began with a minute examination of material Phenomena by means of experiments; they followed them through the effects which diſcovered the cauſes that acted in Nature; by a train of intuitions, or by a demonſtration from theſe effects and cauſes, they decided on the rules or Laws by which Nature proceeds; they followed every Law through all the aſpects of a principle in the uſeful Arts, and at laſt aſſumed it as a doctrine fitted to explain any new

new appearance in the ſame department. To this doctrine they gave the name of a Theory. CHAP. III.

When Galileo diſcovered the Laws of Bodies falling in direct or in inclined planes, he ſhewed that theſe Laws were principles in the mechanical Arts, and that they might be adopted as a Doctrine or Theory fitted to explain appearances in this branch of Nature.

When Torricelli and Paſchal diſcovered the weight of the air, and the ſpecific gravities of fluids, they introduced them into the uſeful Arts, and they became the Theory or Doctrine by which new Phenomena in the ſame department were to be explained.

When Harvey perceived that circulation of blood was the law of the animal œconomy, it was adopted as a principle in the medical art, and is now a Doctrine or Theory fitted to explain many of the animal functions.

When Newton diſcovered the gravitation of bodies within the earth's attraction, and by experiment and evidence found that this was the univerſal law of material Nature, and not leſs a principle in the mechanical Arts, it became a Doctrine fitted to explain appearances in the ſyſtem of Nature, and took the name of the Theory of Gravitation.

The

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The characters of a Theory in Phyſics thus appears to be uniform in all the branches of material Nature. It is a demonſtrated Law, adopted to explain new appearances.

It comes next to be enquired, Whether Ethics will yield a Theory of the ſame ſcientific deſcription?

Philoſophical analyſis and induction have enabled us to diſcover, that Probity, or the acknowledgment of rights; Juſtice, or the maintenance of rights; Benevolence, or the improvement of rights; are fixed objects, which uniformly addreſs the Moral Faculty, and have its approbation. They are like bodies verging to the earth's centre, which uniformly have its attraction.

Moral Theory admits the ſame ſcientific characters with Phyſical Theories.

By the ſame means we have diſcovered, that the moſt general fact relating to the objects of the Moral Faculty, and to the operations of the Faculty itſelf, is, that Probity, Juſtice, and Benevolence conſtitute the good or happineſs of mankind. Like the different modifications of body, whether ſolid or fluid, all are ſubjected to gravitation.

We have diſcovered the conſequences of the Moral Law to be ſo many fixed effects in Nature. Pleaſure attends on the obſervation

vation and adoption of its objects in conduct; pain, on the rejection or neglect of them; and that the combination of these pleasures and pains formed Moral Obligation. Like the effects of the Law of Gravitation, in whatever manner it acts, whether in the fixed arrangements of material Nature, or in an arrangement given by Art, the uniformity of the effects from the Moral Law constituted an obligation to the adoption of it as the rule of conduct. We have found, that the Moral Law may be adopted in each of its branches of Probity, Justice, and Benevolence, as maxims or principles of conduct; and that it may be either traced in its appearances in the progress of civilization, or as so many subordinate principles, shewing the operations of the Law of Nature in the Arts of Civil Society. Like the Law of Gravitation, the Moral Law has been unequally adopted; the former in the mechanics of solids, of fluids, and of light; the latter in the individual, civil, and national situations of man.

We have only therefore to adopt the Moral Law, as the natural Philosophers have done Physical Laws, as a Doctrine fitted to explain appearance in its specific departments, and we obtain a Theory in Ethics, corre-

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corresponding in character to the Theories in Physics.

In Physics, the Theories may either be applied in a limited or in the most extensive manner. In Ethics, the same latitude is admissible. The rights which mark the character of an individual, or his place among other men, are the great objects of his esteem. He is placed in society by acknowledging them, or by having Probity; he continues in it, by maintaining them, or by having Justice; he is happy in it by improving them, or by having Benevolence. These truths or doctrines will apply to mankind in every possible situation, as individuals, as citizens, and as nations. Whether this Law is used as a Doctrine or Theory, in its general aspects, or in the aspect of particular principles, it is the fixed and unerring measure of the virtues and vices of human nature, in its savage, barbarous, polishing, polished, and corrupting situations. It is the touchstone by which the value of governments, of laws, of dispositions, and of actions, can invariably be tried in all the diversified situations of the human mind.

If a description of Moral Theory, or a description of the Law as a Doctrine fitted to explain appearances, shall be demanded, it is but repeating the terms which defined the Law,

Law, and the requiſition is obtained. Probity, Juſtice, and Benevolence conſtitute the good of mankind. This is a truth, or a doctrine, applicable to all the poſſible aſpects of human life.

The Moral Theory is thus preciſely in the ſame ſituation with Theories in Phyſics. The Theories of Gravitation, of Motion, of the Circulation, are only ſo many ſimple tranſcripts of the Laws in theſe departments. The Theory of Morality in ſcience and in ſimplicity follows their example in its formation and deſcription.

Let ſpeculatiſts refine on the principles of action; let them contend for the ſuppoſed perfection of their Theories, our enquiries aſpire not higher than the ſimple Theory which the hiſtory and ſcience of moral Nature ſeem calculated to afford.

CHAP. IV.

Application of the Moral Law to Man as an Individual.

SECT. I.

Application of the Moral Law to the Conſtituents of Good and Evil, Happineſs and Miſery, in the Nature of Man as an Individual.

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Like PhyſicalLaws, the application of the Moral Law muſt be ſcientific.

IT is more difficult to diſcover than to apply a Law of Nature. The diſcovery may be prevented by numerous accidents, the application is little more than a natural conſequence of the diſcovery. When the Laws of Motion were diſcovered, they were immediately applied to explain and improve the mechanical arts. In their application for theſe purpoſes, the ſame ſtrict obſervation and experiments were neceſſary which had evolved the laws upon which the Arts depended. In a ſimilar manner, if we have diſcovered the true character of the Moral Law, we may eaſily apply it to meaſure the good or evil, the enjoyments

or

or ſufferings of man, and thus reach the principles upon which his happineſs as a Moral Agent depends.

The application to the conſtituents of good and evil, &c. diſcovers them to be relative terms.

In the character and ſituation of man, good or evil, enjoyments or ſufferings are relative terms. When good is referred to his character and ſituation, it ſignifies the moſt intenſe and refined pleaſures of which he is ſuſceptible; when evil is referred to his character and ſituation, it ſignifies the moſt exquiſite and debaſing pains which his nature can experience. We have then only to attend to the ſources from which he draws his pleaſures and his pains, to examine the degree in which the application of the Moral Law refines his enjoyments, and the degree in which the violation of it increaſes his ſufferings; and Phenomena or facts will enable us to deduce the conſtituents of good and evil in human life.

Application of the Moral Law to the enjoyments and ſufferings of the animal œconomy in its functions, in its ſenſations, and in its appetites.

I. Man experiences enjoyment or ſuffering in his animal œconomy. The enjoyments refer to its functions, to its ſenſations, and to its appetites. The animal functions depend on an organization and progreſs, which, though perfect in character, are ſubjected to derangement. The ſtructure of the ſolids, and the qualities of the fluids, on which life depends, are uniform, but accident may produce irregularities in the one,

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and ſpecific corruptions in the other. Sufferings reſult from this morbid ſtate, as enjoyments accompany the ſound ſtate of the œconomy.

Though theſe accidents may in many caſes be independent of any action of the ſufferer, the effects of Morality on the mind which experiences them, are ſtriking. Thoſe virtues which preſerve the body in its ſound ſtate, ſerve to alleviate and diminiſh the pains of its deranged ſtate. Temperance, if it removes not, diminiſhes pain; Fortitude gives a firmneſs under it, which ſeems to raiſe the mind above ſuffering. Prudence directs to the means which fill up the moments of relief from pain with important and honourable engagements; while Benevolence in all its aſpects draws from the human heart the ſympathy, which at leaſt can blunt the edge of ſuffering.

2. Enjoyment or ſuffering is experienced in our ſenſations. The pleaſures of the ſenſes are organic, dependent on the qualities of their objects, and on the ſubjects with which they may be aſſociated by the Imagination.

The organic pleaſures of the ſenſes are fixed in their kind and extent. Each of the five ſenſes have a degree of exertion from Nature, which affords more or leſs pleaſure,

pleaſure, or which gives a higher or a lower degree of ſenſation. The extent and intenſity of the pleaſures of the ſenſes are widely different. If touch give more information of the real qualities of its objects than the other four ſenſes do, hearing and ſeeing admit of pleaſures which are more extenſive as well as more various and delicate.

The qualities alſo of the objects of the ſenſes are widely diverſified, and on that account are fitted to afford unequal degrees of enjoyment. The qualities of the objects of touch ſeem rather deſtined to afford information than pleaſure; they deſcribe matter, and ſuch effects of it as are neceſſary to ſafety rather than to enjoyment. The objects of the ſenſes of taſting and ſmelling ſeem to be chiefly ſubſervient to the appetites which preſerve life. The objects of hearing and ſeeing, beſides giving information, diſcover qualities which are poſitively productive of pleaſure. They lay a foundation alſo for the higher pleaſures of the underſtanding. The former, from the mechanics of ſound, from the inexplicable power of the muſical ear, and from the refinements which the ſtudy of ſounds confers, produces the ſenſe of muſic. The latter, from the kinds of figure, colour, ſymmetry, animation, and expreſſion which

PART III. they exhibit, produces the ſenſes of beauty and ſublimity.

The ſubjects with which the ſenſes can be aſſociated by the Imagination reciprocally heighten each other's pleaſures. Muſic can be aſſociated with the paſſions, and forms to them an energetic language. It can be aſſociated with diſpoſitions, and expreſs all the lively, tender, or melancholy ſentiments of the heart. It can accompany the deſcription of the ſcenes in which virtue ſeems moſt intereſting, and thus add to its native enjoyments, thoſe which the paſſions and the heart confer.

The ſenſes of beauty and ſublimity can be aſſociated in a ſimilar manner with all the objects of paſſion and of diſpoſition, and either in real life, or in the Arts which copy it in repreſentation or in exhibition, unite with the aſpects of the virtues, and derive from them additional influence.

3. Enjoyment or ſuffering attends the appetites. The appetites are thoſe of hunger and thirſt, and of the ſexes. The pleaſures from the appetites are tranſitory in their nature, and terminate with their gratification. The pains which accompany exceſs in the appetites are permanent and fatal. Hunger and thirſt are ſubſervient to the preſervation of life. When gratified in the degree

gree of Nature they give enjoyment; when this is exceeded, they are followed by ſatiety and ſuffering. CHAP. IV.

The appetite of the ſexes admits of ſimilar conditions; and it is only when the finer ſenſes, the paſſions and the diſpoſitions of the heart, are aſſociated with it, that it leads to real enjoyment. When theſe are wanting, it is productive of languor and ſuffering. If it exceed the temperance which bounds the other appetites, a ſpectator is ſhocked at its meanneſs and brutality. If the appetite ſhall diſappear, and leave the paſſion and the objects of it, with the great qualities, on the one part, of valour and diſintereſtedneſs, and with the amiable qualities of beauty and diſpoſition on the other, then, whether in actual life or on the ſtage, a ſpectator's eye dwells on the ſcene, and his heart feels for the event.

The application of the Law of Morality is ſimple and direct. The application of Probity moderates the appetites, and yet heightens their gratifications; it teaches that Intemperance can only be indulged by counteracting the degree in which Nature gives pleaſure from the appetites; and that by infringing on the rights of others we render them wretched. The application of Juſtice marks both the degrees of gratification

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which are conſiſtent with the diſpoſition to maintain the rights of mankind; and with the unqueſtionable claims of all men to theſe rights. In corrupted ſituations, forms may give a ſanction to ſuch deeds; but forms can no more alter the Law of Morality, than the dreams of the Aſtrologer do the order of material Nature.

Benevolence, though it be not a duty which Society can enjoin, is a virtue which the moſt corrupted admire. If it have a place in the human ſoul, it refines the appetites, marks the miſeries which the low gratification of the ſenſualiſt or voluptuary induces, and reſtrains from the pleaſures which would render the innocent, the amiable, or the deſerving, miſerable.

Hence the enjoyments which have their foundation in the animal œconomy, from its functions, its ſenſes, or its appetites, are encreaſed by the application of the Moral Law. Sufferings in all of theſe articles are created, encreaſed, and rendered fatal by its violation.

Application of the Moral Law to the enjoyments and ſufferings from the Deſires and Averſions.

II. Man experiences enjoyment or ſuffering from his Deſires and Averſions.

Deſires and Averſions accompany our inſtinctive feelings, our paſſions or affections, and the actual ſituations which we hold in life.

1. The

1. The Deſire of life and the Averſion to death form the moſt ſtriking example of inſtinctive feeling. The exiſtence of ſuch an inſtinct is admitted; and the Deſire and Averſion may be obſerved in the objects to which the perpetual exertion of the inſtinct is directed. The inſtinctive love of life is aſſociated with the objects of ſenſe, of diſpoſition, and of judgment. The ſenſes connect it with all their organic or acquired pleaſures; the diſpoſitions of the heart, with all their natural or acquired attachments to friends or to country; the judgment, with all the exertions which the underſtanding can make to procure ſafety, independence, or fame. If the inſtinct itſelf were not ſtrong and irreſiſtible, all the circumſtances with which it can be aſſociated would be inadequate to the artificial creation of a love of life. Who would endure heat and cold, diſeaſe and want, infamy and puniſhment, or the "ſtings and arrows of "outrageous fortune," were it not from the uniform operation of the Deſire of life?

The Averſion to death is but another aſpect of the ſame inſtinct. It is confirmed by the appearances which death exhibits. To ward off this blow, men toil, lay up ſtore, fight, enact laws, and inſtitute puniſhments. This Deſire and this Aver-

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ſion are interwoven with every branch of the Moral Law. We cannot acknowledge rights, unleſs we feel that we ourſelves poſſeſs them; we cannot have the diſpoſition to maintain them, if our ſafety be not connected with the virtue; we could not deſire to improve them had we not felt the happineſs which reſulted from kind and beneficent deeds.

2. Deſires and Averſions accompany the paſſions and affections.

Simple emotions, or mental feelings of pleaſure or pain, ariſe from almoſt every object which addreſſes the mind. An appetite, a ſenſation, a diſpoſition, or an action, may produce them. When they are of ſufficient importance to ſeize on the attention, then either the pleaſure or the pain which characteriſes them, excites Deſire or Averſion. It is this laſt circumſtance which forms paſſions. A good or an evil when expected, produces hope or fear; when experienced, joy or ſorrow. If, however, the paſſions themſelves, or the objects which excite them, be ſufficiently intereſting to give the mind the habit of reviewing them, then they become, in a great degree, a part of it, and form its affections. Though affection is commonly, and properly, viewed as a term which marks the reſult of the beſt

beſt diſpoſitions of the heart, yet perhaps it is an equally faithful picture of Nature, to refer affections of a contrary kind to a mind in which the malevolent paſſions rule. The influence of the Moral Law, in refining and heightening the enjoyments from the paſſions and affections, will beſt appear in examples. CHAP. IV.

The paſſion of love may ariſe from the emotions which beauty involuntarily excites in a mind fitted to feel the ſimplicity and elegance by which it is conſtituted. When intelligence and diſpoſition are either obſerved or imagined in the object, the paſſion is confirmed; and when the mind fixes its attention either on the original object, or on the real or fancied good qualities which have excited its pleaſure, a permanent affection is formed. The influence of the Moral Law on the paſſion and affection is direct and ſtriking. It renders the paſſion delicate and beneficent, giving a degree of reality to the magnified perfections of the object, which the imagination at firſt had perhaps only pictured. If, on the contrary, the Law of Morality forbids the means by which the paſſion ſeeks to be gratified, it is becauſe theſe means are ſtained by the vileſt deceit, by the moſt cruel injuſtice, and by a malevolence which

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ſinks an honourable paſſion into a low brutal appetite.

The paſſion of hatred may be analyſed in the ſame manner: it begins with an involuntary emotion of pain from the real or imagined diſagreeable qualities of the object. The very exiſtence of this pain may lead to actions which the object of the emotion deſerves not, and may produce returns which confirm the firſt prejudice. The pain is ſtamped with an Averſion, which, ſhould it deſcribe the true character of the object, would enumerate its real or imagined bad qualities. If it be of ſufficient importance to arreſt the attention, the Averſion becomes habitual, and conſequently an affection of the mind, in the ſenſe of being a part of it.

The application of Probity to ſuch an object and paſſion, lays bare the foundations of the firſt prejudice, and weakens its power. The application of Juſtice ſhews the paſſion to be inconſiſtent with the maintenance of the eſſential rights of civil Society, while Benevolence diſarms the paſſion of its malignity, and has a tendency to diſſipate and extinguiſh it. If the Moral Law have no influence on the paſſion of hatred, then the dark, ſpecious, fawning coward plots and accompliſhes the ruin of its object; or the determined villain, regardleſs of the miſery which

which his paſſion is bringing on himſelf, boldly aſſerts the daring character of the calumniator or the murderer.

The affections experience, in a ſimilar manner, refinement and permanency from aſſociation with the Moral Law; and when oppoſed to it, they narrow and debaſe their own character. Diſintereſtedneſs, if an affection of the mind, while it aſſerts the rights which are the patrimony of human nature, is ſuperior to the numerous advantages which accidents, addreſs, and patience might ſeize. Self-intereſt with a keen eye watches the accidents of life; with ſuppleneſs and with art it deludes, and ſeems to act as if its poſſeſſor alone were entitled to enjoyment. If the application of the Moral Law refine and encreaſe the pleaſures from the diſintereſted affections, it either curbs or diſſipates the ſelfiſh ones.

3. Deſires and Averſions ariſe from the actual ſituations which mankind hold in life.

When the ſituation of any individual affords him the means of ſubſiſtence, accommodation, and luxury, in all the ſtages of civilization it is conſidered as proſperous. When the reverſe of this deſcription is true, it is conſidered as adverſe. The conſideration of the different and unequal ſituations of life, excites the Deſire of proſperity, and the

PART III. the Averſion to adverſity. The conſtituents of proſperity are, health, talents, diſpoſition, ſucceſs, the approbation and the confidence of mankind. The conſtituents of adverſity are, ſickneſs, ſtupidity, depravity, misfortunes, the diſapprobation and diſtruſt of mankind. It is of little moment in what ſtage of civilization a people are; there is proſperity among ſavages, as well as among citizens. It is only where no rights exiſt, or dare to be aſſerted, where all are equally ſlaves, that the objects of proſperity or adverſity are indifferent. If probity be felt, the advantages which ſtrength or talents give, while they reward their poſſeſſor, enable him to protect the ſame rights to others over whom Nature has aſſigned him the ſuperiority. He neither takes advantage of the candour of the unſuſpecting, nor of the defects of the weak or the ignorant. Juſtice, in a ſimilar manner, tells him, that talents receive their higheſt enjoyments when they maintain the rights of mankind, while benevolence moderates ambition, or employs it for the proſperity of human nature. "What," (ſaid the virtuous Barnevelt to the Prince of Orange) "would you exchange the character of Preſerver, for that of Maſter of a republic? I do not hate kings becauſe they are kings, but becauſe they

" they often forget that they are men. Do " not ſully the glory of being the father of a " free people, for trappings which the worſt " of tyrants can wear." He ſaid, in this honourable advice, that true proſperity conſiſts in ſubjecting talents, diſpoſitions, ſucceſs, and fortune, to probity and to juſtice, and in ſuperadding to theſe duties the virtue of benevolence to his country.

The conſtituents of proſperity in common life are unequally poſſeſſed. Adverſity too viſits any one man, but in one or in few forms. The Deſire of proſperity, if it ſtimulate to activity in the purſuits of ambition, wealth, or fame, by the application of the Moral Law, is directed to its proper objects. If no ſuch controul exiſt, then activity, in whatever form it appears, is either checquered with diſappointment, or has its ſucceſs embittered with remorſe. The cyniciſm of Diogenes was affectation confirmed into a ſpecies of extravagance in conduct. His opinion, however, " of the Athenians being " mad when they were buſtling after follies; " that, for his part, proſperity or adverſity " were ſo indifferent, that the ſmiles of the " conqueror of the world were beneath his " notice;" affords the inference, that the application of the Moral Law moderates the Deſire

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Deſire of proſperity, and renders the Averſion to adverſity leſs painful.

Hence we conclude, that the enjoyments from the Deſires or Averſions which accompany inſtinctive feelings, the paſſions or affections, and the actual ſituations of mankind, are refined and heightened by aſſociation with the Moral Law, and diminiſhed or deſtroyed by violations of it.

Application of the Moral Law to the enjoyments or ſufferings from the intelligent powers.

III. Man experiences enjoyment and ſuffering from his intelligent powers.

The enjoyments or the ſufferings of the underſtanding ariſe from the character of its powers, and from the kinds of objects to which they are directed.

From the nature of theſe powers.

1. The powers of the underſtanding, either in their ſpecific characters, or in their united operations, experience pleaſure or pain. Memory, which recalls paſt perceptions, is ſtrong or weak. In the former caſe, its exertions daily add to the experience which conſtitutes a character fitted for life; in the latter, it expoſes to actions, which by their improvident nature induce ſufferings.

The enjoyment or ſuffering ariſing from the exertions of memory are alſo affected by the Moral Law in another manner. If our

our paſt actions have not been regulated by the principles of Morality, the ſcenes and reflections which memory often involuntarily recalls, create anguiſh and remorſe; and thus produce ſuffering, from the exertion of the moſt common faculty of the underſtanding.

Abſtraction, or the power which enables us to claſs all the objects of our knowledge, by its very nature ſhortens the labour required in ſcience or in buſineſs, and confers that enjoyment which ſprings from active and ſucceſsful engagements.

Imagination, or the power which enables us to combine and invent among the objects of nature, in one view, gives all the pleaſures of genius or diſcovery; in another, all the pleaſures of information and of taſte. If genius invent in the ſciences, it perceives, as in the mind of Newton, the great facts on which Nature reſts, and by experiments and induction realiſes the invention, which at firſt had lived only in Imagination. If an humbler mind can only follow the paths which Newton unguided purſued, its pleaſure is that of information or knowledge. Should genius again perceive the combinations of the objects in Nature, which pleaſe the eye or the ear, and preſent thoſe ſtriking repreſentations of them in

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in painting, in ſcenery, or in muſic, which faſcinate the mind, then its pleaſures are exquiſite and refined, preſenting to the taſte thoſe objects from which it derives equal pleaſure and improvement. Homer had the active imagination which aſſembled all the objects of the eye and of the paſſions, and in the muſic of verſe preſented them to the taſte of the critic, whoſe humbler office it was, to trace the ſteps by which the art of the poet had delighted and informed mankind. Shakeſpeare makes Nature live in the ſcenes and language of Fancy, and taſte or paſſive imagination feels the power of his muſe.

The faculties of the underſtanding thus riſe in ſucceſſion, and each have their marked degree of pleaſure. Intuition, or the perception of the agreement of the objects of the mind in qualities and relations, confers a pleaſure proportioned to its own intrinſic perfection, and enables its poſſeſſor to carry on the chain of reaſonings which afford certainty to the mind, and which lead to the judgments or deciſions that are alike the marks of penetration and of wiſdom.

If thus the intelligent powers of man experience pleaſure in their ſucceſsful exertions, and uniformly meet pain when they

are unfit for their proper ends, we can readily perceive the operation of the Moral Law in preſerving them in the ſound ſtate in which they all have the pleaſures deſtined them by Nature, as well as the encreaſed enjoyments which ſpring from their ſucceſsful applications. On the contrary, where they are exerted without the controul of Morality, they loſe their native energy, and are directed to objects, the acquiſition of which is checquered with diſappointment and diſguſt.

2. The Intelligent Powers of man experience enjoyment and ſuffering from the kinds of objects to which they are directed. The operation of the Moral Law in the choice and in the acquiſition of ſuch objects not only decides and heightens their value, but adds to the intenſity of the pleaſure which they are calculated to afford.

From the objects to which they are directed.

The objects of the Intelligent Powers of man may be comprehended under the titles, of taſte, of ſcience, of buſineſs, and of conduct in life. In all of theſe views, the proper direction of them is conſidered as conſtituting perfections; the improper direction of them, as conſtituting defects.

Taſte comprehends a firſt claſs of objects to which our Intelligent Powers may be directed.

The

PART III. To Taſte.

The direction of our Intelligent Powers to the objects of Taſte muſt no doubt primarily ariſe from poſſeſſing the finer ſenſes, the paſſions and imagination, in the degree which fits the mind to feel the beauties of Nature or the productions of the fine Arts. Though the faculty of Taſte in its original character is partially poſſeſſed, in its acquired character, or in its ſuſceptibility of improvement, it is a common and frequent power. In this view, it requires not thoſe difficult and aſpiring exertions of intellect by which Science proceeds, but demands only an attention to the objects which pleaſe the eye, the ear, the paſſions, and the imagination. In its acquired character, it is conſequently the attribute of a man whom induſtry has formed to improve the moderate bounty of Nature, and who regulates his opinions by the leſſons of others rather than by obſervations of his own. In its original character, it is the attendant on genius, and is fitted to correct and poliſh this ſeemingly unbounded power. If Taſte, in either of theſe aſpects, be directed to Nature, or to the productions of the fine Arts, it is not only improving as a faculty by every exertion, but is the ſureſt mean of giving elegance, and of adding to the influence of all the virtues.

In

In muſic, painting, and poetry, the ſtudy of the productions of the fine artiſts renders Taſte delicate and correct. If it have theſe qualities when applied to its proper objects, it extends their influence to the diſpoſitions and actions of the mind, refines on the probity, juſtice, and benevolence which form Morality, and is itſelf reciprocally improved by the virtues with which it is aſſociated.

It is a ſtriking fact, that whenever this reciprocal influence of Taſte and Morality on each other is leſſened (even in the higher views of Taſte, as the concomitant of genius, much more when it is ſecondary and acquired), inſtead of preſerving its native intenſity or poliſh, it inſenſibly becomes vitiated, and diſappears.

To Science.

Science forms a ſecond object to which the Intelligent Powers of man may be directed. This at firſt view ſeems their proper and moſt dignified engagement. To ſee man placed as a ſpectator of the univerſe; to ſee him obſerving the widely extended kingdoms of Nature, perceiving the boundaries of each, and diſcriminating her operations and intentions in the moſt minute or in the moſt auguſt phenomena; to ſee him, in fine, employing the Laws by which the Author of the whole directs his works, in

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the Arts that preſerve life, that improve its ſituations, and that elevate the characters of the mind which contemplates them, is to view him in the brighteſt aſpect of his character. The pleaſures that ariſe from diſcovery ſimply, are certainly exquiſite and permanent; thoſe even that ariſe from inſtruction in diſcoveries, are real and laſting; but thoſe which ſpring from directing the diſcoveries of Science to improve the ſituation, the character, and the virtue of individuals and of ſtates, at once open to view the pleaſures which the employment of the underſtanding directed by Science can give, and ſhew how every ſucceſsful application of the mind will receive its own and the merited eſteem of mankind.

When we ſuppoſe the Intelligent Powers directed by Science, and yet the Moral Powers ſo weak or ſo perverted that they turn the moſt important acquiſitions to the purpoſes of debaſing or of injuring human nature, we at leaſt perceive one part of the pleaſures of diſcovery loſt, and the other unfit to ſecure to the mind its own or the good opinion of others. Hiſtory, however, affords few examples of Philoſophers who have made diſcoveries, and who have at the ſame time ſeparated the pleaſures of the Underſtanding from thoſe of Morality. The claſs of Philo-

Philoſophers who have in this way debaſed their talents, come under the deſcription of Speculatiſts or Theoriſts. With a partial knowledge of the real hiſtory of Nature, they have employed ingenuity and eloquence to eſtabliſh apparently profound and often pernicious hypotheſes; and have rather ſought the reputation of novelty, than of uſeful diſcovery. Hence perhaps the reaſon why all of them have been Metaphyſicians, or ſpeculative Moraliſts; the firſt have been diſtinguiſhed by ſubtility of reaſoning, and the laſt, by ingenious accommodations of Nature to Syſtem. CHAP. IV.

Buſineſs forms a third object to which our Intelligent Powers may be directed. Civil Society has marked and diſtinct offices, the governing and governed, the ſoldier and the ſtateſman, the farmer and the artiſan, the mechanic and the labourer. Though the degrees of underſtanding requiſite for theſe oppoſite and unequal ſtations are widely removed from each other, yet ſtill the judgment is engaged; and by the kind of meaſures with which an end is purſued, the ſucceſs and the proſperity of mankind may be eſtimated. To Buſineſs.

If the ſtateſman ſhall poſſeſs the penetration which diſcriminates the intereſts of his country, in the relation which they bear to

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the intereſts of other nations; if he ſhall be able ſo to direct its powers and reſources, that by engaging foreigners in their own mutual claims, prejudices, and jealouſies, he ſhall prevent the formation, or fruſtrate the ſchemes of his enemies; if in the moments of peace he ſhall repair the injuries of war, and yet prepare to meet and repel new dangers; if, inſtead of ſeeking the unmeaning pageantry of titles, he ſhall reſt his fame on his diſintereſted virtue, his talents, and his prudence; a grateful people will look up to ſuch perfections, and ſeek their ſafety from their benefactor. On the other hand, ſhould he form falſe eſtimates of the intereſts of a people; if, inſtead of availing himſelf of the mutual pretenſions and jealouſies of foreigners, he ſhould make them forget the whole, that they may avail themſelves of the weakneſs and eaſy conqueſt he is offering them;—if, amid theſe public calamities, he ſhould ſeek honours which he deſerves not to wear, and amaſs wealth from the wrecks of the nation he has ruined; incapacity, imprudence, and venality are the terms with which a people reprobate and ſeek to puniſh their deſtroyer.

The talents of the ſtateſman of the firſt deſcription owe not more to their intrinſic excellence, than they do to the direction which

which the acknowledgment, maintenance, and improvements of rights, or the Law of Morality, have given them. "If the Romans "(ſaid Marcus Antoninus) were not made "happier by my power, I ſhould think it "a miſery to preſerve it."

The weakneſs and incapacity of a ſtateſman of the laſt deſcription are in themſelves contemptible only; but in the miſeries that they bring, both from the ill-fated accidents which veſted them with power, and from the opportunities which that power afforded of violating the rights and of ruining the independence of a people, they become the ſubjects of execration and revenge. Even Tiberius might be allowed to murder Sejanus.

If a ſoldier ſhall be entruſted with the armies of his country, and if his mildneſs and his humanity on the one hand, and his patience of hardſhips and his intrepidity on the other, ſhall acquire him their confidence and their affections; if in ſervice he ſhall ſee the moments when deciſion is required, or ſhall await thoſe when caution can coolly command ſucceſs; if the enemies whom he reduces ſhall admire his generoſity, in the ſame degree that they have felt his ſuperiority; there is not a reward which the pride or the affections of a people

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can confer, but they will hold out as the inadequate expreſſions of their gratitude.

I know not whether the tears of the Hollanders for the firſt Prince of Orange were any thing but a melancholy regret that an aſſaſſin had ſwept away the opportunities of honouring the father of their republic.

If, on the other hand, with the confidence of his country, and the prejudices of an army in his favour, a ſoldier ſhall waſte the moments of action in idle forms and contemptible diſſipation; if, jealous of another's fame, to ruin it he ſhall endanger his country's honour; if, inſtead of ſtrengthening her power by her wealth, he ſhall ſuffer it to be embezzled by minions and flatterers, till at laſt ſubjugation and diſgrace narrow her empire and ſubvert her greatneſs; a people, though they could avert their ruin, muſt ever execrate the puſillanimity and baſeneſs of their betrayer. If the apprehenſion of the rights of mankind made the firſt character humane, intrepid, generous, and great; inſenſibility to them made the ſecond arbitrary, irreſolute, prodigal, and deteſted.

The efforts of the underſtanding, as influenced by Morality, are not, in the buſineſs of life, limited to great characters; they equally appear in the particular purſuits of individuals.

The

The merchant, who ſtudies the value of the crude materials of his own, compared with thoſe of foreign nations, who calls forward the artiſt to invent and add value to both, and affords employment to numbers, whom poverty or diſſipation would have expoſed to indigence or to wretchedneſs; and yet who amid this toiled-for though deſerved wealth, in the moment of danger comes forward with reſources to his country; ſhews the foreſight, the prudence, the juſtice, and the patriotiſm, on which not his own private proſperity only, but that of his country relies.

If with apparent talents and ſucceſs another ſhall, by ſchemes ignorantly and improvidently laid, ſeem apparently ſucceſsful, while really he is haſtening to ruin; if, to ward off the blow, by affected opulence he ſhall deceive his friends, and by fictitious buſineſs impoſe on the public, till at laſt the honeſt induſtry of thouſands is wrecked in his ruin, men only regret that he had not added violence to iniquity, that their vengeance might puniſh the injuries done to their rights.

In the humbler walks of life the underſtanding has a proportionably limited range; ſtill, however, it is affected in that proportion by Morality. The farmer culti-

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vates the grain and rears the cattle, which he can exchange for the productions that the ſkill and induſtry of the artiſan have formed. Both are contributing to each other's preſervation, and diſcovering, in the ſubdiviſions of labour, the application of the powers of the underſtanding to the purpoſes of life. If theſe ſhall be controuled by the Moral Law, induſtry, on the one hand, will meaſure out with equity the uſeful means of ſubſiſtence; ingenuity and arts, on the other, will be proportionably encreaſed and rewarded. If no ſuch influence of Morality ſhall exiſt, induſtry being impaired, the means of ſubſiſtence muſt diminiſh in quantity and value; while the artiſt, by every trick and chicane, muſt ſoon loſe the confidence of his employers, and ſink into diſtreſs and miſery.

To Conduct in Life.

Conduct in Life forms a fourth object of the underſtanding, which is accompanied with good and evil, or enjoyment and ſuffering, and on which, in a ſtriking manner, the Law of Morality has its effect.

The characters of individuals ariſe from the degrees of intelligence and diſpoſition which they are ſuppoſed to poſſeſs. Though an individual may know his own real capacity or virtue, mankind muſt read both in the ſigns which are deſcriptive of them.

If

If a perſon ſhall appear penetrating, yet calm, juſt, and benevolent; his conduct fixes his reputation, and uniformly commands the good opinion and confidence of the world. Such appearances, however, may be deceitful, and the diſguiſes only of weakneſs or depravity. It is eaſier to detect weakneſs than vice; a fool ſoon diſcovers his folly, but a knave may long appear an honeſt man. It is the greateſt misfortune of private life, when talents, hypocriſy, and vice are united. Though they are only the ſemblance of virtue, they are often miſtaken for its reality. The credulity of the ignorant is exceſſive. The obſervation of the tricks, and baſe envy, or malice, which are practiſed on others, is never brought home to ourſelves; we are apt to ſay we have never found in ſuch a character any thing but innocence and juſtice. It was the want of foreſight and prudence in others which expoſed them to the oppreſſion and malice of which they complain. We readily allow the folly of others in ſubmitting to an impoſture, but think our own ſagacity ſufficient to detect and prevent it. Sufferings at laſt ſatisfy us, that we are neither infallible nor inſenſible to pain.

The application of the Moral Law to Conduct in Life, not only affixes to characters

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ters their true ſtamp of merit, but ſerves as a ſtandard by which to try the value of pretenſions, as well as to puniſh poſitive iniquity.

A man is ſaid to be prudent in the Conduct of Life, who preſerves the powers of his mind and body in the ſound ſtate in which the one is fitted for reflection, and the other to bear the hardſhips of life. In the Conduct of Buſineſs, ſuch a man is active and unremitting; in proſperity he is unelated, in adverſity he is not depreſſed. Informed of the conſtituents of character, he decides from knowledge of talents, of diſpoſitions, of virtues; he is faithful to others, and yet juſt to himſelf; he feels what honour is, yet ſcorns and keeps at a diſtance contemptible pretenders; and, while he is not appealing either to his virtue or to his wiſdom, he is conſtantly exerciſing both.

A man is ſaid to be fooliſh in the Conduct of Life, who debilitates the powers of his body, and by low and ſilly vice debaſes and enfeebles thoſe of his mind. Inſtead of having paſſions which lead him on to honourable engagements, he ſubjects his paſſions to low appetites, and ſinks into effeminate timidity. In proſperity he is elated and inſolent, in adverſity he is depreſſed and mean. He miſtakes perpetually his

own intereſt, by being diſhoneſt to others; talks of an honour which he neither feels nor dares to defend; and while his weakneſs is perpetually ſhewing his vices, he is ever repeating the names of virtues which he neither practiſes nor feels.

If the underſtanding in the Conduct of Life enable a man to act with wiſdom, it is the influence of Morality which refines and renders that Conduct the object of love or of admiration. If the want of judgment lead a man into embarraſſing and hard ſituations, mankind pity his misfortunes becauſe integrity accompanies them; but if low chicane and trick have been the attendants of incapacity or imprudence, the hatred and contempt of the vices are extended to the weakneſſes which with Morality would have been forgiven.

From theſe facts it appears, that the good or enjoyment which ariſes from the ſimple exertion of the powers of the underſtanding, is heightened by aſſociation with Morality, and diminiſhed by oppoſition to its controul; and that good or enjoyment from the objects of the underſtanding, whether thoſe of Taſte, of Science, of Buſineſs, or of Conduct in Life, reſults from the influence of the ſame Law; evil or ſuffering, from the neglect or perverſion of it.

IV. Man

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Application of the Moral Law to the enjoyments or ſufferings from the active powers.

IV. Man experiences good or enjoyment, evil or ſuffering, from his active powers.

The nature of theſe powers themſelves, and the objects to which they are directed, determine the kind, as well as the degree either of good or evil which reſult from them.

From their nature.

1. The original power of action in the mind is a ſimple and obvious phenomenon, of which we are conſcious. It may be either viewed in its obvious character of the Will, or the power of beginning and continuing action; or in its progreſſive and varied exertions. Its enjoyments or ſufferings will appear in both views to be affected by the operations of the Moral Law.

The ſimple and original faculty of activity, or the Will, is perpetually exerting itſelf. Whether it be poſitive or negative, its activity is uniform. It is ſo much a part of our nature, that it is not only employed in bringing it to maturity, but is the ſource of many of its ſucceſſive enjoyments and ſufferings. If we ſuppoſe it conſtrained, languor and death are the conſequences; if we view it as free, it ſeems a propenſity which accounts for the gambols of children, for the buſtle of life, and for the amuſe-

ments

ments of age. To the firſt, it is neceſſary to perfect the progreſs of the body or of the mind; to the ſecond, to execute the deciſions of the intelligent or moral powers; to the laſt, to diſſipate the melancholy which the averſion to the common fate of man would neceſſarily induce.

In the exertion of this active power, however, we diſcover the great ſcenes of our enjoyments or ſufferings. There is a ſtriking difference between the character of the objects of the active and thoſe of the intelligent powers of the mind. If the objects of the active are ſufficient to engage, they have degrees of enjoyment independent of their intrinſic value. The objects of the underſtanding, on the contrary, gain pleaſures proportioned to their real dignity. The purſuits of common life illuſtrate the character of the principle of activity. The ſoldier is not more impelled by it than the peaſant, the mechanic than the philoſopher. The prodigal is as active as the miſer; each purſue their objects, and each ſeem to derive enjoyment from their purſuits. The one finds enjoyment in penury, hunger, and cold; the other, in diſſipation, ſenſuality, and debauch. If the man of buſineſs find pleaſure in conducting affairs with addreſs, the antiquary finds pleaſure in decyphering,

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phering, perhaps, an unmeaning inſcription. The activity is univerſal, but the enjoyments which are natural to its exertions may be promoted or counteracted by the habit of directing them either to proper or to improper objects.

From their exertions in connection with the Moral Faculty.

2. This direction may be given by the underſtanding ſimply, or in connection with the Moral Faculty.

If given by the underſtanding alone, then the propenſities, whether animal, as thoſe from the appetites, or intellectual, as thoſe from imitation and emulation, are meaſured by their true character, and permitted to have their natural and juſt influence. Opinions from education and talents are ſifted, and their value determined; the very ſentiments which paſſions and affections produce are eſtimated, and the Will muſt be ſuppoſed to act from pure inferences. But as ſuch obſervation and reaſoning cannot be inſtituted without a perpetual reference to the rights which we feel and muſt acknowledge in civil Society, all the objects which are fitted to addreſs the Will have immediately or remotely a reference to moral conduct. If the Law of Morality be applied in any of its branches, its influence in heightening the enjoyments from active purſuits is at once apparent.

If

If the application unite the whole branches of the Law, then we have a view of the moſt complete ſtate of our enjoyments. The reverſe of theſe ſuppoſitions will ſhew the greateſt evil or ſuffering which our nature can experience.

If probity be applied, while it adverts to the circumſtances in the mind itſelf, which are perpetually calling forward active exertions, as the appetites, the deſires, and averſions, or even the objects of the underſtanding, it at the ſame time allows that the activity of other men is addreſſed by ſimilar, and equally forcible means. The peaſant riſes with the ſun, ploughs his field, gathers in his fruit, and protects his humble family; he ſees the ſame purſuits occupy others, and feels pleaſure in their ſucceſs. The prince rules a people, and though he may think their toils ſubſervient to his rank, he too muſt allow the claims of his equals. Difference of ſituation alters not the probity which refines the principle of activity; it only ſhews, that where luxury and power exiſt, the virtue is of more difficult practice.

If juſtice be applied to the active powers of the mind, its effect will appear equally neceſſary and important. If one man could ſeize the rights of another, his activity would

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would be the ſource of miſery. Nations reſtrain ſuch activity by puniſhments or poſitive ſanctions. Though the virtues which enable an individual to maintain the rights of Society have natural obligations, theſe do not always combat the ſelfiſh affections. Ambition, for example, in the ſoldier, is the love of fame; in the ſtateſman, of power; in the merchant, of wealth. If activity ſhall be directed to theſe objects, and ſhall yet preſerve the rights of others, it is honourable; but if the ſoldier build his fame on ſubverting rights, the ſtateſman, on the aggrandiſement of himſelf, and the merchant, on riches extorted from the wants of a people, then their activity becomes the ſource of miſery.

If benevolence be applied to activity, it introduces the power of the paſſions, and ſhews equally the force of the Law of Nature in its aſpect either of a duty or of a virtue. But the oppoſite principle, or malevolence, when aſſociated with activity, adds, to the infringement of rights, the unguided and cruel effects of the vicious paſſions.

The influence of the whole Moral Law on the powers of action, at once ſhews the place of both in the mind, and the effect of their union in determining the good or enjoyment of human nature.

The

The active powers alone might have enjoyment from their own ſimple exertions in bringing to maturity the nature, and in affording perpetual objects to the being who poſſeſſed them. But ſuch activity muſt at firſt ſight be diſcovered to be inconſiſtent with the exiſtence or ſafety of civil Society. The ſtrong would then feel no compunction, nor value the diſapprobation of mankind, when they enſlaved the weak; the wiſe would then ſelect the means which were beſt fitted to ruin the ignorant; and every man and every nation would, without reſtraint or blame, be the enemies of every other. The application of the Law of Morality, founded on the ſenſe of rights, not only diſcovers but diſſipates theſe evils, and leaves the plain inference, that the enjoyments which men actually experience, are limited and coarſe; while thoſe which the ſame activity finds, are broad and refined, if they receive bias or direction from the acknowledgment, maintenance and improvement of the rights of human nature.

Good or enjoyment conſiſts in having the animal œco-

If the great Ethical queſtion ſhall be ſtated—"In what does the good or enjoyment, the evil or the ſuffering of man conſiſt?"—plain inferences from the claſſes

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of his enjoyments and ſufferings will give a ſcientific ſolution.

nomy, the deſires and averſions, the intelligent and active powers, refined and moderated by the Moral Law; evil or ſuffering, by placing them in oppoſition to it.

1. Man experiences good or enjoyment when the Moral Law controuls his animal œconomy in its functions, its ſenſations, and its appetites; he experiences an evil or ſuffering when either of theſe are in oppoſition to the rights of human nature.

2. Man experiences good or enjoyment from his deſires and averſions, whether they are inſtinctive, dictated by paſſions and affections, or ariſe from ſituation, if they are moderated and directed by probity, juſtice, and benevolence. He experiences evil or ſuffering from his deſires and averſions, if they are directed to objects which require deceit, injuſtice, or malevolence in the attainment.

3. Man receives good or enjoyment from his intelligent powers, not only from their own operations, but from the kinds of objects to which they are directed. The objects of taſte, of ſcience, of buſineſs, or of conduct in life, give enjoyment, if the refinements of the firſt, the diſcoveries of the ſecond, the nature of the third, and the principles of the laſt are in ſubſervience to probity, juſtice, and benevolence. The pleaſures of the whole loſe their tone, and change into evil

or

or ſuffering, when they counteract the rights of mankind. CHAP. IV.

4. Man experiences good or enjoyment from the active powers of his mind, both in the pleaſures reſulting from their exertions, and from the bias which the Moral Law gives when it unites the approbation of the mind itſelf with that which mankind beſtow on the preſervation and improvement of their rights. Where theſe are violated, activity is inconſiſtent with the exiſtence of civil Society, and is the ſource of miſery. The ſum of theſe inferences is, that good or enjoyment reſults from having the animal œconomy, the deſires and averſions, the intelligent and the active powers of the mind, directed and refined by the juſt apprehenſion of rights, or by the Law of Morality; and that evil or ſuffering conſiſts in the perverſion of rights, or of the Moral Faculty which they are fitted to addreſs.

If ſuch are the conſtituents of the enjoyments and ſufferings, or of the good and evil competent to the nature of man, the ſecond great Ethical queſtion—"What is "happineſs and miſery in his nature?" muſt receive its ſolution from the ſame phenomena.

Happineſs or miſery are terms which certainly are relative to the being reſpecting whom Happineſs conſiſts in the obſervation of

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the Moral Law, Miſery in the neglect of it.

whom their conſtituents are demanded. Mankind, amid their anxiety to diſcover what is happineſs, ſeem to have overlooked this eſſential requiſite, to a ſcientific inference deſcriptive of their univerſal demand. The wiſh of common life is to be happy, and yet the objects purſued are as little fitted to confer happineſs, as many of the hypotheſes of the Philoſophers are to deſcribe it: both ſeem to have ideas of happineſs which imagination has carried beyond life. The one meets with diſappointment, the other with inextricable difficulties. The man of pleaſure and the man of buſineſs ſay, they are in purſuit of happineſs; the ambitious and avaricious augur to themſelves the poſſeſſion of it. The whole complain at laſt, that all the happineſs they have poſſeſſed was in the purſuit, not in the attainment of their objects. One Philoſopher tells them, they will find it in pleaſure, and they are diſappointed; another ſays, in contemplation, and this too is found but a ſhadow; a third, in indifference to pain, and this is diſcovered to be impracticable. At laſt, diſguſted with the purſuit, they complain that it has been a vain one, and decide, that the glare of light indeed was great, but that the object was loſt in the ſplendour which ſurrounded it.

If,

CHAP. IV.

If, in applying the Moral Law to the conſtituents of the good or enjoyment of man, we could diſcover that in his animal œconomy, in his deſires and averſions, in the attainments of his intelligent, and in the purſuits of his active powers, the nature of the pleaſures of each was rendered more intenſe and refined; if, on the contrary, we could diſcover, that when this Law was either overlooked or perverted, the ſources of enjoyment were changed into ſources of ſuffering, Science would authoriſe the following obvious inferences, deſcriptive of the happineſs of human nature.

1. Man is happy in poſſeſſing the powers and faculties of his nature: he is miſerable from the want, or from the neglect of them.

2. Man is happy when he employs the powers and faculties of his nature in the manner which their characters and objects dictate: he is miſerable from the neglect or from perverſion of them.

3. Man is happy when he directs the powers and faculties of his nature to acknowledge, maintain, and improve the rights of mankind: he is miſerable when he employs them to limit, violate, or deſtroy thoſe rights.

SECT. II.

Application of the Moral Law to the Actions of Mankind.

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Action is the natural language of Moral Diſpoſition.

THE hypotheſis of a ſolitary ſituation of man, is contrary to the fact in Nature. The relation of parent and child muſt always have exiſted. The wants of individuals, as well as their natural affections, unite them for common ſafety and happineſs.

The diſpoſitions of mankind ſpring from the mutual relations which they bear to each other. The very terms by which they deſcribe theſe diſpoſitions ſhew, that if they are the ſubjects of praiſe, they mark morality improving the affections; if they are the ſubjects of blame, they indicate the degree in which immorality has perverted them. The terms kind, generous, and beneficent affections, deſcribe the diſpoſitions which conſtitute an amiable character; while the oppoſite terms of cold, ſelfiſh, and malevolent, ſum up the worſt of reputations.

tations. Actions in civil life may be conſidered as the language of diſpoſition; ſo much ſo, that mankind, though they can from conſciouſneſs eſtimate their own feelings or deeds, have no other method of interpreting thoſe of other men.

The application of the Moral Law to Actions is, therefore, as extenſive, as the ſituations of individuals, of citizens, and of nations. The Law of Morality, like the other Laws of Nature, is not limited in its application to one aſpect of man, but is the common meaſure of actions to human nature.

The Law of Morality applies to the Actions of mankind as individuals.

I. The Law of Morality applies to the intercourſe of mankind in domeſtic life. This application may be traced in the terms which deſcribe their particular intercourſe, where no poſitive duty is required, as in civility and politeneſs; or in the terms by which the actions which are required as poſitive duties are demanded, as in integrity and honour.

Civility in the intercourſe of domeſtic life deſcribes the introduction of Morality into manners. The characters of men are ſo various, that different degrees of attention are proper to them. To one man diſtance may be proper; to another, openeſs:

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to one man we may ſhew eſteem; to another, contempt. The Morality of their different characters may render theſe oppoſite expreſſions of our diſpoſitions proper. In ſhewing, however, this diſtance or openeſs, this eſteem or contempt, there is an attention due to the rights of human nature. We ſhew it to a man we love, becauſe we think his title to the improvement of his rights is good; we ſhew it to a man we hate, becauſe however contemptible an object he may be, we wiſh to mark our own feeling of what is right. Hence civility, which in manners indicates an uniform attention to the common rights of our nature, is not bounded by any ſituation in life. The peaſant and the courtier may be equally civil, for both may have diſpoſitions, and Morality requires that the expreſſions of theſe diſpoſitions correſpond with their character.

In the progreſs of refinement the expreſſions of civility are retained and rendered artificial under the name of *politeneſs*; ſometimes they are united with the virtue, at other times they are retained when the ſpirit of the virtue ceaſes to be felt or known. The firſt ſtudy in this Art is to wear off aukwardneſs from the expreſſions of civility; the next is to form an art of theſe

expreſſions. Politeneſs, in its natural meaning, is the improved and elegant expreſſion of civility; in its artificial meaning, this connection is altogether affected, in ſo much that good breeding is not the proof of any diſpoſition with reſpect to the perſon to whom it is ſhewn, but only a proof of education and enlarged commerce with the world given by the perſon who is polite. Men of addreſs, of conſequence, are civil without ſincerity, and polite purely to be thought ſo. They flatter to deceive, and they conſider ſucceſs in deceit as the teſt of talents. Affected ſimplicity ſometimes deceives as effectually as ſtudied politeneſs. A peaſant has often outwitted a courtier. The one thought he could deceive by his pretended attentions, and the other deceived by his affected ignorance.

The Law of Morality, however, applied to theſe expreſſions of manners, refines the one, by ſhewing the baſeneſs of impoſition; and the other, by uniting the graces of manners with ſincerity.

The terms again which mark the application of Morality to domeſtic life in the degree that produces poſitive duties, admit of more preciſe examination.

Integrity in the intercourſe of life ſuppoſes its poſſeſſor to feel the natural obligations

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tions to Morality ſo ſtrong, that no circumſtance can either weaken or remove them. Such a mind ſeems to have reviewed the ſources of Moral Enjoyment, and in every action to be decided by them. The emphatical language of common life deſcribes this character. When it pronounces any man to have integrity, it ſays, that he acts from conſcience. In other words, that he meaſures all his actions by the Moral Law, which allows, maintains, and improves the rights of mankind. If an accidental paſſion ſhall miſlead ſuch a mind, the review of its conduct is accompanied with remorſe and deſpair. It is the dread of ſuch conſequences that "makes cowards of us all," and ſhews, that the application of the Moral Law to the Actions which conſtitute the duties of domeſtic life, not only refines them, but is productive of happineſs.

In actual life, however, poſitive Integrity is unfrequent, though the ſemblance of it is the profeſſion of the knave and the theme of the ſceptic. The language of Integrity is frequently uſed to conceal a dark deſigning ſcheme. Smoothneſs and an unreflecting openeſs are aſſumed, oblique flattery is practiſed, ſignificant expreſſions of truth are copied; theſe are ſo like Nature, that they are believed to be Nature. An open honeſt diſpoſition

ſitiou neither ſuſpects nor diſcovers the arts which are to undo it. The end, however, once obtained, credulity is repaid with contempt, and ſincerity with a violation of rights.

There is a ſomething in temper which, perhaps, better than any rule, diſcovers ſuch a character. A keen, kind, though perhaps iraſcible temper, is unfit for the deceit or the hypocriſy, which the ſemblance of ſincerity muſt wear. It is the cold deliberating diſſembler who cheats and ruins with ſucceſs.

If the application of the Moral Law form the virtue of Integrity, and ſtrongly paint its force as a duty in actions, the violation of it accounts for the deeds which, while they ſtain the virtue, darken the affections of human nature.

Honour, in its connection with Morality, is a refinement on Integrity. A man may be upright when ſtrict Morality ſtamps his actions; but he is honourable when, by ſtudying and diſcerning the characters of mankind, he eſtimates the advantages which with ſimilar talents and feelings to his own they either expect, or would have had a right to claim. Honour therefore is not only a delicate feeling of Morality in ourſelves, but the ſame feeling extended to the expectations which others are entitled to

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to form of our actions. A man who gives his word of honour, pledges all the value which Morality has in the approbation of his mind, and all the value which the confidence of mankind in that Morality has produced. The breach of honour of conſequence induces a double miſery, one ariſing from the mind itſelf, and another from the loſs of rank or place in Society. The expreſſions therefore of this virtue muſt be as preciſe as the virtue itſelf is delicate; and the application of the Moral Law is the only meaſure of determining the purity of either. The diverſified ideas, however, which mankind form of honour, ſhew that this ſtrict reliance on Morality is partial and unfrequent in actual life. When men of buſineſs ſpeak of honour, they mean fidelity in engagements. When men of pleaſure talk of honour, they mean only form and ceremonial. The firſt have Morality in a limited ſenſe; for they reſt their credit on the honeſt diſcharge of their obligations. It is perhaps impoſſible to ſay in what ſenſe the laſt have Morality. The common obligations to juſtice and humanity are among them unknown;—they conſider the claims of a creditor as impertinencies; they view innocence and beauty as lawful ſpoil; and fight to revenge a ſmile

ſmile which their abſurdities had involuntarily drawn from the ſenſe of ridicule. The moſt profound Caſuiſt could not deſcribe the honour of a man of Pleaſure.

Such are the conſequences of the application of the Law of Morality to the Actions which appear in the intercourſe of domeſtic life, when they are conſidered as conſtituents of character, or as poſitive duties.

The Law of Morality applies to the Actions of mankind as citizens.

II. The Law of Morality applies to the Actions of mankind in the ſtate of citizens.

This application of the Law of Morality may be traced in a ſimilar manner with the preceding, either in the terms which expreſs the virtue, or in thoſe which deſcribe the poſitive duties of citizens. The term *Equity* deſcribes the actions of the firſt kind; the term *Juſtice*, thoſe of the ſecond.

1. *Equity* in the actions of citizens with reſpect to each other, ariſes not only from a nice perception of their mutual rights, but from the poſitive application of this perception to their actual ſituations. In Society the ranks of mankind are both naturally and artificially different. Strength and talents form natural diſtinctions, birth and property form artificial diſtinctions. In maintaining either, mankind are ready to conſider

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conſider their ſuperiority to be their right, and on it to build power and a title to command. The order of Nature is thus tranſgreſſed; for though mankind are unequal in talents or in rank, they can never be conſidered as unequal in their rights to life, to liberty, to reputation, and to property. In legiſlation this aſpect of Morality has been ſometimes copied; hiſtory affords few inſtances where it is not in ſome degree infuſed into juriſdiction. In the actual ſtate of citizens, however, it is a common perception when they decide on the actions of others; but though it may be perceived in the actions which regard themſelves, the ſelfiſh paſſions in moſt caſes fetter its operation.

When Equity as a principle of action among citizens is appealed to, they either refer to ſuch maxims as deſcribe it in the inſtitutions by which they are governed, or to the deciſions which the underſtanding, judging impartially, can form from particular caſes.

If the firſt appeal be made, the party who pleads the principle of Equity, endeavours to ſhelter his caſe under thoſe deſcriptions of the virtue which both protect a people and have their common opinion in its favour. Should a proprietor of lands ſeize the utenſils

utenſils of induſtry from his tenant, who had no power to reſiſt him, this laſt would plead the rights which he had in them from Equity. He would admit the power of the invader, but ſhew, that as he lived by his labour, and paid to the other his ſtipulated rent, the violence in itſelf was extravagant, contrary to that common feeling of rights by which Society began, and in direct oppoſition to the principles upon which it either had, or poſſibly could continue. If power can ſweep away the rights of induſtry from the labourer, the tyrant himſelf muſt in the end loſe the means of ſubſiſtence, and the oppreſſor and the oppreſſed be equally wretched.

Should he plead again from common reaſoning on the caſe, it is but reverſing ſituations, and the iniquity of the oppreſſor's conduct becomes glaring. The peaſant might argue, that the caſe, in the revolutions of life, might be ſuppoſed altered, and demand of the other; Whether he would not feel, if oppreſſed, in his turn? Whether, like him, he would not plead the principles in the inſtitutions by which both were governed? Whether, like him, if ſuch appeals were unavailing, he would not have recourſe to Reaſon and to Morality, and argue, that though accidents had made the one

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one powerful and the other a ſlave, Nature had given both the ſame feelings, the ſame ſenſe of right and wrong, and the ſame judgment to perceive the reaſonableneſs of their common ſafety?

Equity thus marks the perceptions of what are the common rights of mankind, and decides, not from what it is bound to perform either by poſitive inſtitutions, or by ſtrict rule, but from what the feelings of men in the ſame circumſtances would pronounce to be proper.

The juriſdictions of moſt free countries admit of pleadings on the principles of Equity; but the Engliſh nation is the diſtinguiſhed people, whoſe freedom is ſo perfect, that, while ſtrict Juſtice marks the ſpirit of their laws, Equity itſelf has its legal voice. The principles upon which the common perceptions of rights depend, as well as the peculiar circumſtances of the parties in litigation, can by the Laws of this country enter into the mind of the Judge, who decides profeſſedly from Equity. This influence of Morality on the actions of individuals has been admired by the Philoſophers, but thought impracticable in actual inſtitutions. In the example now mentioned, it is found the reſource of parties when ſelfiſh paſſions have made one of them deaf to feelings or reaſonings

reaſonings which cool, impartial deliberation and conſcience would have pronounced to be proper.

The Law of Morality, however, in its application to the actions of citizens, extends to their poſitive duties.

Juſtice here appears, not as a virtue only, but as the ſpirit of the duties by which citizens are mutually bound. If the virtue, with which Society begins, is the Acknowledgment of Rights, or Probity; the virtue, by which alone it can continue, is the Maintenance of Rights, or Juſtice.

Juſtice among men living in the ſame Society may be conſidered, either as a virtue which they ought to feel, or a duty to which they may be forced by poſitive ſanctions to ſubmit.

When Juſtice is viewed as a virtue which men ought to feel, then both the natural effect of moral obligation, and the effect of the judgment diſcerning the neceſſity and importance of it in the relative ſituations of mankind, may be appealed to. In the firſt caſe, conſcience muſt decide on an action whether it be juſt or not, and the approbation or diſapprobation of the mind, united with the eſteem and confidence of Society, forms the full obligation. In the ſecond caſe, beſides the force of theſe arbiters of

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our deeds, an appeal may be inſtituted to the reaſon and ſenſe of ſafety which every individual and every community muſt feel. Reaſon muſt diſcover, that if one man can take the life or the food of another, the rights of all are in danger; that ſuch actions are both contrary to the original principle of ſelf-preſervation, and to the perpetual attention to their ſafety which a people are exerting. Such actions, therefore, are ſufficient to rouſe them againſt the aggreſſor, who finds that reparation muſt be made, and that promiſes to abſtain from violence muſt be given and obſerved.

When ſuch reſtraints become ineffectual, Juſtice is found ſo neceſſary, that rights are maintained by force or by poſitive ſanctions. The ſimple precepts, "Thou ſhalt "not kill, or ſteal," are not only enforced by a declaration of their turpitude, but by poſitive ſanctions or puniſhments. In the moſt rude age the adoption of the Moral Law is underſtood, and ſo readily acquieſced in, that the friend or ſon of the murdered is authoriſed to purſue and kill the murderer. If after the diſtinct intereſts of tribes begin to be underſtood, one of them ſhall protect a criminal whom the other has adjudged to death, the revenging of the injury is adopted as a common cauſe, and

and produces a petty war, in which the innocent and the guilty fall promiſcuouſly. CHAP. IV.

When nations become civilized, they conſider that delinquents are as obnoxious to the ſtate to which they fly, as to the laws which they have violated; and whether they are a free people, or ſubjected to monarchy, whether they are friends or enemies, the principle of Juſtice operates ſo ſtrongly, that the criminal is delivered over to puniſhment. Any ſubterfuge which prevents this conduct is reputed diſgraceful, and a ſtain on the honour of the nation who has had recourſe to it.

When moral obligation is ſo weakened, or the reaſon and ſenſe of an individual ſo perverted or debaſed, that he no longer has any reſtraints from his own feelings or the diſapprobation of mankind, then the Moral Law ceaſes to be the principle of conduct, and Juſtice, enjoined by force, binds men to the duties of civil Society.

So dignified are the ideas which Moraliſts entertain of their thus transferring the Law of Morality to become the Law of civil Society, that they diſtinguiſh it by the name of *the Law of Nature*. They point out how Moral Juſtice becomes the ſpirit of

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thoſe inſtitutions by which the rights of citizens are defined and defended. The Law of Morality thus, as a Law of Nature, is extended in its application to the ſituation of individuals living in the ſame ſociety, and becomes the meaſure of the original rights, and of the common objects, in the maintenance of which a people place their ſafety.

Theſe circumſtances mark the limits between the Sciences of particular Ethics, and of particular juriſprudence, and ſhew, that in active life the moſt perfect inſtitutions are but copies of the Law of Nature.

The Law of Morality applies to the actions of mankind as nations.

III. The Law of Morality applies to the actions of mankind in the ſtate of nations.

It is a narrow view of moral Nature to ſuppoſe that its law is not univerſal. The chain of moral phenomena extends from the individual to the moſt general relations of man.

Though we have found that man has the faculty of Will, or the power of beginning and continuing action, its efforts are controuled by the enjoyments or ſufferings which he experiences. The objects on which theſe enjoyments reſt are fixed: he is happy when Probity, Juſtice, and Benevolence

nevolence are the objects of his choice; he is miſerable when actuated by their oppoſites.

When he becomes a member of Society, he diſcovers that the ſources of the beſt enjoyments of his mind are alſo the ſources of his beſt actions as a citizen. If he would enjoy his own rights, he muſt allow them to others. If he would ſeek the means which contribute to his ſafety, he muſt admit this activity as a common right. If he would preſerve his place among mankind, he muſt enforce the Law of Morality in its aſpect of Juſtice, as the meaſure of rights and of crimes.

If we ſuppoſe a review of the actual ſituations of mankind to be made, we diſcover them to be divided into different parties, with ſeparate and oppoſite intereſts. The human race could not originally have compoſed one great family. Their wants, their objects, and their paſſions would form them into independent groups. Fathers of families would become chiefs of tribes. Chiefs of different tribes would ſettle in the ſtate of agriculture, and become the ſovereigns of cantons, or of diſtricts. If one of theſe cantons or diſtricts injure another in the lives of its ſubjects, that other conſiders that a crime has been committed, and muſt be re-

PART III.

venged; if one of them ſeize the goods of another, that a wrong has been done, and muſt be repaired. They thus claim rights as ſtates, as they had done as perſons, and when theſe are violated, they conſider the puniſhment of the violator to be a neceſſary mean of ſelf-defence.

When the ſituations of mankind extend, by the introduction of arts and of commerce, their real rights as nations become more numerous and defined. They have now not only their territory to protect, but the productions of their ſkill and induſtry to introduce among foreigners. If they obtain ſuch outlets for their own productions, they grant ſimilar privileges to other ſtates. The ſenſe of intereſt regulates this intercourſe of arts and induſtry. Nations thus, like individuals, become moral agents, who have their rights and their defences.

The chain of moral phenomena here diſcovers itſelf in its utmoſt extent. It begins in the human mind itſelf; it forms the principle of private action; it becomes the Law of Nature adopted into the municipal inſtitutions of citizens; and it is finally the Law of Nations, differing not in its character, but in the extent of its application. If as the Law of Nature, it has its ſanctions in

reaſon, and in the puniſhments which that reaſon inflicts; as the Law of Nations, it appears in the reaſon of the Public, and in the wars which follow, as the only ſanctions or puniſhments belonging to nations. CHAP. IV.

There appears in this laſt application of the Moral Law very unequal degrees of refinement in the deſcriptions given of it by different nations, and very partial adoptions of it in their practice.

In rude ages national Juſtice is unknown. In civilized ages there appears a liberality which pride ſeems to dictate, rather than a ſenſe of rights to preſcribe. Juſtice, then, in the moſt refined ſituations, is rather the language than the ſpirit of treaties.

If one nation ſhall by force invade, or ſeize on the territories or commerce of another, that other appeals to its own Probity, and complains or remonſtrates againſt the violation of rights. If theſe reaſonings are diſregarded, and the violence continued, while it indulges a juſt reſentment, it makes declarations to impartial nations of the neceſſity of force, and concludes, that the moral turpitude incurred, by bringing the miſeries of war on the innocent, muſt reſt with the firſt aggreſſor.

PART III.

If the Moral Law under the aſpect of Juſtice be the rule of citizens with reſpect to each other, it becomes in a ſimilar manner the rule betwixt independent nations. In the ſtruggles for power and for empire, impartial nations, like ſpectators in common life, admit the equity and propriety of the appeal.

The force of the Law appears not in theory only, but may be deduced from the actual practice of nations. The ſtate which is attacked not only complains, but pleads from common danger, that the wrong ought to be repaired, or the injury puniſhed, by united and common force. The ſtrength of the reaſoning is felt, and nations form alliances to repel ambition and puniſh injuſtice. They copy the manner in which citizens inſtitute rules accompanied with ſanction. Hence the diſpoſitions of nations riſe to notice with the ſame variety of characters as thoſe of individuals; they have probity, and acknowledge each other's rights and independence; they have Juſtice, and perceive the neceſſity of maintaining theſe rights by the ſanction of force or of arms: they ſometimes have Benevolence in its aſpect of generoſity; for they feel for the oppreſſed, and check the ambitious iniquity which threatens to deſtroy them.

The

The Law of Morality thus, in its application to the actions of mankind in the ſtate of nations, diſcovers itſelf to be univerſal in one of the great departments of Nature.

All the applications of the Moral Law, like thoſe of phyſical Laws, contribute to ſhew its ſimplicity and general operations.

If the principles of Phyſics have directed our obſervations of moral Phenomena, they now come forward to illuſtrate this concluding aſpect of Ethics, and to mark, in the moſt extenſive application of it, the obviouſneſs, uniformity, and univerſality of the Laws of Nature.

In Phyſics, the Philoſopher obſerved the pebble to fall from his hand to the earth, which attracted it. The moſt diſtant projection which he could make, of bodies from the earth, exhibited the ſame reſult. The moon, he conjectured, was retained in its orbit by the ſame principle, reſulting from the combination of its centripetal and centrifugal forces. The ſame effects he decided, muſt uniformly attend Phenomena of the ſame kind in whatever remote ſituations they may be placed; and he thus drew the great inference, that gravitation retained the planets in their orbits, and was the moſt general Fact, or Law, in material Nature.

In Ethics, obſervation of Nature has diſcovered, that governments are formed, laws enacted, diſpoſitions valued, and actions admired,

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admired, in proportion as men acknowledge rights, or have Probity; maintain them, or have Juſtice; improve them, or have Benevolence. That theſe Phenomena, like light to the eye, or elaſtic *tremuli* to the ear, addreſs the moral faculty of the mind, and meet its approbation; that deviations or perverſions of them, while they induce ſuffering in the mind itſelf, connect with it the contempt or ſcorn of mankind. The Law of Morality, thus, as it appears in the individual character of man, has its effects or obligations, becomes a principle in the Art of Living, and a doctrine which explains every caſe.

If Phyſics aſcended from the mechanical Arts, in which the Laws of Nature were conſtrained to the diſcovery of the ſame Laws in their free and great aſpects, the Law of Ethics paſſes through a like extenſive range. From its operation on the enjoyments or ſufferings of the mind, it can be traced as productive of the ſafety and happineſs of citizens: by it they meaſured the principle of union with which Society began; by it they meaſure the value of the rules by which it continues. Its award tells what degrees of Probity and of Juſtice ſecure the lives and the properties of individuals

individuals from each other's violence, and what degrees of puniſhment form the true ſanctions of rights. It becomes, in fine, the *Law of their Nature.*

Nations carry forward the ſame chain of Phenomena, and by it meaſure the relations which they reciprocally hold. They plead it as the principle of their actions; they appeal to it when they ſeek redreſs, or take vengeance for injuries; they grant terms to the vanquiſhed by pretenſions to its ſpirit, and receive ſubmiſſions in its language.

It takes different names in its different ſtages. With the individual, it is the *Moral Law;* with the citizen, it is the *Law of Nature;* with the nation, it is the *Law of Nations.* Theſe names have made Philoſophers in theory imagine, that different Laws operate in Moral Nature: but the vortices of Des Cartes do not form any objection to the ſimple Laws of Motion and of Gravitation. The inadequate views of Morality in juriſdiction change as little the ſimplicity of the Law of Morality, as the contradictory dreams of Viſionaries and Sceptics do its principle. The Phenomena are obvious which lead to the Moral Law, its application to the actions of mankind alters not, but elucidates its

PART. III.

its character; and discovers that, like gravitation in Physics, the acknowledgment, maintenance, and improvement of Rights, constitute the happiness of individuals, the safety of citizens, and the real glory of nations.

APPENDIX,

N° I.

THE hiſtory of the Moral Law forms but the elementary article in the comprehenſive Science of Ethics. It would open to the mind an extenſive view of Nature, if we could trace it as it becomes the ſpirit of the Laws of Nature and of Nations, and mark the degrees of it that enter into the inſtitutions which Hiſtory, or the preſent aſpects of Society, afford. The Law of Morality might, in this way, be obſerved in its creation of the Sciences of Juriſprudence and of Politics. APPEND. I.

A ſketch of ſuch a work is here ſubmitted to the Public, ſolely to mark out how Nature might be purſued through all the variety of Moral Phenomena. The execution of ſuch a plan, however, would, in this moment, be a preſumptuous and dangerous effort; and could only in ſome future period ariſe from an approbation of the preſent attempt, which its Author ſcarcely preſumes to hope that it deſerves.

APPEND. I.

PART I.

SCIENCE OF PARTICULAR JURISPRUDENCE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Science of particular Juriſprudence treats of the operations of the Law of Morality, when, in the aſpect of Juſtice accompanied with poſitive ſanctions, it defines and defends the rights of citizens.

The Laws of this Science, from their importance to the ſafety and improvement of civil Society, have been termed the *Laws of Nature*.

The ſubjects of the Science offer a ſimple diviſion of it;

1. Of Juſtice and the nature of Rights.
2. Of the Rights of Citizens.
3. Of the Defences of Citizens.

CHAP.

APPEND. I.

CHAP. I.

Of Juſtice and of Rights.

SECT. I.

Nature of Juſtice.

Juſtice ſignifies the application of the Moral Law accompanied with poſitive ſanctions, as the rule of action in civil Society.

Deſcriptions of Juſtice:

—In the Syſtems of Juriſprudence.

—In municipal Laws.

SECT. II.

Nature of Rights.

The gifts of Nature, which are neceſſary to the ſafety, enjoyments, and improvement of one man, without injury to the ſame claims in other men, conſtitute a Right.

The Moral Law, conſidered as the Law of Nature, is the fixed and invariable meaſure of Rights and of Wrongs.

Deſcriptions of Rights:—

—In the ſyſtems of Juriſprudence.

—In municipal Laws.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Rights of Citizens.

SECT. I.

Of the Rights of Perſon.

The Rights of Citizens divide themſelves into thoſe of Perſon and of Property.

The Rights of Perſon are—

—The Right to Life.

—The Right to Liberty.

—The Right to Reputation.

Comparative view of the manner in which theſe Rights are defined by the Law of Nature, and in municipal inſtitutions. Examination of the principal ſubjects in which the application of the Law of Nature exhibits its real characters, *viz.*—

—The relation of a maſter to ſervants, to artificers, and to ſlaves.

—The relation of parents and children.

—The relation of guardian and ward.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Rights of Property.

The Right of Property begins with the objects which are neceſſary for aliment, clothing, and defence.

Hiſtory of the progreſs of Property :—

—In the ſavage ſtate.

—In the ſtate of paſturage.

—In the ſtate of agriculture.

—In the ſtate of arts and commerce.

The Rights of Property are aſcertained by the Law of Nature, and approaches to it unequally appear in municipal Laws :—

—By poſſeſſion of a moveable or immoveable ſubject.

—By induſtry and ſkill, in improving theſe ſubjects *.

—By contracts reſpecting them, prior and poſterior to the introduction of arts and commerce.

The Right of Property may be transferred by the Law of Nature, and approaches to this Law unequally appear in municipal Inſtitutions :—

—By pledges.

* Does Literary Property give a real right from ſkill and induſtry?

APPEND. I.

—By inheritances.
—By contracts.
—By ſervitudes.
—By forfeitures.
—By preſcription.

CHAP. III.

Of the Defences of Citizens.

SECT. I.

Of the Defences of perſonal Rights.

The means which the Law of Morality in its aſpect of the Law of Nature preſcribe to a citizen, or to a ſtate, for preſerving its rights, conſtitute Defences.

Injuries to perſonal Rights, by the very nature of ſuch Rights, conſtitute crimes.

Defences prior to the eſtabliſhment of poſitive law, ſeem to be:—

—Appeals to the Reaſon and Morality of the invader.
—Art and addreſs.
—Force *.

Defences, poſterior to the eſtabliſhment of poſitive law, ſeem to be:—

* Is Duelling agreeable to the Law of Nature?

—The

—The forms of juriſdiction.

—Puniſhments, in all their variety and proportions.

When crimes are committed, the Law of Nature dictates the evidence which eſtabliſhes guilt, or reſcues innocence.

The executive power is defined by the Law of Nature, but varies in its aſpects as municipal inſtitutions approach to, or recede from this ſtandard.

SECT. II.

Of the Defences of real Rights.

Invaſions of real Rights, by the very nature of ſuch Rights, conſtitute a damage or a wrong.

The Defences of real Rights prior to the eſtabliſhment of poſitive law, are the ſame with thoſe of perſonal Rights.

The Defences of real Rights poſterior to the eſtabliſhment of poſitive law, are:—

—The forms of juriſdiction.

—Reparations proportioned to the damages or wrongs ſuſtained.

Though the Law of Nature preſcribes the ſpecies of evidence which eſtabliſhes or vindicates from the commiſſion of a wrong, municipal inſtitutions copy it in very various and unequal degrees.

APPEND. I.

The executive power is perfect by the Law of Nature, but in actual eſtabliſhments its application is partial, and frequently unjuſt.

PART II.

SCIENCE OF GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Science of general Juriſprudence treats of the Law of Morality in its application to the Rights and Defences of Nations.

This Science is not different from the preceding one in its principles, but in the ſubjects to which theſe principles are applicable.

Its Laws take the name of the Laws of Nations, but are only the Moral Law and that of Nature extended in their application to Societies of different deſcriptions.

The ſubjects of this Science admit of a ſimple diviſion:

1. National Juſtice.
2. National Rights.
3. National Defences.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of national Juſtice.

SECT. I.

Of national Juſtice.

Juſtice in the Law of Nations ſignifies the adoption of the Moral Law and Law of Nature as the rule of action to nations.

In actual hiſtory the approaches of nations to this ſtandard have been leſs frequent than in municipal inſtitutions.

SECT. II.

Of the perſonal Rights of Nations.

The Rights of any nation ſignify the means which are neceſſary to independence, ſafety, and improvement, without injury to the ſame claims in other nations.

The perſonal Rights of Nations refer to their internal adminiſtration, and to their external connections with other nations.

The internal perſonal Rights of Nations are:—

APPEND. I.

—Legiſlative Rights.
—Judicative Rights.
—Executive Rights.

The external perſonal Rights of Nations are:—

—The Rights of war.
—The Rights of peace.

SECT. III.

Of the real Rights of Nations.

The real Rights of Nations, or their Rights of property, regard their landed or commercial intereſts.

They are acquired by ſimilar methods, and deſcribed, almoſt, by the ſame names with the real Rights of Citizens.

—By original poſſeſſion, or by conqueſt.
—By induſtry and ſkill in arts and trade.

They are transferred—

—By pledges.
—By inheritances.
—By leagues or treaties.
—By ſervitudes.
—By forfeitures.
—By preſcription.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Defences of Nations.

SECT. I.

Of the Laws of Peace.

The Laws of Peace regard—
—The means of defence dictated by the juſtice of Nations.
—The faith of Nations, either underſtood, or expreſſed in treaties.

SECT. II.

Of the Laws of War.

The Laws of War regard—
—The cauſes of war admitted by the juſtice of Nations.
—The actions of the belligerent powers.
—The principles on which hoſtilities ceaſe, and the obligations which ariſe from treaties of peace.

PART III.

SCIENCE OF POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION.

POLITICS, as a Science, explain the ſucceſſive aſpects of the rights of mankind in the origin, and during the progreſs of civil Society.

The ſubjects of this Science divide themſelves into four branches:—

1. Government.
2. Public Oeconomy.
3. Public Adminiſtration.
4. Public Happineſs.

CHAP. I.

Of Government.

SECT. I.

Origin and Foundations of Government.

The origin of Government may be traced—

In

—In the diſpoſitions, faculties, and objects of the human mind.

—In the progreſſive circumſtances which lead to actual eſtabliſhments.

SECT. II.

Progreſs of Government.

Government exhibits ſtriking aſpects in the ſucceſſive periods of civil Society from rudeneſs to refinement:

—Government in ſavage ages.
—in barbarous ages.
—in poliſhing ages.
—in poliſhed ages.
—in corrupted ages.

Speculative forms of Government withdraw the attention from Nature and from hiſtory.

The inſtitutions which have appeared, or at preſent exiſt, can only illuſtrate the real character of ſubordinations at any one period.

CHAP.

APPEND. I.

CHAP. II.

Of public Oeconomy.

SECT. I.

Nature of public Oeconomy.

Public Oeconomy treats of the means by which Government is ſupported in the ſucceſſive periods of its civilization.

SECT. II.

Branches of public Oeconomy.

The branches of public Oeconomy are, People, Police, Riches, Revenue.

1. Oeconomy has to conſider *People* in the aſpects of—

—Their numbers.

—Their purſuits.

—Their value in the ſucceſſive periods of Society.

2. It has to conſider *Police*, or the internal order of ſubordination, in the articles of—

—The forms of religion.

—Manners.

—Health.

—Health.
—Maintenance of the poor.

APPEND. I.

3. It has to conſider *Riches* in its branches of—

—Territory.
—Arts and manufactures.
—Commerce.

4. It has to conſider *Revenue*, or the value which a people can employ for their public expences, in its branches of—

—Spoils taken from enemies.
—Demeſnes.
—Taxes, by—
—Capitation.
—Aſſeſſments.
—Cuſtoms.
—Exciſe.

CHAP. III.

Of public Adminiſtration.

SECT. I.

Nature of public Adminiſtration.

Public Adminiſtration ſignifies the application of the laws of a ſtate, with the view of

APPEND. I

of preſerving its independence and the rights of its ſubjects.

SECT. II.

Progreſs of Adminiſtration.

The management of a ſtate with a view either to its ſafety or to the rights of its members muſt vary with circumſtances.

Aſpects of Adminiſtration—

—In rude governments.
—In poliſhing governments.
—In poliſhed governments.
—In corrupted governments.

CHAP. IV.

Of public Happineſs.

SECT. I.

Conſtituents of public Happineſs.

The Happineſs of a people depends on the Morality of their character, and on the general utility of their government.

SECT.

APPEND. I.

SECT. II.

Progreſſive Aſpects of public Happineſs.

The progreſſive aſpects of public Happineſs may be eſtimated—

—By the manner in which the offices of Society are diſtributed.

—By the encouragement of the virtues which tend to preſerve the rights of citizens and of nations.

APPENDIX.

N° II.

APPEND. II.

IN the Firſt Appendix, the Progreſs of Science, in an extenſive application of the Moral Law, is ſketched out; in this, the ſubjects which have, from their nature, or from the manner in which they have been applied, an influence on the operations of the Moral Law, are drawn into view. Their natural influence can thus be compared with their actual appearances in the hiſtory of mankind.

Natural Religion forms a diſtinct Science, which has an obvious influence on Ethics, but has been often corrupted by ſuperſtition.

Caſuiſtry is an Art without Science, which accidents and the perverſion of reaſoning have created, and ſucceſsfully introduced to corrupt all the branches of Ethics.

PART

PART I.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

Natural Theology, as a Science, treats of the relations which the obſervation of Phenomena diſcover to ſubſiſt between the Supreme Being and mankind.

Phenomena in this Science lead to—

—The diſcovery of the exiſtence and attributes of the Deity.

—The diſcovery of the duties which mankind owe the Deity.

—The diſcovery of the nature and proſpects of the human ſoul.

CHAP. I.

Of the Exiſtence and Attributes of the Deity.

SECT. I.

Of the Exiſtence of the Deity.

The human mind poſſeſſes faculties which enable it to infer the exiſtence of a firſt cauſe in Nature.

APPEND. II.

This inference is the reſult of all the obſervations and reaſonings which Science can inſtitute either in the phyſical or moral departments of Nature.

Partial obſervations and reaſonings on theſe effects and cauſes diſcover the ſources of ſuperſtition and mythology.

SECT. II.

Of the Attributes of the Deity.

The phyſical Attributes of the Deity are—
—Power.
—Unity.
—Intelligence.

The moral Attributes of the Deity are—
—Goodneſs.
—Juſtice.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Duties of Mankind to the Deity.

SECT. I.

Their Sources.

The Duties of an intelligent and moral agent have their ſources in the inferences, which his underſtanding neceſſarily makes, from each of the Attributes of the Supreme Being.

SECT. II.

Their Claſſes.

Duties ariſe from each of the phyſical Attributes, of Power, Unity, and Intelligence.

Duties ariſe in the ſame manner from each of the moral Attributes, of Goodneſs and Juſtice.

CHAP. III.

Of the Human Soul.

SECT. I.

Of the Nature of the Soul.

From its intelligent and moral qualities, the immateriality of the Human Soul has been inferred.

From theſe, united with the moral Attributes of the Deity, its immortality has been inferred.

SECT. II.

Of the future Proſpects of the Soul.

Scientific inferences reſpecting the intelligent and moral qualities of the Soul, aſſociated with ſimilar inferences reſpecting the moral Attributes of the Deity, give general eſtimates of future rewards and puniſhments, or of the future proſpects of the Human Soul.

PART II.

OF CASUISTRY.

Caſuiſtry is an Art without Science, which in different forms has attempted to ſubſtitute principles of conduct in the place of thoſe principles which the Moral Law dictates.

It has, in general, been limited to Morals ſtrictly ſo called; but in the hiſtory of mankind it may be obſerved in its influence on every branch of Ethics.

It took its regular form, as an Art—

—Among the ſchool Eccleſiaſtics.

—Among the Civilians.

—Among the abſtract Metaphyſicians.

When Caſuiſtry is obſerved in its operations on the Moral Law ſimply, it ſubſtitutes, in the place of Moral Obligations and Principles, eſtimates of Merit and Demerit, ariſing from prejudices and from habits.

When Caſuiſtry is obſerved in its operations on the Laws of Nature, it ſubſtitutes the ſituations and artificial duties of citizens, in place of the principles of Juſtice, and the maintenance of Rights.

When

APPEND. II.

When Caſuiſtry is obſerved in its operations on the Law of Nations, it ſubſtitutes forms and intereſted views, in place of the extenſive applications of Juſtice to the Rights and Defences of Nations.

When Caſuiſtry is obſerved in its operations in Politics, it ſubſtitutes the ſchemes of artful and corrupted ſtateſmen in the place of the ſafety and independence which the preſervation of the Rights and Eſtabliſhments of Nations requires.

The influence of Natural Religion on all the branches of Ethics has introduced a Caſuiſtry into this ſubject, which ſubſtitutes forms and ſervices in the place of rational and moral duties.

THE END.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM